[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 23, 2009
No. 09-10126 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-22416-CV-KMM
WANDA THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Dr. James B. Peake,
NANCY BOX,
STEPHEN LUCAS,
ALEX J. FURST,
PAUL MAGALIN,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(December 23, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this case, Wanda Thomas, proceeding pro se, has sued the Secretary of the
Department of Veterans Affairs and others for denying her various civil rights. The
district court, acting sua sponte, denied her initial complaint for failure to state a
claim, but granted her leave to amend. She filed an amended complaint and again
sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The court denied leave, but
allowed her to supplement application for IFP status by filing financial
documentation corroborating her monthly income, mortgage, and other expenses.
She filed such documentation, but the court denied it. She then moved the court
for reconsideration of its ruling, and the court denied her motion—under the
impression that she failed to submit proof of her monthly income and her monthly
mortgage payment. Thomas now appeals the court’s denial of her motion for
reconsideration.
We review a district court’s denial of an application for IFP status under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a) and motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion.
Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 (11th Cir. 2004) (IFP);
Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (reconsideration).
“[P]proceeding [IFP] is a privilege, not a right,” see Camp v. Oliver, 798 F.2d
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434, 437 (11th Cir. 1986). The district court therefore has wide discretion in ruling
on an application for IFP status, and should grant the privilege “sparingly” in civil
cases for damages, see Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1306. However, a district court
cannot act arbitrarily or deny the application on erroneous grounds. Id. at 1306-07.
When considering a motion filed pursuant to § 1915(a), “[t]he only
determination to be made by the court . . . is whether the statements in the affidavit
satisfy the requirement of poverty.” Id. at 1307. A person need not be “absolutely
destitute” or reduce herself to a public charge in order to proceed IFP; rather, “an
affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant, because of [her]
poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide
necessities for [herself] and [her] dependents.” Id. A district court may not deny
an IFP motion without first comparing the party’s assets and liabilities in order to
determine whether the party has satisfied the poverty requirement. Id. at 1307-08.
Moreover, a district court’s review of a party’s ability to pay is not limited by the
application, as it may “look beyond” the application to determine a party’s
financial condition. Id. at 1307 n.3 (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court overlooked evidence submitted by Thomas that
supported her IFP claim. The court failed to compare her assets against her
liabilities to determine whether she satisfied the poverty requirement. The court
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therefore abused its discretion in denying Thomas’s application.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and remand with
instructions that the court either grant Thomas IFP status or conduct further
proceedings consistent with the foregoing.
VACATED and REMANDED.
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