United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-8662.
Johnny B. CHATMAN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
James SPILLERS, Mayor, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Jan. 20, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia. (No. CV-86-91-COL), J. Robert Elliott, Judge.
Before BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and CLARK, Senior Circuit
Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs-Appellants are black residents and voters of the
City of Butler, Georgia. In 1986, they filed a complaint alleging
that the existing at-large method of electing the mayor and city
council members was in violation of the United States Constitution
and Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973
and 1973c. Defendants-Appellees are the mayor, members of the city
council and the election superintendent for the City of Butler.
Butler has a population of 1,673 people, 45.8% of whom are black.
This case presents two issues for appellate review: (1)
whether the district court's May 10, 1994, order is final and
appealable as an order denying injunctive relief; and (2) whether
the court erred in refusing to order interim elections for the city
council and mayor since the parties' consent plan was only
precleared in part and defendants objected to the terms of the
plaintiffs' new plan.
We raised the jurisdictional issue sua sponte. The
defendants argue that the district court's May 10, 1994, order is
not final and appealable, because it does not end the litigation on
the merits. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893, 104 S.Ct. 239, 78 L.Ed.2d
230 (1983). In its May 10 order, the district court essentially
refused to impose upon the City of Butler a voting scheme that both
parties to this litigation had not agreed upon.
While both parties agree that a vote needs to be held, the
United States Department of Justice ("the Justice Department") has
objected to the parties' consent order entered on June 1, 1992, and
a new agreement has not been reached. After the plaintiffs renewed
their motion for court-ordered elections and the defendants opposed
the motion, the court denied it.
The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the district
court's order arguing that their appeal is of right under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1). Section 1292(a)(1) provides, inter alia,
jurisdiction for courts of appeals from interlocutory orders
entered by district courts denying injunctions. In this case, the
plaintiffs were requesting an order directing the defendants to
call and conduct special elections. They argue that their request
was in the nature of an injunction. Injunctions have been defined
as "orders that are directed to a party, enforceable by contempt,
and designed to accord or protect "some or all of the substantive
relief sought by a complaint' in more than preliminary fashion."
C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper & E. Gressman, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3922, at 29 (1977 & Supp.1985). Further, "there is
little difficulty in allowing appeal from orders that involve
requests for some part of the relief that might be sought in a
final judgment." Id. at 44. The relief requested by plaintiffs in
their motion is part of the relief that they are seeking in a final
judgment. Also, it is directed to the defendants, and the
requested order, if granted, would accord more than preliminary
relief. Accordingly, we hold that the requested order can be
characterized as an injunction and, consequently, we have
jurisdiction over this appeal.1
None of the merits of this case have ever been considered by
the district court. The defendants have never admitted the charges
brought by the plaintiffs, and the parties' settlement agreement
cannot be implemented as it was drawn. Meanwhile, elections have
not been held in the City of Butler since 1986 because of the
district court's TRO enjoining the holding of elections.
The defendants have offered no logical explanation for their
opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for elections under terms
suggested by the Justice Department. The only reason offered for
their opposition is that the elections would be highly unusual and
complicated, because they would require the election of city
council members by a majority vote, and the election of mayor by a
1
Another approach to the jurisdiction issue would be for us
to address whether the temporary restraining order should be
considered as a preliminary injunction because it has been in
effect for several years. A TRO that runs beyond twenty days may
be appealable as a preliminary injunction. See, e.g.,
International Primate Protection League, et al. v. Administrators
of Tulane Educ. Fd., et al., 500 U.S. 72, 111 S.Ct. 1700, 114
L.Ed.2d 134 (1991). The plaintiffs' appeal could be viewed by us
as an appeal of the district court's TRO, which has stayed
mayoral and city council elections in Butler since 1986. Thus,
under this approach, this action could be considered appealable
under § 1292(a)(1) as an appeal from a preliminary injunction.
plurality vote. The district court has the power to order interim
or special elections. Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 111 S.Ct.
2096, 114 L.Ed.2d 691 (1991); Campos v. City of Houston, 968 F.2d
446, 451 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct.
971, 122 L.Ed.2d 126 (1993). What we must decide in this appeal is
whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to
order elections under the terms suggested by the plaintiffs in
their motion. We hold that it did.
The defendants' argument that to require the city to monitor
two completely different methods of elections would be highly
unusual and complicated is meritless. The defendants had
previously agreed to adopt two different methods of elections in
their consent order—the at-large method for mayor, and the
two-district method for district council. The difference in the
number of votes necessary to win each race would actually never be
an issue unless the race was close. Included among the defendants
opposing a special election are the incumbent mayor and city
council members, who naturally might have a conflict of interest.
Accordingly, the district court should have ordered a special
election in spite of the defendants' objections.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court's
order refusing to order interim elections and remand with
directions that the district court order special elections within
thirty (30) days from the issuance of the mandate in this case in
the manner suggested by the plaintiffs.2 Upon remand, the district
2
The city council members will be selected from two
districts and elected by a majority vote. The mayoral candidates
will run at-large and be elected by a plurality vote.
court is also directed to dissolve its TRO and order a permanent
court-ordered change adopting the two-district method of electing
city council members in the City of Butler.
VACATED and REMANDED.