delivered the opinion of the Court:
It is the settled law of this State, that a person who is not a party to a promissory note which is to become a valid obligation against the maker upon its delivery to the payee, by writing his name in blank upon the back of the note, is presumed to assent to the obligation of a guarantor. 3 Scam. 437; 3 id. 497; 13 Ill. 682; 14 id. 240; 17 id. 465; 21 id. 636; 25 id. 91. But where the note creates no valid obligation against the maker, and can create none, until it is indorsed and transferred by the payee, the presumption is that a person writing his name in blank upon the back of the note assumes the obligation of an indorser. Inasmuch as the note can never have any validity until the name of the payee appears upon it as an indorser, the person writing his name in blank upon the note understands that, when the note takes effect, his name will appear upon it as a second indorser, and it is reasonable to conclude that such was the position which he intended to occupy. Bogue v. Mellick, 25 Ill. 91; Bigelow v. Colton, 13 Gray (Mass.), 309; Lake v. Stetson, 13 id. 310; Capp v. Rice, 13 Gray, 403, 405, n. All persons receiving a note thus payable and so indorsed are apprised of the apparent obligations of the indorsers, and if they rely upon any other obligation, it is their duty to ascertain whether it exists. Any other obligation is dehors the instrument. An authority to fill out an undertaking over a signature is to be exercised consistently with the nature of the instrument and the intention of the parties. From the nature of a note payable to the maker’s own order, it is known what the law will presume was the intention of the parties in indorsing it in blank; and if any agreement is written over the signature inconsistent with such presumption, it is the duty of persons receiving the note to ascertain how and by what' authority it was written there.
Judgment affirmed.