United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-3134
Non-Argument Calendar.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Forrest Jerome FAISON, Defendant-Appellant.
Aug. 11, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. (No. 93-313-CR-T-23B), Steven D. Merryday,
Judge.
Before EDMONDSON, BIRCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In August 1993, a jury found defendant Forrest Faison guilty
of two counts of distribution of cocaine base in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court allowed defendant to remain
free on bond pending sentencing. In September 1993, while free on
bond, defendant was arrested and charged with being a convicted
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g). In December 1993, the district court adjudicated defendant
guilty on the cocaine distribution charges; and, in July 1994,
defendant plead guilty to the firearm charge.
This appeal is about the firearm charge. Defendant claims
that his conviction for being a convicted felon in possession of a
firearm must be dismissed because when he was released on bond he
had not yet been "convicted" on the cocaine charges. According to
Faison, a jury verdict of guilty, without an adjudication of guilt
by the district court or other notice that he had been convicted,
does not constitute a conviction for purposes of the firearms
statute.
As Faison's prior offenses were in federal court, federal law
controls whether a jury verdict constitutes a conviction supporting
a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. While
this case presents an issue of first impression in this circuit, in
United States v. Dougherty, 895 F.2d 399 (7th Cir.1990), the
Seventh Circuit held that a jury verdict of guilty amounted to
being "convicted" of the federal offense of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, even though no formal judgment of
conviction had been entered on the jury verdict. Id. at 403.*
And, in Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, 460 U.S. 103, 103 S.Ct.
986, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983), the Supreme Court held that an
individual is "convicted" under section 922(g) when he enters a
plea of guilty and is placed on probation, even without a written
adjudication of guilt. Id. at 112-14, 103 S.Ct. at 992. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that:
"[a] plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere
admission or an extrajudicial confession; it is itself a
conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More
is not required; the court has nothing to do but give
judgment and sentence."
Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 1113-14, 103 S.Ct. at 992.
*
Dougherty involved a defendant convicted of being a felon
in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1) which was
enacted as part of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968. In 1986, that section was repealed by
Pub.L. 99-308 § 104(b) and was incorporated into other sections
of the Code. This case involves the definition of the word
"convicted" under section 922(g) of Title IV of the Act. But, as
the Supreme Court has found "little significant difference
between Title IV and Title VII," see Lewis v. United States, 445
U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980), we think the
Seventh Circuit's holding in Dougherty persuasive.
While neither Dickerson nor Dougherty controls the issue
before this court today, those cases persuade us. We conclude that
a jury verdict of guilty constitutes a conviction for the purposes
of section 922(g) whether or not the court enters a formal judgment
adjudicating the defendant guilty. Because a jury found Faison
guilty of the cocaine charges, he was "convicted" of a felony
during the time he remained free on bond; so, he was a convicted
felon when found in possession of a firearm. Faison's conviction
is AFFIRMED.