concurring.
I join in affirming the grant of summary judgment with one observation: Our decision in Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 516-17 (D.C.Cir.2000), and the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905 (4th Cir.1998), appear to be outliers in describing the fourth element of a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The description is inconsistent with the language of McDonnell Douglas, as opinions in eight circuits make clear. See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 353-54 & nn. 5-6 (3d Cir.1999) (listing cases from the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, including Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir.1996) (citing O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 450, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (1982))).