United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-8222.
Charles McCOY, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Charles B. WEBSTER, Individually and as Sheriff of Richmond
County, Georgia, William Mnu Brown, Individually and as Deputy
Sheriff of Richmond County, Georgia, Defendants-Appellants,
Hobson Chavous, Henry Brigham, Herb Beckham, Jessie Carroll,
William Mayes and Lee Neal, as Commissioners of Richmond County,
Georgia, Defendants.
March 14, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia. (No. CV191-157), Dudley H. Bowen, Jr., Judge.
Before COX, Circuit Judge, FAY, Senior Circuit Judge, and CARNES*,
District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Charles McCoy filed this suit against Charles B. Webster and
William Brown, the Sheriff and a Deputy Sheriff, respectively, of
Richmond County, Georgia, asserting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and
various state tort claims. The district court held that Brown was
not entitled to qualified immunity and denied his motion for
summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted Webster
summary judgment on the section 1983 claim, but denied Webster's
motion for summary judgment on the state law claims. Both Brown
and Webster appeal. We reverse the denial of Brown's motion for
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and remand the
state claims.
*
Honorable Julie E. Carnes, U.S. District Judge for the
Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation.
I.
After conviction in federal court, McCoy was temporarily
incarcerated in Cell Block East on the sixth floor of the Richmond
County, Georgia jail. Each of the six floors in the Richmond
County jail is divided into an east and west cell block. Both the
east and west cell blocks on the sixth floor are composed of
individual cells grouped around a community area. These community
areas are separated from one another by metal and glass walls
through which inmates can communicate.
At 1:30 a.m. on August 17, 1989, McCoy complained to the tower
guard that he was being threatened and harassed and had been beaten
by Craig Curry, another prisoner in Cell Block East. McCoy told
the guard that he feared for his life and asked to be moved to
another floor. He also requested medical attention for back pain
resulting from the beating. The tower guard informed his shift
supervisor, defendant Deputy Brown, of McCoy's complaints and was
instructed to send McCoy to Brown's office. The tower guard
recorded this in the tower guard log.
McCoy told Brown that Curry had beaten and threatened him and
again expressed fear for his life.1 The jail has a policy of
segregating an inmate once an official determines that the inmate's
safety is being threatened. Having determined that McCoy might be
in danger, Brown sent McCoy to the nurse for medical attention and
then placed McCoy in a holding cell for the night. Brown went off
1
The actual content of this conversation is in dispute.
However, for purposes of summary judgment, we view the facts in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hardin v. Hayes, 957
F.2d 845, 848 (11th Cir.1992).
duty at about 6:00 a.m. He did not file any written report of
McCoy's complaint nor did he tell any member of the oncoming shift
about the incident.
At around 11:00 a.m. that day, McCoy was transferred back to
the sixth floor, but placed in Cell Block West. Brown did not
participate in the decision or the actual transfer. Two days
later, McCoy was attacked and beaten by other inmates incarcerated
on Cell Block West.
McCoy filed a complaint asserting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
against Brown, Sheriff Charles B. Webster, and several other
defendants. McCoy alleges that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his personal safety in violation of his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. He
also asserts a number of tort claims under Georgia law. The
district court granted Webster's motion for summary judgment on the
section 1983 claim, but denied Webster summary judgment on the
Georgia negligence claims. The district court denied Brown's
2
motion for summary judgment on all claims. Brown and Webster
appeal.
On appeal, Brown contends that the district court erred in
denying him qualified immunity and in denying summary judgment on
the supplemental Georgia negligence claim. Webster asserts that
the district court erred in denying summary judgment on the Georgia
negligence claims.
2
One of the original defendants was eliminated from the
action when the district court granted its motion to dismiss.
The district court also granted the Commissioners' motion for
summary judgment.
II.
A denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity is immediately appealable. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The issue
of qualified immunity presents a question of law; thus, on appeal,
this court considers the issue de novo. Elder v. Holloway, ---
U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 1022, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994).
Because the district court properly retained jurisdiction over
Webster, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1993); see also Palmer v. Hospital
Authority of Randolph Co., 22 F.3d 1559, 1568 (11th Cir.1994),3 we
have discretionary pendent appellate jurisdiction over Webster's
appeal. Swint v. City of Wadley, Al., 5 F.3d 1435, 1449 (11th
Cir.1993), cert. granted sub nom. Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n,
--- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2671, 129 L.Ed.2d 808 (1994).
III.
Qualified immunity shields government officials performing
discretionary duties from civil trial and liability if their
conduct violates no "clearly established statutory or
3
This action was filed in August 1991, after the enactment
of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5113. Thus 28 U.S.C. § 1367, codifying supplemental
jurisdiction, applies to this case. Section 1367(a) requires the
district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims
which are closely related to claims over which the district court
has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1993). "Such
supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the
joinder or intervention of additional parties." Id. Therefore,
the district court was not required to dismiss the supplemental
state law claims against Webster although no federal claim
remains against Webster. Id.; see also Palmer, 22 F.3d at 1567.
If after this appeal, however, no federal claim remains against
any of the defendants, the district court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims against both
Brown and Webster. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1993); see discussion
infra part IV.
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727,
2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In other words, "[t]he contours of
the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right."
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97
L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Qualified immunity protects "all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89
L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Therefore, "[f]or qualified immunity to be
surrendered, pre-existing law must dictate, that is truly compel
(not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the
conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent
that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the
circumstances." Lassiter v. Alabama A & M University, 28 F.3d
1146, 1150 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc).
This court has developed the following framework for analyzing
qualified immunity:
In Zeigler v. Jackson, [716 F.2d 847, 849 (11th Cir.1983),]
this Court established a two-step analysis to be used in
applying the Harlow test: the defendant government official
must prove that "he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts
occurred," and then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defendant "violated clearly established
constitutional law."
Sammons v. Taylor, 967 F.2d 1533, 1539 (11th Cir.1992).
Here, the district court found against Brown in both steps of
the two-step analysis. The district court concluded that Brown was
performing a ministerial duty, rather than acting with discretion,
when he moved McCoy from the sixth floor to the holding cell upon
being informed of the threat to McCoy's life. The district court
further held that even if Brown were acting within his
discretionary authority, McCoy had successfully demonstrated that
"a reasonable official in Lt. Brown's circumstances would have
known that [Brown's] conduct violated clearly established
constitutional law based upon the information available to him."
(R1-28-14) (internal quotations omitted). We disagree with the
district court's analysis under both steps.
The district court concluded that Brown was not acting with
discretion but merely performing a ministerial duty because the
Richmond County jail had a policy of moving inmates who were in
danger. We need not find that Brown's conduct was discretionary in
this sense in order to grant him qualified immunity. In Jordan v.
Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir.1994), we interpreted the term
"discretionary authority" to include actions that do not
necessarily involve an element of choice. In Jordan, we held that
qualified immunity was available to a government official whose
actions may be ministerial so long as the official's actions " "(1)
were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties,' and (2)
were "within the scope of his authority' ". Id. (quoting Rich v.
Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir.1988)). Brown's conduct
falls within this definition; he was acting within his authority
and pursuant to his duties as shift supervisor. Therefore, Brown
has met his burden by establishing that he was acting within the
scope of his discretionary authority.
Once Brown has established that he was acting within the scope
of his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to McCoy to
demonstrate that a reasonable official would have known that his
conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.
Zeigler, 716 F.2d at 849. The district court found that McCoy had
satisfied this burden and that Brown was therefore not entitled to
qualified immunity. We disagree.
As noted by the district court, a prison official's failure to
act in certain circumstances can amount to an infliction of cruel
and unusual punishment. An official's deliberate indifference to
a known danger violates an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290-91, 50
L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). More specifically, "[w]hen officials become
aware of a threat to an inmate's health and safety, the eighth
amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
imposes a duty to provide reasonable protection." Brown v. Hughes,
894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 928, 110
S.Ct. 2624, 110 L.Ed.2d 645 (1990), see also Hopkins v. Britton,
742 F.2d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir.1984). However, "[i]t is obduracy
and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that
characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause...." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106
S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). Furthermore, "[t]o be
cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be
punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care
for the prisoner's interests or safety." Id., 475 U.S. at 319, 106
S.Ct. at 1084.
McCoy contends that although Curry did not personally attack
him a second time, Curry was still responsible for the attack
because Curry was able to communicate to inmates on Cell Block West
through the glass partition. Additionally, McCoy argues that he
would not have been placed in either cell block on the sixth floor
if Brown had communicated the situation to the oncoming shift.
Finally, McCoy contends that Brown's failure to communicate the
situation to the oncoming shift demonstrates deliberate
indifference to McCoy's safety.
Here, Brown took measures to provide McCoy reasonable
protection. After making sure McCoy received medical attention,
Brown placed McCoy in a holding cell for the night. The tower
guard made a record of the situation in the log after receiving
instructions from Brown. Brown had nothing to do with McCoy's
transfer to Cell Block West on the sixth floor. McCoy was not
attacked by Curry and the attack did not occur until two days after
McCoy's return to the sixth floor. We conclude that a reasonable
prison official in Brown's position could have believed his conduct
to be lawful in light of the information he possessed.
It is unclear to us that Brown's omission rises to the level
of obduracy and wantonness required by Whitley. Accordingly, Brown
could reasonably believe that his failure to communicate the
situation to the oncoming shift was not unconstitutional.
Furthermore, Lassiter requires McCoy to point to a case in which
similar conduct was held to be deliberately indifferent in order to
demonstrate that his clearly established right was violated.
Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1151. McCoy has failed to do so and our
research reveals no such case. The district court, therefore,
erred in concluding that McCoy has satisfied his burden of
demonstrating that Brown's conduct violated a clearly established
right. Under these circumstances, Brown is entitled to qualified
immunity and we reverse the denial of summary judgment on the
section 1983 claim.
IV.
The district court also denied summary judgment on the state
tort claims McCoy asserts against Brown and Webster. Although we
have the discretion to review nonfinal decisions of the district
court because we properly have jurisdiction to review the denial of
qualified immunity, Swint, 5 F.3d at 1449, we decline to exercise
our pendent appellate jurisdiction over these nonfinal decisions.
Furthermore, because the district court's denial of summary
judgment on the federal claim against Brown is reversed, no federal
claim remains. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the district court
may decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction when all
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction have
4
been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The district court,
therefore, must revisit the state law claims.
V.
Because the law was not clearly established that Brown's
conduct, based on the information he possessed, violated McCoy's
Eighth Amendment right, Brown is entitled to qualified immunity.
4
Under some circumstances, we have held that a district
court abuses its discretion when it dismisses a pendent state law
claim after the statute of limitations has run. Edwards v.
Okaloosa Co., 5 F.3d 1431, 1435 (11th Cir.1993) (applying common
law pendent claim jurisdiction as it existed prior to the
enactment of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990). We express
no opinion as to whether there is a statute of limitations issue
in this case.
Therefore, we reverse the district court's denial of summary
judgment on the section 1983 claim against Brown. The state law
claims should be revisited following remand in light of the fact
that no federal claim remains.
REVERSED in part and REMANDED.