United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-2257.
Gertrude LINDLEY, Julia Dolce, F.J. Burr, Bernadeen L. Burr, Eve
Montaldo, Mary Riedel, Paul Riedel, Lorence Tierney, William
Tierney, Eva Harm, Margueritte Mitchell Mann, Lassie Mayhue Meyer,
Ralph Meyer, Eubert F. Taffert, Irene Elbert, Gerald Purdy, Doris
Purdy, June Knistoft, Edward Knistoft, Msgr. Robichaud, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Dora Wade; Janice Oleson, Personal
Representative of the estate of Edna Bromhed; George Olmsted,
Personal Representative of the estate of Thelma Olmsted,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Henry CISNEROS and United States of America Department of Housing
and Urban Development, Defendants-Appellees.
Jan. 25, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. (No. 89-195-CIV-T-15B), Henry Lee Adams, Jr.,
Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, and DYER and GARTH *, Senior Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants are former tenants in a multi-story apartment
building known as the Mandalay Shores Apartments located in
Clearwater, Florida. At the time appellants were tenants, the
apartment building was owned by the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"); each appellant occupied his
or her apartment under a lease with HUD. In this action appellants
seek to recover money damages under both Florida landlord-tenant
law and their leases for HUD's failure, despite their pleas,
properly to maintain the apartment building and their respective
*
Honorable Leonard I. Garth, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for
the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
units.
Tenants of the same apartment complex similarly brought suit
in Mann v. Pierce, 803 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir.1986), also seeking to
recover damages under Florida landlord-tenant law and their leases.
They claimed that, while HUD was their landlord, the apartment
building was "infested with a wide array of vermin and that the
ceiling tiles were crumbling and spewing asbestos whenever the roof
leaked or the air conditioning was operated. [In addition, they
claimed that] HUD failed to make reasonable provisions for running
water and failed to maintain the project's elevators, plumbing,
roof and common areas. [They sought] redress, including equitable
restitution of rent paid while HUD ... maintained the project in
substandard conditions." Id. at 1554.
While Mann was pending in the district court, the Mandalay
Shores Cooperative Housing Association (the "Association"), which
had been a tenant in the building, brought suit to obtain the same
relief as the Mann plaintiffs. Its case and Mann were
consolidated. Thereafter, in an effort to obtain in a single
adjudication relief for all of the building's former tenants, the
plaintiffs in the consolidated cases sought class certification
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The district judge
presiding over the cases refused to certify a class, however,
because the causes of action of the individual plaintiffs were not
identical; the plaintiffs had separate leases and the facts
underpinning their claims were not likely to be common. Moreover,
HUD and the Secretary opposed the idea of a mass adjudication of
the tenants' claims.
In an effort to have the claims of all of the former tenants
resolved in the consolidated cases, the Association obtained
assignments from the tenants, the appellants here, and then moved
the court for leave to amend its complaint to bring the assigned
claims. HUD and the Secretary opposed the motion, claiming that
the assignments were invalid, and that consequently the Association
could not represent the assignors. The court denied the
Association's motion, concluding that allowing the Association to
proceed as the tenants' representative would not promote the
economic and speedy disposition of the controversy. The
adjudication of appellants' claims would be left to another day.
While the consolidated suit (of the Association and the Mann
plaintiffs) was pending, appellants brought the instant suit.
HUD and the Secretary prevailed in the consolidated case and
then moved for summary judgment in the instant case, contending
that the doctrine of res judicata foreclosed appellants' causes of
action. Appellants opposed the motion. They argued that the
defendants, having urged the court to reject the Association's
effort to litigate appellants' claims in the consolidated cases and
to defer consideration of these claims to another day, should stand
by their word. Common decency, if not fundamental due process,
they claimed, required that they be given their day in court.
The district court, while acknowledging the merits of
appellants' fairness argument, rejected their plea and granted the
defendants summary judgment. We reverse, and direct the court to
reinstate appellants' claims.
Res judicata does not bar a claim unless the parties to both
actions—here, appellants and either the Mann plaintiffs or the
Association (or both)—are identical or are in privity with one
another. See Richardson v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 935 F.2d
1240, 1244 (11th Cir.1991). The parties are not identical; nor
are they in privity with one another. HUD and the Secretary argue
that appellants were virtually represented in the prior litigation
by the Association. For a number of years, they point out, the
tenants, including appellants, had voluntarily aligned themselves
with and supported the goals of the Association. That may well be
so, but such an alignment does not alter the fact that appellants'
claims are based on their individual leases, that they assert
discrete breaches on HUD's part, and that they assert separate
injuries. After all, this is why HUD and the Secretary opposed
class certification in Mann, and this is why the district court
denied class certification.
As the district court stated when it rejected the
Association's attempt to litigate appellants' claims as appellants'
assignee: appellants will have their day in court—later. That
time is now. The judgment of the district court is accordingly
VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.