(concurring).
While concurring, I would have preferred that the question of union implementation of “hot cargo” clauses be critically reexamined, as the decisions of this Court in Rabouin v. N. L. R. B., 2 Cir., 1952, 195 F.2d 906, and in Milk Drivers & Dairy Emp., etc. v. N. L. R. B., 2 Cir., 1957, 245 F.2d 817, seem to me to be contrary to both plain statutory language and the intent of the Congress. See N. L. R. B. v. Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 9 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 147; Alpert v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, D.C.Mass.1956, 143 F.Supp. 371; Douds v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local No. 680, D.C.N.J.1955, 133 F.Supp. 336; and Judge Levet’s first opinion of June 13, 1957 in the cause now before this Court, 154 F.Supp. 222. See also N. L. R. B* v. Local 11, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 6 Cir., 1957, 242 F.2d 932. Contra: General Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No. 886 v. N. L. R. B., D.C.Cir., *5391957, 247 F.2d 71. If Congress intended to protect the public and, in the case of § 8(b) (4) (B) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, primary employers, from the effect of secondary boycotts, and I believe it did so intend, other parties cannot insulate themselves by contract from such statutory prohibitions.