United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Nos. 92-9217, 92-9229.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Woodrow Larry BEARD, Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Timothy BARNES, Defendant-Appellant.
Jan. 10, 1995.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. (Nos. 1:88-CR-488-5, 1:89-CR-373-2), Robert L.
Vining, Jr., Judge.
Before KRAVITCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and GIBSON*, Senior
Circuit Judge.
KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:
Whether the time calculated under the Speedy Trial Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3161-74, is tolled during the pendency of a pretrial
motion, is the main issue presented. Because we hold that the time
during which Appellants' pretrial James motions were pending is
excludable under the Act, we AFFIRM the district court's order
denying Appellants' motions to dismiss their indictments.
I.
Beard was arrested in October 1988 as part of a large scale
drug investigation conducted by the Drug Enforcement Agency and the
*
Honorable Floyd R. Gibson, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for
the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Georgia Bureau of Investigation.1 On December 5, 1988, Beard filed
a motion for a James hearing to determine whether the statements of
his alleged coconspirators would be admissible against him pursuant
to Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). On January 5, 1989, at a pretrial
conference, the magistrate judge deferred Beard's motion for a
James hearing to the trial judge. Beard was not brought to trial
and on January 16, 1992, he moved to dismiss his indictment,
alleging a violation of the Speedy Trial Act. When that motion was
denied, Beard pleaded guilty to possession with intent to
distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1);
attempt to possess with intent to distribute marijuana in violation
of § 21 U.S.C. § 846; and use of a firearm during a drug
trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). He now
appeals from the denial of his speedy trial motion.2
In June 1989, Barnes pleaded guilty in state court to charges
of cocaine possession. In October 1989, Barnes was arrested on
federal drug charges, stemming from the same overall investigation.
On October 30, 1989, Barnes filed a motion for a James hearing. At
a pretrial conference held on November 21, 1989, the magistrate
judge deferred Barnes's motion for a James hearing to the trial
judge. On April 26, 1990, Barnes and six codefendants were brought
to trial.3 Barnes became ill during the trial, and on May 3, 1990,
1
In separate indictments, Beard was charged with marijuana
and cocaine violations. He was tried and found guilty on the
cocaine charges. Only the marijuana charges are relevant to this
appeal.
2
Beard reserved his right to appeal this issue.
3
Beard was not a codefendant in Barnes's case.
the judge declared a mistrial as to Barnes. At the time when the
judge declared the mistrial, he had yet to rule on Barnes's James
motion. When his retrial had not commenced by January 28, 1991,
Barnes filed a motion to dismiss his federal indictment, alleging
a violation of the Speedy Trial Act. Barnes also alleged that his
prosecution in federal court violated the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers Act ("IADA"), 18 U.S.C.App., and the Department of
Justice's dual prosecution policy. The district court denied the
motion and Barnes pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute
cocaine in violation 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and possession of
cocaine in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. He appeals from the denial
of his motion to dismiss the indictment.4
II.
The Speedy Trial Act requires that a person be tried within
seventy days of his indictment or first appearance before a judge
or magistrate, whichever occurs later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
The Act enumerates various periods of delay, however, which
automatically toll the computation of time. See 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h). The government argues that the pendency of the James
motions tolls the computation of time in these cases under 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F). We agree.
Delay resulting from "any pretrial motion, from the filing of
the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other
prompt disposition of, such motion" is automatically excluded in
computing the time within which trial must commence. 18 U.S.C. §
4
Barnes reserved his right to appeal the district court's
denial of his motion.
3161(h)(1)(F); see Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 330,
106 S.Ct. 1871, 1876-77, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986) (holding that all
the time between the filing of a pretrial motion and the conclusion
of the hearing on that motion is excluded when calculating the
seventy days, regardless of whether such delay is reasonably
necessary). We have held that motions which are deferred to the
district court by a magistrate judge remain pretrial motions.
United States v. Garcia, 778 F.2d 1558, 1562 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 477 U.S. 906, 106 S.Ct. 3279, 91 L.Ed.2d 568 (1986). Thus,
"the entire time from the filing of the [James ] motion to the
conclusion of the hearing is excludable, even [though] the hearing
[was] deferred until trial." United States v. Phillips, 936 F.2d
1252, 1254 (11th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Mendoza-
Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1476 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. --
--, 113 S.Ct. 436, 121 L.Ed.2d 356 (1992).5
5
Appellants assert that where, as here, a hearing is never
held, exclusion for pending motions is inapplicable. United
States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 972 n. 25 (11th Cir.1990) ("We
are aware of no case where a motion filed pre-trial excludes all
time through the hearing where the hearing is never held or is
held after the commencement of trial."). This court's statement
in Khoury is merely dicta. In Khoury, there was no pending
motion because the magistrate judge had denied the motion; he
did not defer the motion. Thus, § 3161(h)(1)(F) was
inapplicable. Further, in Phillips, this court made clear that
when a motion is deferred until trial, it remains a pre-trial
motion, triggering the automatic tolling provision of §
3161(h)(1)(F). 936 F.2d at 1254.
A delay of sufficient length may be a Constitutional
violation, even though it is not a violation of the Speedy
Trial Act. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,
305 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. 648, 650 n. 1, 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986)
(noting that respondents sought relief under Sixth Amendment
because automatic exclusions precluded relief under Speedy
Trial Act); United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th
Cir.1982). Neither Beard nor Barnes asserts that the
lengthy delay from the time of his indictment to the time of
Because the trial judge had yet to hold a James hearing when
Beard pleaded guilty, the computation of time for the purposes of
the Speedy Trial Act remained tolled. The district court therefore
properly denied Beard's motion to dismiss his indictment.
III.
Barnes's case requires a slightly different analysis. Barnes
was brought to trial in April 1990 and a mistrial was declared on
May 3, 1990. Following a mistrial, a new trial must "commence
within seventy days from the date the action occasioning the
retrial becomes final." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e). Barnes asserts that
the government's failure to timely commence a new trial violates
the Speedy Trial Act.
The government correctly notes that Barnes waived his right
to object to any delay preceding the commencement of the April
trial because he failed to move for dismissal prior to the start of
that trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). 6 The government argues that
this waiver continues post-mistrial, precluding Barnes from
objecting to any delay in the commencement of his retrial. We
disagree. A waiver pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) does not
continue beyond the declaration of a mistrial. See United States
v. Didier, 542 F.2d 1182, 1185 (2d Cir.1976) ("appellant's waiver
of his right to a speedy trial was voided and his right to a speedy
his guilty plea violates the Sixth Amendment. We therefore
express no opinion as to whether delays of this length,
under these circumstances, violate the Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial.
6
§ 3162(a)(2) provides that the "[f]ailure of the defendant
to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere shall constitute a waiver of the right to
dismissal under this section."
trial revived by the declaration of a mistrial"); United States v.
Kington, 875 F.2d 1091, 1107 (5th Cir.1989) (clock resets to zero
following a mistrial).
Although Barnes did not waive his right to a speedy retrial,
his claim nonetheless fails. Barnes had a James motion pending
when his April 1990 trial began, and the judge had yet to resolve
the motion when he declared a mistrial. 7 Thus, the James motion
tolled the computation of time. See, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F);
Philips, 936 F.2d at 1254. Accordingly, we hold that Barnes's
rights under the Speedy Trial Act were not violated.
Barnes's two other contentions merit little discussion. He
argues that his federal indictment violated the IADA, because he
was never advised of his right to be tried within 180 days of his
transfer from the Georgia state penal system to the federal system.
18 U.S.C.App. III. Barnes concedes that a detainer was never
filed, however, as he was brought into federal custody by means of
a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Because a detainer was
never filed, the protections of the IADA were never triggered. See
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 361, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1847-48,
56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978) (writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does
not constitute a "detainer" within the meaning of IADA and
therefore, application of IADA not proper).8
7
For purposes of the Speedy Trial Act, Barnes's James motion
survived the mistrial. See United States v. Riley, 991 F.2d 120,
124 (4th Cir.) (pretrial motion to suppress survived declaration
of mistrial for purposes of Speedy Trial Act), cert. denied, ---
U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 392, 126 L.Ed.2d 341 (1993).
8
Barnes's argument that the Speedy Trial Act required the
government to place a detainer on him is belied by the plain
language of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(j)(1) provides in
Barnes also argues that his federal prosecution violates the
Department of Justice's policy of refraining from multiple
prosecutions for essentially the same conduct. He asserts that
because he pleaded guilty to cocaine charges in state court, the
federal government may not indict him on charges relating to the
same cocaine.
The dual prosecution policy is an internal policy which
confers no enforceable rights on a criminal defendant. See United
States v. Nelligan,9 573 F.2d 251, 255 (5th Cir.1978) (dual
prosecution policy is "internal policy of self-restraint that
should not be enforced against the government"); Andiarena v.
Keohane, 691 F.2d 993, 995-96 n. 3 (11th Cir.1982). Thus, Barnes
pertinent part:
If the attorney for the Government knows that a person
charged with an offense is serving a term of
imprisonment in any penal institution, he shall
promptly—
(A) undertake to obtain the presence of the
prisoner for trial; or
(B) cause a detainer to be filed with the person
having custody of the prisoner and request him to
so advise the prisoner and to advise the prisoner
of his right to demand trial.
(Emphasis added). 3161(j)(1) is written in the disjunctive.
The government therefore properly secured Barnes's presence
by filing a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and was
not required to file a detainer. See United States v.
Roper, 716 F.2d 611, 613-14 (4th Cir.1983) (§ 3161(j)(1)
written in alternative; thus no Speedy Trial Act violation
when writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum was issued to
secure Roper's presence at federal trial).
9
The Eleventh Circuit, in the en banc decision Bonner v.
City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981), adopted as
precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to
October 1, 1981.
may not use the policy to effectuate dismissal of his indictment.10
AFFIRMED.
10
Barnes's assertion that Petite v. United States, 361 U.S.
529, 80 S.Ct. 450, 4 L.Ed.2d 490 (1960), requires the dismissal
of his indictment is unavailing. In Petite, the government
sought to have a conviction vacated based upon its policy of
refraining from multiple prosecutions stemming from the same
conduct. Petite does not give a criminal defendant the right to
enforce this policy.