Black v. City of Atlanta

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 93-9043.

Karen BLACK; Ronald Brock; Rick Grayson; Glenda Phillips;
Chet Gallagher; Joseph Foreman; Gary McCullough; Louis Vasquez;
Robert Roethlisberger; Dale Kahl; John Stetzer; Dena Neihouse;
Carolyn Brice; George Caldwell; Mary Marshall; Dan Rosenblit;
Jonathan Thoburn; Bryan Longworth; Raul Eugene Scott Hanson;
Virginia K. Dyer; Carolyn Kinsey; Daphne Holcomb; Suzanne Marie
Yingst; Connie Lee Garrett, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

CITY OF ATLANTA; Darrell L. Williams, Police Officer, in his
official and individual capacities; Jerry E. Price, Police
Officer, in his official and individual capacities; A.E.
Armstrong, Police Officer, in his official and individual
capacities; D. Marcus, Police Officer, in his official and
individual capacities; J.R. Freeman, Defendants-Appellants,

John Doe, 1-25, Defendant.

Aug. 16, 1995.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. (No. 1:91-01705-CV-MHS), Marvin H. Shoob,
Judge.

Before DUBINA, Circuit Judge, HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and
SIMONS*, Senior District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal grows out of a lawsuit filed by pro-life

demonstrators after they were arrested by City of Atlanta ("City")

police officers for disorderly conduct near the Feminist Women's

Health Center, a clinic located within the City limits where

abortions are performed. The plaintiffs alleged causes of action

for damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, against

the City and several of its law enforcement officers pursuant to

*
Honorable Charles E. Simons, Jr., Senior U.S. District
Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.
the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia law. On the eve of

trial, counsel for the parties reached an agreement in settlement

of the plaintiffs' claims. Based on that agreement, the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia entered

a consent order which incorporated the terms of the stipulation.

The City afterwards moved to set aside the consent order on the

ground that its attorneys lacked the authority to bind the

municipality to the agreement without the prior approval of the

City Council. The primary focus of the objection was the provision

for payment of monetary damages to the plaintiffs in the amount of

$37,500.00. The district court denied the City's motion and it

appealed. After oral argument, we concluded that the merits of the

appeal were governed by an unanswered question of Georgia law.

Consequently, we certified the following question to the Supreme

Court of Georgia:

DOES AN EXPRESS RESTRICTION ON A CITY ATTORNEY'S RIGHT TO
SETTLE A CAUSE OF ACTION, EMBODIED IN A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE,
WHICH IS NOT SPECIFICALLY COMMUNICATED BY THE CITY OR ITS
ATTORNEY TO AN OPPOSING PARTY, CIRCUMSCRIBE THE CITY
ATTORNEY'S APPARENT AUTHORITY TO BIND HIS CLIENT TO A
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT?

Black v. City of Atlanta, 35 F.3d 516, 518 (11th Cir.1994) ("Black

I ").1
The Supreme Court of Georgia has now answered the question in

the affirmative, holding that public sector attorneys are public

officers within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 45-6-5.2 City of Atlanta

1
Our earlier opinion contains a more detailed statement of
the relevant facts and proceedings, which need not be repeated
here.
2
O.C.G.A. § 45-6-5 provides that the "[p]owers of all public
officers are defined by law and all persons must take notice
v. Black, 265 Ga. 425, 457 S.E.2d 551, 552 (1995) ("Black II ").

The plaintiffs accordingly had a duty under Georgia law to apprise

themselves as to the scope of the City attorneys' capacity to bind

the municipality to the settlement contract, and failed to do so "

"at their peril.' " Id. (quoting Penitentiary Co. v. Gordon, 85

Ga. 159, 11 S.E. 584, 586 (1890)) (emphasis deleted). The state

court held moreover, citing O.C.G.A. § 1-3-6,3 that the plaintiffs

were presumptively charged with knowledge of a municipal ordinance

which proscribed the City's attorneys from settling any monetary

claim in excess of $500.00 without first obtaining City Council

approval. Id. 11 S.E. at 552-53. The court concluded that,

because of these restrictions on the power "of the

attorney-as-public-officer," the Georgia law governing the ability

of private sector attorneys to bind their clients, upon which the

district court relied, did not apply. Id. 11 S.E. at 553.

In light of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia, we

REVERSE the district court's order denying the appellants' motion

to set aside the consent decree and REMAND the case to the district

court for a trial on the merits.4

thereof. The public may not be estopped by the acts of any
officer done in the exercise of an unconferred power."
3
O.C.G.A. § 1-3-6 states that "the laws of [Georgia] are
obligatory upon all the inhabitants thereof. Ignorance of the
law excuses no one."
4
Of course, our ruling does not preclude the parties from
concluding a settlement agreement consistent with the decision of
the Supreme Court of Georgia in Black II.