United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 93-2599
Summary Calendar.
Conrell HADLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,
v.
VAM P T S, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.
Feb. 15, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court from the Southern
District of Texas.
Before DAVIS, JONES and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
Both parties to this case have appealed the trial court
judgment that awarded Hadley $283,000 against his former employer.
VAM, the employer, was found liable for Title VII retaliatory
discharge and Texas common law intentional infliction of emotional
distress, but not liable for disparate treatment on the basis of
race. VAM appeals only the jury's award of punitive damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Conrell Hadley
appeals the district court's reduction of his requested attorneys
fees, the failure of the district court to award front pay, and the
denial of prejudgment interest on back pay. We vacate the punitive
damages award, remand for reconsideration of the denial of front
pay, and otherwise affirm.
BACKGROUND
Conrell Hadley, a black man, was hired by VAM in 1981. Hadley
was apparently moving up the job ladder until 1990, when he was
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demoted. Hadley filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that he
had been discriminated against based upon his race. Later that
year, Hadley filed a second complaint with the EEOC alleging
unlawful retaliation. He complained that he had been
discriminatorily denied the opportunity to work light duty after
injuring his back on the job. The EEOC found no discrimination on
either complaint.
Hadley was ultimately fired by VAM after he made a machining
error that cost VAM more than $6,000. Hadley filed suit against
VAM claiming racial discrimination in violation of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, retaliatory discharge under Title VII, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress under Texas state law. The jury
found for VAM on the racial discrimination claim and for Hadley on
the retaliatory discharge and intentional infliction of emotional
distress causes of action. For the retaliatory discharge cause of
action, the jury awarded Hadley $33,000 in back pay and other
benefits, $3,000 in compensatory damages, and $100,000 in punitive
damages.1 For the intentional infliction of emotional distress
cause of action, the jury awarded Hadley $150,000 in punitive
damages. However, the jury was not asked whether Hadley had
suffered any actual damages as a result of the intentional
infliction of emotional distress and therefore did not award any
such damages.
After the judgment was entered, Hadley submitted a request for
1
The punitive damages award was later reduced to $97,000 in
accordance with Title VII limits.
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$144,693.75 in attorneys fees as a prevailing party under Title
VII. The district court found the requested fees to be "clearly
excessive" and instead awarded Hadley $50,000. The district court
also refused to grant Hadley any front pay and did not award
prejudgment interest on the back pay awarded by the jury.
VAM appeals the $150,000 in punitive damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress on the ground that there was no
requisite finding of actual damages to support an award of punitive
damages. Hadley appeals the reduction of his attorney fee request
to $50,000 and the decisions of the district court not to award
front pay or prejudgment interest.
DISCUSSION
Punitive Damages
Whether a jury finding of actual damages is a necessary
predicate to an award of punitive damages is a question of Texas
state law, which is reviewed on appeal de novo. See Salve Regina
College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1221, 113
L.Ed.2d 190 (1991).
Texas law is uniform and clear that a finding of actual
damages is a prerequisite to receipt of punitive damages.
Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 753-54 (Tex.1984).
The facts and holding of Federal Express v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d
282 (Tex.1993), are remarkably similar to the instant case, yet
neither party cited this controlling Texas Supreme Court case in
its briefs.
In Dutschmann, the plaintiff sued her employer in both
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contract and tort. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
on both causes of action and awarded the plaintiff punitive damages
on the tort cause of action. However, the Texas Supreme Court
reversed the award of punitive damages because no actual damages
question had been submitted to the jury on the tort cause of
action. The court explained that "[r]ecovery of punitive damages
requires a finding of an independent tort with accompanying actual
damages." Id. at 284. Because the jury did not find that the
plaintiff suffered any actual tort damages, the plaintiff was not
entitled to an award of punitive damages. Id.
The instant case is virtually indistinguishable from
Dutschmann. The jury found VAM liable for violation of Title VII
and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The jury also found
tort liability, but as in Dutschmann, was not asked to assess any
actual damages, only punitives. As in Dutschmann, this oversight
by Hadley is fatal to his punitive damages award for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress tort.
Hadley is creative in his attempt to circumvent this
requirement, but to no avail. Hadley first asserts that the
compensatory damages awarded in the Title VII retaliatory discharge
cause of action are sufficient to fulfill the actual damages
requirement. While it is true that compensatory damages under
Title VII can overlap with actual damages suffered as a result of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the severity of
injury necessary for each is markedly different. In order to be
compensable, emotional distress under the state law tort of
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intentional infliction of emotional distress must be severe. See,
e.g., Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex.1993). There
is no such requirement for compensable emotional harm under Title
VII. Therefore, the fact that the jury awarded compensatory
damages under Title VII does not mean that it also found that
Hadley suffered compensatory damages under the intentional
infliction of emotional distress tort.
Hadley alternatively argues that even if there were no actual
tort damages found by the jury, VAM waived its right to complain of
this feature of the judgment by not objecting to the jury charge in
accordance with Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 51. This argument seeks to shift
the burden of securing a finding of actual damages from the
plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant has no duty to ensure
that the plaintiff has furnished jury questions covering all fact
issues necessary to his cause of action. Texas law is clear that
a plaintiff must "allege, prove and secure jury findings on the
existence and amount of actual damages sufficient to support an
award of punitive damages." Nabours v. Longview Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
700 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex.1985). Therefore, plaintiff did not
fulfill his burden to secure a jury finding of actual tort damages
upon which a punitive damage award could be based.
Attorneys Fees
As a prevailing party in a Title VII case, Hadley was
entitled to an award of attorneys fees. We review the district
court's award only for abuse of discretion. Purcell v. Sequin
State Bank and Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 961 (5th Cir.1993).
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Hadley submitted an attorneys' fee bill to the court for
$144,693.75. The court reviewed the bill, considered the factors
set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir.1974), and concluded that the requested fee was excessive. He
therefore reduced the fee to what he found was reasonable and
necessary and awarded the plaintiff $50,000.
Although the district judge's recitation of the reasons why he
reduced the requested fee is not fulsome, it does evidence the
required examination of the Johnson factors. The requested fee was
extremely high for this sort of case. Therefore, the court did not
abuse his discretion in reducing the fee request to a still
generous amount.
Front Pay
The district court denied Hadley's request for an award of
front pay. We review such a denial for abuse of discretion.
Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 822 (5th Cir.1990).
Section 2000e-5(g) of Title VII authorizes a court to order
reinstatement of the plaintiff or order any other appropriate
equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Front pay is an
equitable remedy that can be employed when reinstatement is not
feasible. Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th
Cir.1992). In the instant case, the district court determined
that, because of the animosity between the parties, reinstatement
would not be feasible. However, citing Walther, the court
determined that because of the large amount of punitive damages
awarded to the plaintiff, an award of front pay would be
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inappropriate and excessive. This case was tried under the 1991
Civil Rights Act, which newly permits awards of compensatory and
punitive damages in Title VII cases.
In Walther, the Fifth Circuit adopted the position of both
the First and Seventh Circuits and held that "a substantial
liquidated damage award may indicate that an additional award of
front pay is inappropriate or excessive." Id. at 127. Plaintiff
urges this court to limit Walther to ADEA cases dealing with
liquidated damages and not to apply its rationale to Title VII
punitive damages cases. However, we find the reasoning of Walther
and our sister circuits is equally applicable to the impact of
Title VII punitive damages, so we adopt Walther in this context.
See Price v. Marshall Eidman & Assoc., Inc., 966 F.2d 320, 326 (7th
Cir.1992); Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 1056 (7th
Cir.1990); Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st
Cir.1985).
Explaining the legislative history of the ADEA, the Supreme
Court, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111,
125-26, 105 S.Ct. 613, 624, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985), stated that
"Congress intended for liquidated damages [under ADEA] to be
punitive in nature." Id. See also Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co.,
559 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066,
98 S.Ct. 1243, 55 L.Ed.2d 767 (1978) (citing legislative history
suggesting that Congress intended liquidated damages to supply the
deterrent that punitive damages normally served). Because Title
VII punitive damages serve the same function as liquidated damages
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under ADEA, it makes sense that they should affect equitable relief
similarly.
The district court's decision to deny front pay apparently
arose from its sense that Hadley received sufficient punitive
damages to accomplish full recompense. Whether the $150,000 award
premised on state law explicitly influenced this decision is not
clear. It may be that reversal of the punitive damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress will prompt a
re-evaluation by the trial court of whether an award of front pay
remains inappropriate and excessive. Without expressing any
opinion on how the court's discretion should be exercised, we
remand for reconsideration of front pay.
Prejudgment Interest
The decision to award prejudgment interest on back pay awards
in Title VII cases rests within the sound discretion of the
district court. Sellers v. Delgado Community College, 839 F.2d
1132, 1140 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 987, 111 S.Ct.
525, 112 L.Ed.2d 536 (1990). We will not overturn the district
court's determination of the appropriateness of prejudgment
interest absent an abuse of discretion. Id. Although this Circuit
has acknowledged that a back pay award in Title VII cases should
make the injured party whole by putting him in the same position he
would have been in but for the violation, Id. at 1136, we have not
adopted a per se rule that requires prejudgment interest to be
included in the award. Accordingly, we find no abuse of the
district court's discretion in the failure to award prejudgment
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interest on the back pay award.
In summary, because we find that the plaintiff failed to
fulfill his burden of proving and securing a jury finding of actual
tort damages, the final judgment awarding $150,000 in punitive
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress is to that
extent reversed. The court's decisions on attorneys' fees and
prejudgment interest are affirmed. Further, we remand the case to
the district court for a determination on whether the reversal of
the state law-based punitive damages award affects the equitable
decision to deny front pay to the plaintiff.
AFFIRMED in PART, REVERSED in PART and REMANDED.
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