[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 27, 2009
No. 08-16533 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-01093-CV-W-N
EDDIE J. HAYNES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CITY OF MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(August 27, 2009)
Before CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and DOWD,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
*
Honorable David D. Dowd Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio,
sitting by designation.
The main question presented by this appeal is whether there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to find that the City of Montgomery violated the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. After he was placed on
involuntary leave and then terminated by the City from his position of firefighter,
Eddie J. Haynes filed a complaint that the City had violated the Disability Act. At
trial, the jury found for Haynes and awarded him $90,000 for back pay and
$270,000 for emotional pain and mental anguish. The district court denied the
motions of the City for a new trial or remittitur and for judgment as a matter of
law.
The City argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find that
the City regarded Haynes as disabled and to find that Haynes’s perceived disability
motivated the City to terminate Haynes’s employment, but we disagree. Sufficient
evidence established that the City perceived Haynes as substantially limited from
performing a broad range of jobs, including that of firefighter, because of his
prescription medication. The notes and testimony of the doctor hired by the City to
perform evaluations of firefighters established that the doctor would not have
cleared Haynes to work in any safety-sensitive position or drive a vehicle of any
kind, including a fire truck. Sufficient evidence also established that perception
prompted the City to terminate Haynes’s employment, not the desire of the City to
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ensure the safety of Haynes, other firefighters, and the public. The City relied on
the doctor’s evaluation of Haynes in deciding not to return Haynes to duty, and the
doctor admitted that other firefighters who were taking similar medication were not
terminated or placed on leave. Because Haynes’s regarded as disabled claim was
an independent basis for the jury’s verdict, we need not address the argument of
the City that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find against the City on
its business necessity defense to Haynes’s claim about qualifications standards.
The City also argues that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
because Haynes failed to mitigate his damages, but the City waived this argument
when it failed to raise it in its motion for a judgment as a matter of law. Even if the
argument were not waived, the jury was instructed about Haynes’s duty to
mitigate, and the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find in favor of Haynes.
The City also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied remittitur or a new trial because the jury award was excessive, it was
prejudiced by Haynes’s closing argument, and the jury instructions were
erroneous. We disagree. First, neither the award of $90,000 for back pay nor
$270,000 for emotional pain and mental anguish was “so large as to shock the
conscience.” Sykes v. McDowell, 786 F.2d 1098, 1105 (11th Cir. 1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Second, Haynes’s closing argument was based on a
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reasonable inference from the record, and the City has not established that the
argument, even if improper, was prejudicial. Third, the City argues that three
modifications to the pattern jury instructions misled the jury, but none of the
modifications failed to reflect accurately the law “in such a way that we are left
with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly
guided in its deliberations.” Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d
1189, 1196 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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