United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-8305.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,
v.
Gloria CROSBY, Sheriff of Columbia County (in her official
capacity) and Columbia County, Georgia, Defendants-Appellees,
Cross-Appellants.
July 27, 1995.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia. (No. CV192-26), Dudley H. Bowen, Jr., Judge.
Before KRAVITCH and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and GOODWIN*, Senior
Circuit Judge.
KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:
The United States appeals the district court's denial of
relief in this Title VII disparate treatment case. Sheriff Gloria
Crosby cross-appeals the district court's denial of attorneys'
fees.1 We AFFIRM.
I.
Carolyn Burbridge worked as a sergeant/shift supervisor in the
detention center at the Columbia County, Georgia, Sheriff's
Department. Her granddaughter was scheduled to serve as a page in
the Georgia General Assembly on February 2, 1988. Burbridge was
invited to accompany her granddaughter to Atlanta for the occasion.
Burbridge was slated to work February 2. She told Captain
*
Honorable Alfred T. Goodwin, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for
the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
1
Gloria Crosby succeeded Otis Hensley as Sheriff of Columbia
County after Hensley's death on October 17, 1994 and has replaced
Hensley as a named defendant in this lawsuit.
James Stottlemire, who was out on sick leave, that she wanted to go
to Atlanta. Stottlemire said that the matter would have to be
referred to Lieutenant James Gibbs, who had assumed Stottlemire's
duties during his absence. Burbridge did not ask Gibbs for leave;
instead, she told him that she was going to Atlanta on February 2.
Gibbs did not respond to Burbridge's statement. Burbridge went to
Atlanta on February 2 even though she knew that she had not been
granted leave.
Burbridge's detention center shift was short-handed that day.
When Burbridge did not report to work, Gibbs reported her absence
and recommended that she be terminated. Sheriff Hensley ordered
that Burbridge be fired if it were found that she was absent
without leave. After a perfunctory investigation revealed that she
did not have permission to miss work, Burbridge was terminated.
On February 12, 1992, the United States filed this action,
pursuant to its enforcement powers under Title VII,2 alleging that
Burbridge's cursory termination and the hasty investigation leading
to it constituted unlawful disparate treatment resulting from race
and gender discrimination.3
II.
A.
Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer—(1) to ... discharge any individual ...
2
On May 5, 1988, Burbridge filed a charge of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The
EEOC issued a cause determination and referred the case to the
Department of Justice with a recommendation that a Title VII
enforcement action be instituted. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
3
Burbridge is a black female.
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Disparate treatment
under Title VII occurs when "[t]he employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp.,
Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir.1994) (quoting International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.
15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (citations
omitted)).
When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, as here,
proof in a Title VII case follows the approach established by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93
S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Walker v. NationsBank of
Florida, N.A., 53 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir.1995); Armstrong, 33 F.3d at
1313-14. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case,
"which creates a rebuttable presumption of unlawful
discrimination." Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1313-14. Next, the
defendant may rebut the presumption established by the prima facie
case "by articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions."
Id. at 1313.
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113
S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), the Supreme Court
emphasized that once the defendant satisfies its burden of
articulating a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its
actions, the presumption of discrimination "simply drops out of the
picture" and the sole inquiry becomes whether the plaintiff has
proven intentional discrimination. See also Walker, 53 F.3d at
1560 (Johnson, J., concurring) (citing Hicks ). Evidence that
similarly situated employees were treated differently is of
probative value, but does not always establish that intentional
discrimination occurred. Id. (fact that defendant bank treated
similarly situated branch manager differently from plaintiff
insufficient to prove intentional discrimination).
B.
This case proceeded under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
After a bench trial, the district court determined that the United
States had made out a prima facie case but that defendants had
produced a nondiscriminatory reason for Burbridge's termination.
Accordingly, the court then focused on whether intentional
discrimination had been established. The district court explicitly
found that Sheriff Hensley, who terminated Burbridge, and
Lieutenant Gibbs, who recommended the termination, did not intend
to discriminate against Burbridge based upon her race or gender. 4
The district court attributed the severity of Burbridge's
punishment to her role as a supervisor, a need to set an example,
and a need to enhance discipline. The district court thus
concluded that "the disparate treatment that is sought to be proven
in this case is a hollow concept and not a reality."
C.
The United States contends on appeal that the district court
4
Lieutenant Gibbs is black. While we acknowledge that a
Title VII violation may occur even where a supervisor or
decision-maker is of the same race as the alleged victim, see
Billingsley v. Jefferson County, 953 F.2d 1351, 1353 (11th
Cir.1992), we note that the district court found that there was
no evidence that Gibbs held members of his own race to a higher
standard of conduct than members of another race.
did not properly consider evidence that certain white male
employees received more thorough disciplinary reviews and less
severe sanctions than Burbridge. The United States claims that
this evidence proves that Burbridge's harsh treatment was caused by
intentional racial and/or gender discrimination. The United States
also claims that the record does not support the district court's
finding that Burbridge received severe treatment because she was a
supervisor and because the Sheriff needed to be decisive and
effective in enforcing discipline.
We review a district court's finding regarding intentional
discrimination in a Title VII case for clear error. Moulds v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 935 F.2d 252, 255 (11th Cir.1991).
After a thorough trial, the district court determined that no
intentional discrimination occurred. It heard testimony from
Sergeant Burbridge, Sheriff Hensley, and Lieutenant Gibbs. The
court found Hensley's and Gibbs's testimony to be credible; it
found that Burbridge's was not.5 The district court determined
that any hostility Gibbs had toward Burbridge was due to
"personalities," not race or gender. Based on Hensley's testimony,
the court indicated that Burbridge's supervisory status and a need
for decisiveness had an impact on the decision to terminate her.
The district court also considered the Sheriff's treatment of
misconduct by white male employees. Many of the incidents cited by
the United States on appeal were included in the stipulation of
facts which the district court incorporated into its findings and
5
Credibility determinations are generally beyond the purview
of appellate courts. Walker, 53 F.3d at 1557.
conclusions. Other incidents were detailed in a list comprised of
actions taken against employees of the Sheriff charged with
misconduct between January 1, 1985 and May 8, 1992; this list was
introduced into evidence by the defendants. The district court
explicitly stated that it had considered the list, but noted that
the listed incidents did not change its decision.6
After reviewing the record, including all alleged incidents
of differential treatment noted in appellant's brief, we conclude
that the court's findings regarding intentional discrimination were
not clearly erroneous. The record contains no direct evidence of
intentional discrimination, and the circumstantial
evidence—incidents of more lenient treatment involving white
males—is not conclusive. None of the occurrences was substantially
similar to the events leading to Burbridge's termination because
none involved a supervisor who was absent from duty for an entire
day knowing that leave had not been granted.7 Because of the
6
The district court made no explicit factual findings as to
which incidents of misconduct by other employees were comparable
to Burbridge's, nor did the court state the impact particular
incidents had on the court's result. While such findings of fact
might have facilitated appellate review, they are not necessary
to decide this case.
7
Only three of the cited incidents of misconduct—those by
white male deputies Philip Stacy, Charles Johnson, and Tommy
Carter—involve absences from regular shifts. The record does not
contain evidence that any of these deputies planned his absence
ahead of time knowing that he had not been granted leave. Stacy
testified at trial that he did not recall the incident and
believed the record of it must be erroneous. Johnson's absence
was not termed "unexcused" in the record; instead, without
further explanation, the record shows that he failed to report
for duty one day in April 1985. Carter called in sick after his
shift had started on the day of his absence. These incidents are
distinguishable for two reasons: (1) because they do not
demonstrate the type of planned unexcused absence which occurred
in Burbridge's case, and (2) due to the district court's finding,
factual differences involved in all of these incidents, the
evidence offered by the United States does not so unequivocally
support a finding of intentional discrimination in Burbridge's
termination or the cursory investigation preceding it as to render
the district court's decision clearly erroneous.
Burbridge's termination was swift and severe. The record
could support an inference that Burbridge was treated more harshly
than other employees. Another district court, facing similar
evidence and making different credibility choices, might even
conclude that this differential treatment was caused by intentional
discrimination. We cannot, however, hold that this district court
clearly erred by not so concluding. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
III.
The final issue in this case is whether the district court
improperly refused to award attorneys' fees to the Sheriff pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).8 A defendant may recover attorneys'
fees under Section 2000e-5(k) if "the court finds that [the] claim
was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff
continued to litigate after it clearly became so." Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 701, 54
L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). We review the district court's decision to
deny attorneys' fees for abuse of discretion. Hill v. Seaboard
which is not clearly erroneous, that Burbridge's supervisory
status resulted in heightened discipline.
8
Section 2000e-5(k) provides: "In any action or proceeding
under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States,
a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of
the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be
liable for costs the same as a private person."
Coast Line R. Co., 767 F.2d 771, 775 (11th Cir.1985).
Our review of the record reveals that the district court did
not abuse its discretion. While the United States was ultimately
unable to prove intentional discrimination, its allegations were
not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, nor did they become so.
See Walker, 53 F.3d at 1558-59 (Title VII attorneys' fees for
defendants improper where plaintiff established prima facie case,
the case proceeded to trial, and the female plaintiff presented
evidence that similar male employee was not disciplined). We
therefore AFFIRM the district court's denial of attorneys' fees.
AFFIRMED.