[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Nov. 13, 2009
No. 09-10840 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00210-CV-1-MMP-WCS
JOHN CARMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(November 13, 2009)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant John Carman, through counsel, appeals the district court’s order
affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s (the “Commissioner”) denial of
his application for disability insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 405 et seq., and
supplemental security income (“SSI”), 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. On appeal,
Carman argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) ignored and failed to
evaluate properly the opinions of his treating physicians. Carman also argues that
the ALJ failed to give “explicit and adequate reasons” for discrediting his
subjective complaints of pain.
We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether it is
supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied the
proper legal standards. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158
(11th Cir. 2004). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Even if the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, we must affirm if the decision
reached is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 1158-59 (internal quotation
marks omitted). “We may not decide facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or
substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d
1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
“Review of the Secretary’s application of legal principles is plenary.” Foote v.
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Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1558 (11th Cir. 1995).
The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step process used to
determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Under the
first step, the claimant has the burden to show that he is not currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity. Id. § 404.1520(b). Next, he must show that he has a
severe impairment. Id. § 404.1520(c). He then must attempt to show that the
impairment meets or equals the criteria contained in one of the Listings of
Impairments. Id. § 404.1520(d). If the claimant cannot meet or equal the criteria,
he must show that he has an impairment which prevents him from performing his
past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(e) and (f). Once a claimant establishes that he
cannot perform his past relevant work due to some severe impairment, the burden
shifts to the Commissioner to show that significant numbers of jobs exist in the
national economy which the claimant can perform. Id. § 404.1520(g); Phillips v.
Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004).
A. The ALJ’s consideration of the medical evidence
The opinions of examining or treating physicians generally are given more
weight than non-examining or non-treating physicians unless “good cause” is
shown to the contrary. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d
1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). Good cause exists to discredit a physician’s
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testimony when a physician’s opinion is conclusory, inconsistent with his own
medical records, or contrary to the evidence contained in the record. Lewis, 125
F.3d at 1440.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Carman has shown no
error in the ALJ’s treatment of the medical evidence, as he did not show that the
ALJ overlooked or improperly discounted any of the evidence.
B. The ALJ’s evaluation of Carman’s subjective complaints of pain
When a claimant attempts to establish disability through his own testimony
concerning pain or other subjective symptoms, we apply a three-part “pain
standard,” which requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and
either (A) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain
stemming from that condition, or (B) that the objectively determined medical
condition is so severe that it can reasonably be expected to cause the alleged pain.
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). “The claimant’s
subjective testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the standard is
itself sufficient to support a finding of disability.” Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221,
1223 (11th Cir. 1991).
“After considering a claimant’s complaints of pain, the ALJ may reject them
as not creditable, and that determination will be reviewed for substantial evidence.”
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Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992). The ALJ must explicitly
and adequately articulate his reasons if he discredits a claimant’s subjective
testimony. Id. “A clearly articulated credibility finding with substantial
supporting evidence in the record will not be disturbed by a reviewing court.”
Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562; see also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th
Cir. 2005) (“We recognize that credibility determinations are the province of the
ALJ.”). “The credibility determination does not need to cite particular phrases or
formulations but it cannot merely be a broad rejection which is not enough to
enable . . . this Court to conclude that the ALJ considered [the] medical condition
as a whole.” Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210 (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). When evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptoms, the ALJ must
consider such things as: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the nature and
intensity of pain and other symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4)
effects of medications; and (5) treatment or measures taken by the claimant for
relief of symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).
The ALJ articulated various inconsistencies in Carman’s evidence that a
reasonable person could conclude supported the ALJ’s finding that Carman’s
subjective complaints of pain were not entirely credible. Thus, we conclude that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding.
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C. The ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational expert
When a claimant cannot perform a full range of work at a given level of
exertion or has non-exertional impairments that significantly limit basic work
skills, the ALJ can determine whether a claimant can perform other jobs through
the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”). Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. “In order
for a vocational expert’s testimony to constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must
pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the claimant’s impairments.”
Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The ALJ is not required to include findings in
the hypothetical that he properly finds are unsupported. Crawford, 363 F.3d at
1161.
Because the ALJ proposed a hypothetical to the VE that included all of
Carman’s credible limitations, we conclude that the VE’s testimony, that there was
a significant number of jobs in the national economy that a person with Carman’s
impairments could perform, constituted substantial evidence that he was not
disabled.
Accordingly, based on our review of the record and consideration of the
parties’ briefs, we affirm the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner’s
denial of disability benefits and supplemental security income.
AFFIRMED.
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