[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 28, 2009
No. 09-14223 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 09-00018-CV-CDL-3
ADOLFUS O BRIEN GILES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WAL-MART DISTRIBUTION CENTER,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(December 28, 2009)
Before CARNES, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Adolfus O Brien Giles appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
employment discrimination action against his former employer, Wal-Mart. The
district court dismissed Giles’s pro se complaint because Giles did not comply with
the district court’s order to file a more definite statement conforming to the
pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After review, we
affirm.1
I. BACKGROUND
Giles’s original pro se complaint was a four-page, single-spaced document
containing two very long, unnumbered paragraphs. Substantively, the original
complaint consisted of a rambling personal narrative of Giles’s workplace
complaints that suggested numerous possible claims, including race and national
origin discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, unjust termination,
wrongful wage garnishment, and physical assault by a co-worker, among others.
Wal-Mart moved to dismiss Giles’s complaint or alternatively for a more
definite statement. In its order granting Wal-Mart’s motion for a more definite
statement, the district court described in detail the ways in which the original
complaint failed to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10.
1
We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with court
rules for an abuse of discretion. Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337
(11th Cir. 2005). “Discretion means the district court has a range of choice, and that its decision
will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of
law.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
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Specifically, the district court explained that the complaint lacked information
regarding dates of incidents or identities of the alleged bad actors, did not
differentiate which facts supported which claims, and did not state claims simply
and concisely in numbered paragraphs each limited to a single set of
circumstances. The district court ordered Giles to file a more definite statement
that complied with Rule 8 and to “[s]et out each of his claims for relief separately,
specify[ing] which factual allegations support each claim and otherwise comply
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” The district court also warned Giles
that if he failed to comply with the order within ten days, it would dismiss his
complaint.
Giles filed a document entitled “Plaintiff’s More Definite Statement,” that
amended some of his original allegations to include dates parenthetically, broke
allegations into shorter, but still unnumbered, paragraphs and added a
“Conclusion” requesting $354 million in punitive damages and $1 million in
compensatory damages. But, the amended complaint did not address each claim
separately or identify which facts supported each claim. In fact, substantively, the
amended complaint was essentially identical to the original complaint. As a result,
the district court granted Wal-Mart’s renewed motion to dismiss, finding that
Giles’s amended complaint did not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
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Procedure and Giles had not complied with the district court’s earlier order to cure
the deficiencies in his complaint.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Giles concedes that his pro se amended complaint did not comply
with the pleading requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and we agree.
Giles’s amended complaint did not contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” or make “each allegation . . . be
simple, concise, and direct.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). Further, Giles’s
amended complaint did not “state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs,
each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10(b). Instead, Giles’s amended complaint consisted of a lengthy series of
unnumbered paragraphs containing what amounts to a personal narrative
suggesting, but not clearly and simply stating, a myriad of potential claims. In
other words, Giles’s amended complaint is a classic “shot gun” pleading in that it
is not possible to know which factual allegations support which claims for relief.
See Anderson v. Dist. Bd. Of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th
Cir. 1996).
Thus, despite guidance from the district court on how to cure the
deficiencies in his complaint and a clear warning that noncompliance would be
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cause for dismissal, Giles did not comply with the district court’s order to file an
amended complaint in conformity with the requirements of Rules 8 and 10. Under
these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) (providing that, if a party ordered to
provide a more definite statement does not provide such a statement within ten
days, the district court is empowered to strike the pleading);2 Betty K Agencies,
432 F.3d at 1337 (stating that, if the defendant so moves, the district court may
also dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to
comply with its order); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989)
(“While dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, dismissal upon disregard of an
order, especially where the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse
of discretion.”).
We find meritless Giles’s argument that justice required the district court to
“over look the fact that [he] was unable to fill out a Complaint correctly” and to
address his claims on their merits. Although “pro se pleadings are held to a less
strict standard than pleadings filed by lawyers and thus are construed liberally,”
Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
632 (2008), this liberal construction “does not give a court license to serve as de
2
The most recent amendments to Rule 12 went into effect on December 1, 2009 and,
thus, do not apply.
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facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to
sustain an action.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369
(11th Cir. 1998). Even a pro se litigant is required to comply with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly after being expressly directed to do so.
AFFIRMED.
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