[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 24, 2009
No. 09-12271 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 09-60289-CV-JIC
JAQUELINE RIGAUD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BROWARD GENERAL MEDICAL CENTER and
NORTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 24, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jacqueline Rigaud, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of her lawsuit. She commenced the action by filing a self-styled pro se
“notice of . . . removal,” accompanied by a number of documents and state court
records. In dismissing her case, the district court liberally construed her filings as
an independent action, in part.
According to Rigaud’s brief on appeal, the notice of removal and the
attached documents and state court records, Rigaud apparently suffered an injury
during the course of her employment and sought workers’ compensation benefits.
Either before or during the workers’ compensation proceeding (Rigaud I), a
settlement was reached which resulted in dismissal of her claim. Rigaud later
sought to reinstate or reopen her claim for benefits, but an administrative law judge
dismissed that effort for lack of jurisdiction because her worker’s compensation
claim had already been settled. Rigaud’s initial efforts to overturn this in state
court were unsuccessful, and ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court denied relief,
struck one of Rigaud’s submissions as unauthorized, explained that her case was
final, and warned her that it would not respond to any further pleadings. See
Rigaud v. Broward General Medical Center, 1 So.3d 173 (Fla. 2008)(table).
Rigaud responded by filing the present “notice of . . . removal” in the district
court.
2
In her “notice of . . . removal,” Rigaud argued that, when state court judges
summarily denied relief in Rigaud I, they violated her rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the “notice”
or action sua sponte after finding that: (a) there was no viable cause of action
giving rise to federal question jurisdiction because the Florida judges were entitled
to absolute judicial immunity while acting in their judicial capacity; and (b) there
was no viable claim supporting removal, because: (i) Rigaud, as a plaintiff, could
not remove her own action; and (ii) there was no longer an active state court action
to be removed. Additionally, the district court found that, to the extent Rigaud was
attempting to appeal one or more adverse state court rulings, she could not do so
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 The district court was required to dismiss
Rigaud’s action for each of these reasons. We therefore affirm its judgment.
AFFIRMED.
1
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82, 103 S.Ct.
1303, 1311-15, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44
S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923).
3