Plaintiff in error was convicted and sentenced uppn an indictment charging him, among other things, with having purchased from “persons unknown, in the city of Chicago, a quantity of cocaine hydrochloride,” in violation of the so-called Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act. Comp. St. §§ 6287g-6287q. Support for the conviction rests entirely upon the presumption which arose from De Moss’ possession of such narcotics.
Section 1 of the act reads: “It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase, * * * any of the aforesaid drugs except in the original stamped package or from the original stamped package; and the absence of appropriate tax-paid stamps from any of the aforesaid drugs shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this section by the person in whose possession same may be found.”
Counsel for plaintiff in error contends that the government failed to prove the venue; that the presumption referred to in the foregoing section does not extend to the place of purchase. The precise question has been considered and very fully treated in Bright-man v. United States (C. C. A.) 7 F.(2d) 532, and with the ultimate conclusion there reached we agree.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.