[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 4, 2009
No. 09-11001 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
Agency No. A099-551-195
MARIA VICTORIA MELO-RUEDA,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(September 4, 2009)
Before BIRCH, CARNES, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Maria Victoria Melo Rueda,1 a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming the Immigration
Judge’s order denying her application for asylum and withholding of removal
under the INA and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), INA §§
208, 241; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231; 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c).
I.
The basis of Melo Rueda’s claim traces back to when the Columbian
government offered a substantial bounty for any information leading to that capture
of FARC leader named Gustavo Rueda Diaz. Melo Rueda’s alleges that, in an
unfortunate coincidence, her uncle is also named Gustavo Rueda Diaz. She argues
that she is eligible for asylum because she has been harassed and attacked by
people seeking information about her uncle under the mistaken belief that he is the
FARC leader. The IJ found that Melo Rueda’s testimony was not credible and
rejected her claims for relief. The BIA agreed.
II.
We review the BIA’s decision, except to the extent that it expressly adopts
the IJ’s opinion. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001).
1
In the court docket, the petitioner’s name is hyphenated (“Melo-Rueda”), although in
her asylum application it is not. We will defer to the spelling petitioner used in her asylum
application and use the unhyphenated spelling in this opinion.
2
Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s reasoning on the adverse credibility finding, we
review the IJ’s decision as if it were the BIA’s. See Chen v. United States Att’y
Gen., 463 F.3d 1228, 1230 (11th Cir. 2006). We review the agency’s factual
determinations under the “highly deferential” substantial evidence test. Forgue v.
United States Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2005). Under that test,
we must affirm the IJ’s decision “if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Ruiz v. United States
Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 2006). We will reverse only when
the record compels us to, and “the mere fact that the record may support a contrary
conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of the administrative findings.” Id. at
1255 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A credibility determination is a factual finding reviewed under the
substantial evidence test. Id. The IJ must provide “specific, cogent reasons” to
support an adverse credibility determination. Ruiz v. United States Att’y Gen., 440
F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006). Additionally, when an applicant submits
evidence in addition to his or her testimony, the IJ may not rely solely on an
adverse credibility determination to deny relief. See id. “The weaker the
applicant’s testimony, however, the greater the need for corroborative evidence.”
Yang v. United States Att’y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir. 2005).
Melo Rueda makes two arguments challenging the IJ’s adverse credibility
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determination. First, she argues that the IJ did not make an explicit finding that she
was not credible. See id. (holding that the IJ must make “clean determinations of
credibility) (internal quotation marks omitted). That argument fails. In the IJ’s
oral decision, it stated that “the Court finds that the respondent’s testimony was not
credible.” That is a clean and explicit adverse credibility determination.
Second, Melo Rueda argues that the IJ’s decision was not supported by
specific, cogent reasons. That argument also fails. “Once an adverse credibility
finding is made, the burden is on the applicant alien to show that the IJ’s credibility
decision was not supported by ‘specific, cogent reasons’ or was not based on
substantial evidence.” Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1255. Melo Rueda has not done that.
The IJ’s opinion identified numerous inconsistencies between Melo Rueda’s
testimony and the documents contained in her application for asylum. Those
inconsistencies included that 1) a medical document contradicted Melo Rueda’s
sworn testimony that she never had problems with her hand prior to an alleged
abduction on July 12, 2002; 2) she had failed to introduce any medical evidence to
support her testimony that she was injured on July 12, 2002; 3) a letter from Melo
Rueda’s employer stated her problems arose in 2004 or 2005, not in 2002 as she
had testified. Those are specific cogent reasons that support the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination.
The record shows that the IJ considered all of the evidence submitted by
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Melo Rueda. Some of it the IJ found incredible. Some of it, such as the letter from
her employer, contradicted her claim instead of supporting it. Given the IJ’s
adverse credibility finding, substantial evidence supports the denial of Melo
Rueda’s application for asylum.
Additionally, because Melo Rueda “has failed to establish a claim of asylum
on the merits, [s]he necessarily fails to establish eligibility for withholding of
removal or protection under CAT.” Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1288 n.4.
PETITION DENIED.
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