The foreman of a gang of stevedores was injured when there was a rupture of a block on machinery attached to a grain elevator, but partially lowered into the hold of a deactivated vessel owned by the United States. Under the Suits in Admiralty Act1 he filed a libel against the United States. This action resulted in the usual petition to implead the granary, with which the United States had contracted for the unloading of the vessel, and a further petition by the granary to implead the stevedore, the employer of the injured man, with which it had contracted for the incidental stevedoring work. The District Court dismissed the libel after finding that the United States was not negligent and had not warranted *415that the machinery of the granary was “seaworthy.”
The principal question is whether the owner of a deactivated vessel warrants to a stevedore employed by a granary the condition of the granary’s unloading machinery. We agree with the District Court that it does not.
The Harry Lane, a Liberty ship owned by the United States, was deactivated in 1945. Her supplies, stores, and nautical instruments were removed. Her boilers, engines and pipes were drained, flushed with preservatives or filled with grease. The tail shaft and propeller were locked and the rudder fixed amidship. Her cargo gear and tackle were stripped, her winches drained and the packing removed from the pistons. Her Coast Guard Certificate of Inspection was lifted and the biannual Coast Guard inspection suspended. She was then relegated to the James River Reserve Fleet, a “moth ball fleet.” She could not be operated again as a commercial vessel without a major overhaul and relicensing and re-certification.
There she remained until the price support program for wheat resulted in such surpluses that the storage facilities for grains were taxed. She, with a number of other “moth-balled” vessels, was then pressed into service as a floating warehouse. She was modified to provide additional ventilation to her holds to protect the grain which was expected to be stored there for a long period.
In June 1954, the Harry Lane was towed to the Norfolk & Western grain elevator at Norfolk, loaded with surplus grain and returned to the Reserve Fleet. She remained there until September 1956, when she was again towed to the Norfolk & Western grain elevator for the purpose of discharging the grain she had taken on more than two years earlier.
This use of the vessel was under a general storage agreement between Continental Grain Company, the lessee of the Norfolk & Western grain elevator, and Commodity Credit Corporation supplemented by specific agreements for the utilization of the storage space in deactivated vessels of the Reserve Fleet. Continental, in turn, had a contract with Atlantic and Gulf Grain Stevedoring Associates pursuant to which Atlantic and Gulf supplied the necessary stevedoring services.
Norfolk & Western’s elevator was equipped with a “Marine leg,” a device for unloading grains. It is a large piece of equipment, permanently affixed to the elevator and to the dock. It is incapable of lateral movement, but, when a ship is properly placed beneath it, the mouth of the leg may be lowered into the hold until it is in contact with the grain. The marine leg is, basically, a housing containing a system of endless-belt, grain-carrying conveyors. These conveyers elevate the grain through the leg and carry it horizontally into the elevator.
When the grain has been removed to the point that the mouth of the leg is on the bottom of the hold and the elevation of the grain in the corners and remote areas of the hold has been so reduced that the grain no longer flows to the leg, it is necessary to bring such remaining grain to the leg and its elevating machinery. For this purpose, the leg is equipped with four plows or grain shovels. Each of these plows is connected, through a bridle, to a line which runs through a block attached to a pad eye at one of the corners of the leg, near the mouth, and thence, through other blocks to one of several small drum winches, high in the leg but controlled by the longshoremen in the hold by means of a clutch line.
The procedure is for a longshoreman to walk the plow away from the leg and place it in any desired location. When the plow has been placed, the drum winch is engaged through the clutch line. As the drum takes up the plowline, it draws the plow, and the grain in front of it, back to the leg.
On the day of his injury, Roper was supervising a crew of stevedores operating the grain plows. He undertook to demonstrate to one of them a more effi*416cient use of the plow. During the course of this demonstration, after the drum winch had been engaged and while the plowline was in tension, a strap holding the plowline block near the mouth of the leg broke, and the block flew into Roper’s face.
Subsequent examination of the block disclosed the fact that its bushing had become worn, allowing the sheave to wobble and to contact the strap. The turnings of the sheave cut into the strap until the strap failed.
The block was unsafe for use, but the defect was not apparent upon a visual inspection of the assembled block. Indeed, Roper testified that one of his duties was to inspect the marine leg and its equipment prior to each use of it and that he had inspected it on the day that he was injured. The defect would have been apparent if the block had been disassembled. The disassembly of one block would not have been a complicated operation nor of long duration. If there was a duty to disassemble this block for inspection purposes, however, the duty would require the disassembly and minute inspection of all of the blocks, tackle and equipment used in association with the marine leg, perhaps the conveying machinery of the leg itself.
Under these circumstances, we think there is ample support for the finding that there was no showing of negligence on the part of the United States. It had engaged the expert operator of the machinery to do the work and it, in turn, had engaged the expert stevedores, who regularly worked with the machine, to perform the stevedoring service. The duty of care by the owner of a live ship to make her safe for the work to be done would hardly require it to make such a minute inspection of shore-based machinery not in its control as would have been required to disclose the defect here. When the United States engaged competent people to do the work in which they were specialists, it was not required to verify for itself the effectiveness of the expert’s maintenance of his specialized equipment.
The more important question is whether the United States, as owner of this deactivated vessel, warranted to the stevedore the soundness of the marine leg and its appliances. The District Court did not consider whether the usual warranty of seaworthiness would encompass this sort of shore-based, shore-attached equipment,2 for it held there was no warranty of seaworthiness. Since we agree, we also confine ourselves to the holding that there was here no warranty of the seaworthiness of any unloading equipment.
It is now settled that a deactivated vessel in one of the “moth ball” fleets is, for these purposes, dead and withdrawn from navigation, so that there is no warranty of her seaworthiness.3 Generally, the warranty of seaworthiness would not arise again until the vessel had been put through a major overhaul and she and her appliances and rigging had been reconditioned, restored and re-certified.
In West, as here, the vessel was a deactivated Liberty ship which had been in the moth ball fleet at Norfolk. She was towed from Norfolk to Philadelphia and there delivered to a ship yard for the purpose of being reconditioned and reactivated. She had aboard several men who became her principal officers when she was recommissioned, but, though in the general employ of the owner, they had not signed on the vessel when, during the course of the reconditioning work, West was injured. These men had the right to inspect the work on behalf of the United States, but no right to control or supervise it. So here, the riding master had no authority to control or supervise the *417unloading operation, for his duties were limited to protection of the vessel from such hazards as fire and pilferage.4
In deciding that there was no warranty of seaworthiness, the Supreme Court in West assumed that the injured man may have been doing seamen’s work. It held there was no warranty to anyone, whatever the nature of the particular work he was doing, because the vessel affirmatively represented that she was not sound or fit for sea and the work was controlled by the shipyard. Here the ship affirmatively represented that her unloading equipment was not sound or fit for use and the work being done was controlled by the elevator, not by the ship or her owner.
Roper seeks to avoid the thrust of West by contending that the Harry Lane was returned to navigation when she was placed in service as a floating warehouse and moved from the Reserve Fleet to the grain elevator. He argues that she was actually “carrying” cargo, that the movement was in furtherance of a commercial transaction and that she should be treated as if she had been reactivated and returned to service.
Of course, the United States was under a duty to exercise care to see that such things as the vessel’s hatch covers and ladders, with which the stevedores must necessarily work, were reasonably safe for use. Should we ignore the fact that the vessel had no crew and carry Roper’s contentions to their extremities, we could, at most, find a warranty that the ship, itself, her hatch covers and ladders were safe for their intended use.5 No such limited use could give rise to a warranty of seaworthiness of unloading equipment, all of which was still in “moth balls” or completely removed.
Petterson v. Alaska Steamship Co.6 and Rogers v. United States Lines 7 extended a live ship’s warranty of her unloading equipment and gear to similar appliances brought aboard by the stevedore and used with the actual or implied permission of the ship. In such situations it is appropriate that the protection of the warranty not depend upon technicalities of title. Those cases in no way suggest, however, that a dead vessel which does not warrant its own equipment, and no one supposed it did, nevertheless warrants the machinery of a granary simply because it is used to unload the vessel. It is not the fact that an unloading operation is being performed which gives rise to the warranty, but the fact that the vessel in service ordinarily represents she is sound and complete in her gear and equipment. There was no such representation here, for the vessel clearly represented itself as being entirely without operable equipment and usable gear. The ship which has no equipment or gear to warrant, does not warrant to others the soundness of machinery they may bring aboard.
We conclude that the owner of this dead vessel did not warrant to Roper the soundness of the granary’s machinery.
Affirmed.
. 46 U.S.C.A. § 741 et seq.
. See United New York and New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Association v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613, 79 S.Ct. 517, 3 L.Ed.2d 541. McKnight v. N. M. Paterson & Sons, Limited, D.C.N.D.Ohio, 181 F.Supp. 434.
. West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118, 80 S.Ct. 189, 4 L.Ed.2d 161; see also Latus v. United States, 2 Cir., 277 F.2d 264, 265 (decided April 11, 1960); Kissinger v. United States, D.C.E.D.N.Y., 176 F. Supp. 828.
. To accomplish the movement of the vessel from the Reserve Fleet to the elevator, the custodial agent sent aboard a riding master and six seamen, but the seamen did not sign on the vessel. They took -with them six mooring lines, a heaving line, fire hose, a boarding ladder, safety lamps, a sounding rod, a lead line and several electric light clusters. The seamen handled the mooring lines at the Reserve Fleet anchorage and at the elevator, but were then dismissed. The riding master remained employed to see that the ship was properly moored and kept clean, that the seals on her storerooms were not broken and that fire hazards were not created. He was not berthed or messed aboard. Indeed, he was not in command of the actual movement of the vessel, that having been under the control of the pilot captain of one of the two tug boats that moved the vessel.
. See, however, Hawn v. American S.S. Co., 2 Cir., 107 F.2d 999; Kissinger v. United States, D.C.E.D.N.Y., 176 F.Supp. 828.
. 9 Cir., 205 F.2d 478, affirmed sub nom. Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson, 847 U.S. 896, 74 S.Ct. 601, 98 L.Ed. 798.
. 347 U.S. 984, 74 S.Ct. 849, 98 L.Ed. 1120.