[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 25, 2009
No. 09-12304 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00197-CV-J-TEM
KEVIN SULLIVAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(November 25, 2009)
Before BLACK, CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kevin Sullivan, through counsel, appeals the district court’s order affirming
the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of disability insurance benefits (DIB)
and supplemental security benefits (SSI).1 Sullivan argues substantial evidence
does not support the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) determination he was not
disabled. Specifically, Sullivan contends (1) the ALJ did not have good cause to
give more weight to limitations noted by a consulting physician, Dr. Russell
Clifton, than to those noted by a treating physician, Dr. Emily Hoon, and (2) the
ALJ’s hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert (VE) regarding
Sullivan’s mental limitations failed to include all significant limitations set forth in
Dr. Clifton’s assessment. We address each issue in turn and affirm.2
I.
Sullivan contends the ALJ erred by discounting the medical opinion of one
of his treating physicians, Dr. Hoon, because good cause did not exist to reject the
opinion and because both doctors concluded Sullivan suffered from severe mental
1
Sullivan has abandoned his DIB claim by failing to challenge it on appeal. Horsley v.
Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1131 n.1. (11th Cir. 2002).
2
When “the ALJ denies benefits and the [Appeals Council] denies review, we review the
ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278
(11th Cir. 2001). We review the Commissioner’s factual findings with deference, and the
“factual findings are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence, consisting of such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
(quotation omitted). However, we review the Commissioner’s legal conclusions de novo.
Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
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health limitations. The ALJ may reject any medical opinion if the evidence
supports a contrary finding. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985).
Absent the existence of “good cause” to the contrary, however, the ALJ must give
substantial weight to the opinion, diagnosis, and medical evidence of a treating
physician. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir.
2004); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). “‘[G]ood cause’ exists when the: (1) treating
physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a
contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent
with the doctor’s own medical records.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232,
1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004).
If the ALJ disregards the opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ must
clearly articulate his reasons. Id. at 1241. We have found no reversible error
“[w]here our limited review precludes re-weighing the evidence anew, and [where]
the ALJ articulated specific reasons for failing to give [the treating physician’s]
opinion controlling weight” and these findings are supported by substantial
evidence. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005). When the
ALJ does not give the treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, the ALJ
applies other factors such as the length of treatment, the frequency of examination,
the nature and extent of the relationship, the supportability of the opinion, its
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consistency with other evidence, and the specialization of the physician. See
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)-(6).
Substantial evidence in the record supports the conclusion the ALJ
discounted Dr. Hoon’s opinion for good cause because the ALJ found Dr. Hoon’s
opinion was not persuasive and was contradicted by the opinions of other
physicians. Specifically, the ALJ gave Dr. Hoon’s assessment “little evidentiary
weight” for four major reasons: (1) she was “clearly sympathetic” to Sullivan;
(2) she did not “document objective mental status findings”; (3) her diagnosis that
Sullivan suffered from chronic depression and PTSD was contradicted by the
findings of three other doctors; and (4) she only treated Sullivan a few times in the
span of six years. Because her opinion was unsupported by objective medical
evidence and the record as a whole, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Hoon’s
opinion regarding Sullivan’s medical conditions. See Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1159.
II.
Sullivan contends the hypothetical posed to the VE was improper because it
failed to include all significant limitations set forth in Dr. Clifton’s assessment.
When a claimant cannot perform a full range of work at a given level of exertion or
has non-exertional impairments that significantly limit basic work skills, the ALJ
can determine whether a claimant can perform other jobs through the testimony of
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a VE. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. For a VE’s testimony to constitute substantial
evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the
claimant’s impairments. See Vega v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 265 F.3d 1214, 1220
(11th Cir. 2001) (reversing and remanding because the ALJ did not give proper
weight to the opinions of the petitioner’s physicians and did not pose thorough
hypothetical questions to the VE). However, the ALJ is not required to include
findings in the hypothetical the ALJ properly rejects. See Crawford, 363 F.3d at
1160-61 (holding the ALJ properly gave less weight to a physician who had only
examined the petitioner once).
Substantial evidence supports the mental limitations included in the ALJ’s
hypothetical questions to the VE. The ALJ explained in the decision he gave
“limited evidentiary weight” to Dr. Clifton’s description of Sullivan’s ability to
make occupational adjustments as “Poor” in five areas because the assessment was
unsupported by Dr. Clifton’s own narrative and clinical exam findings, and also by
Sullivan’s statements during the hearing. Accordingly, the ALJ converted Dr.
Clifton’s five “Poor” mental limitations to “Fair” in the ALJ’s hypothetical
question to the VE. Even though Dr. Clifton was a consulting physician whose
medical opinion the ALJ should normally give great weight, the ALJ in this
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instance was not required to include findings in the hypothetical question he had
properly rejected.
Because the ALJ did not err in (1) discounting Dr. Hoon’s opinion for good
cause and (2) according “limited evidentiary weight” to Dr. Clifton’s five “Poor”
mental limitations, we affirm the Commissioner’s final finding Sullivan was not
disabled for purposes of SSI.
AFFIRMED.
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