[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Oct. 19, 2009
No. 08-17227 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-00203-CV-HL-5
REGINALD DEKEITH MIMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RUSSELL ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(October 19, 2009)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Reginald Mims appeals pro se the dismissal of his complaint against court
reporter Russell Anderson. The district court ruled that Mims’s complaint was
barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994). We
affirm.
Mims complained that Anderson violated his right to due process by
“sabotag[ing]” the direct appeal of his state criminal conviction. Mims alleged that
Anderson failed to attach exhibits to the transcript for his direct appeal and
deprived Mims of a “full and fair review of [his] claim of actual innocence.” Mims
argued in an attachment to his complaint that Anderson’s “misconduct” was “a true
fundamental defect that [could not] be corrected on appeal.” Mims requested as
relief that the district court “vacate [his] judgement[] [sic] on appeal and remand
for [a] new trial”; reimburse him for the “cost of [his] appeal”; and award
“monetary damages” of $80,000.
Mims moved for the appointment of counsel. After the magistrate judge
denied the motion as premature, Mims moved for reconsideration. Anderson
moved to dismiss Mims’s complaint and for a stay of discovery. Mims served
interrogatories on Anderson and, four days later, moved to compel Anderson to
proceed with discovery.
A magistrate judge recommended that the district court dismiss Mims’s
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complaint. The magistrate judge found that “Mims is actually seeking habeas
corpus relief, inasmuch as his claims address his state criminal and habeas corpus
proceedings as well as his appellate rights” and recommended the district court
deny the complaint as barred under Heck. The magistrate judge also recommended
that the district court deny as moot Mims’s motions to reconsider his request for
appointed counsel and to compel discovery. Mims objected to the
recommendation, argued that his petition was not barred by Heck, and moved to
amend his complaint to withdraw his request for a new trial. The district court
“made a de novo determination of the portion of the [report and recommendation]
to which [Mims] object[ed]” and dismissed Mims’s complaint.
Mims challenges the ruling of the district court on three grounds, all of
which fail. First, Mims’s argument that the mistake of Anderson caused the state
courts to deny Mims relief on direct appeal fails because a judgment in his favor
“would necessarily imply the invalidity of [his] conviction[.]” Heck, 512 U.S. at
487, 114 S. Ct. at 2372. Second, Mims argues that he was entitled to amend his
complaint as a matter of right, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), but any amendment
would have been futile. See Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir.
2007) (“Leave to amend a complaint is futile when the complaint as amended
would still be properly dismissed[.]”). Third, the district court did not abuse its
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discretion by denying Mims’s requests for appointed counsel and to compel
discovery because those motions were moot. See Connell v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 927,
929 (11th Cir. 1986).
The dismissal of Mims’s complaint against Anderson is AFFIRMED.
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