Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 94-2974.

William Sanford CHENEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANCHOR GLASS CONTAINER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Jan. 4, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. (No. 93-1636-CIV-J-16), John H. Moore, II,
Chief Judge.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, and DYER and GARTH *, Senior Circuit
Judges.

DYER, Senior Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from a final judgment entered for Appellee

Anchor Glass Container Corporation ("Anchor Glass"), pursuant to

the local rules for the Middle District of Florida, following a

nonbinding arbitration award. Appellant William Cheney ("Cheney")

filed an untimely motion to set aside the civil judgment and

demanded a trial de novo, which the district court denied. We hold

the district court abused its discretion and find that the late

filing was due to excusable neglect by Cheney's counsel.

I. BACKGROUND

Cheney originally filed this civil action pursuant to the

Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, §§ 760.01 et seq., and the Age

Discrimination Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.,

setting forth a cause of action for age discrimination in state

court. Anchor Glass removed the suit to the Middle District of

*
Honorable Leonard I. Garth, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for
the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
Florida. The district court referred the case to arbitration and

scheduled a hearing for May 18, 1994, based upon discussions with

counsel. Cheney's counsel thereafter initiated a motion to

continue the arbitration hearing due to a previously planned

vacation. Anchor Glass joined in the motion, but it was denied.

Cheney's lead counsel left for vacation, leaving a relatively

inexperienced associate attorney who did not have federal trial

court or arbitration experience to represent Cheney at the hearing.

On May 18th the arbitration panel found in favor of Anchor

Glass, determining that Cheney had presented a prima facie case of

discrimination, but had failed to prove that the reasons for

termination offered by Anchor Glass were pretextual. Under Local

Rule 8.05(b) for the Middle District of Florida an arbitration

award becomes final unless a request for a trial de novo is filed

within thirty days.1 The district court mailed a notice to Cheney

on May 18, 1994, informing him that he had until June 17, 1994, to

demand a trial de novo. The associate attorney did not think he

should file the demand without consulting the lead counsel.

Because the associate expected to be out of town when the lead

counsel returned from vacation, he told a secretary to advise the

lead counsel of the June 17th deadline. The secretary neglected to

relay the message. Hence, both attorneys erroneously assumed that

the demand for trial de novo had been filed by the other, and no

demand was filed. The Clerk accordingly entered judgment for

1
Rule 8.05(b) specifically provides as follows: "At the end
of thirty (30) days after the filing of the arbitrator's award
the Clerk shall enter judgment on the award if no timely demand
for trial de novo has been made pursuant to Rule 8.06."
Anchor Glass on June 20, 1994.

For approximately thirty days between the panel's decision and

the parties' receipt of the judgment, the lawsuit proceeded as

though there was no award. Cheney contends this was because

neither side believed, even before the hearing, that the

arbitration would dispose of the suit. Indeed, the award was

nonbinding, and the parties continued with discovery and engaged in

settlement discussions from May 18th until receipt of the judgment.

Immediately upon receiving the judgment, Cheney's attorneys

moved to set it aside on the grounds of excusable neglect, and

demanded a trial de novo, but by then the demand was six days late.

The district judge refused to set the judgment aside and this

appeal ensued.

II. DISCUSSION

We must decide whether the failure to timely demand a trial

de novo in this case constitutes "excusable neglect" within the

meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Rule 60(b)

provides in relevant part: "On motion and upon such terms as are

just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal

representative from a final judgment ... for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect...."2

2
Rule 60(b) motions are directed to the sound discretion of
the district court, and we will set aside the denial of relief
from such motion only for abuse of that discretion. Solaroll
Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 1130,
1131-32 (11th Cir.1986); Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d
396, 402 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981); Fackelman v. Bell, 564
F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir.1977). The district court's discretion in
this area, however, is not unbounded. Seven Elves, 635 F.2d at
402. We will reverse a district court's ruling on a 60(b) motion
as an abuse of discretion, for example, where the district court
applies an incorrect legal standard.
 While we have been at some pain to define "excusable neglect"

in different fact situations, see, e.g., Solaroll Shade, Varnes v.

Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 674 F.2d 1365 (11th

Cir.1982), and Seven Elves. The Supreme Court has now clarified

the meaning of "excusable neglect" in Pioneer Investment Services

Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 113

S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). There the Court held that a

bankruptcy court abused its discretion by refusing to permit the

late filing of a proof of claim pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule

9006(b)(1). In reaching its decision, the Court reviewed the

meaning of excusable neglect in the context of analogous rules that

allow for late filings. It stated that "for purposes of Rule

60(b), "excusable neglect' is understood to encompass situations in

which the failure to comply with a filing deadline is attributable

to negligence." Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1497. The Court

concluded that whether a party's neglect of a deadline may be

excused is an equitable decision turning on "all relevant

circumstances surrounding the party's omission." Id. at ----, 113

S.Ct. at 1498 (citations and footnotes omitted). The factors we

must weigh include "the danger of prejudice to the [opposing

party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on

judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether

it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the

movant acted in good faith." Id.

The relevant circumstances weigh in Cheney's favor. In

Pioneer, the Supreme Court accorded primary importance to the

absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party and to the interest of
efficient judicial administration in determining whether the

district court had abused its discretion. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct.

at 1499. In the instant case, the lack of prejudice to Anchor

Glass is similarly key. Anchor Glass does not argue that it

suffered any prejudice because Cheney filed his request for a trial

de novo six days late. We see nothing indicating Anchor Glass was

lulled or otherwise prejudiced by the untimely filing; rather, the

settlement discussions and continuing discovery indicate that both

parties expected to continue litigating regardless of the

arbitration panel's decision. Furthermore, we see no adverse

impact on the district court or its resources by permitting the

case to be tried as it would have been had Cheney complied with

Local Rule 8.06.

The reason for the delayed filing was a failure in

communication between the associate attorney and the lead counsel.

The circumstances of the error were obviously within counsel's

control, but their noncommunication and resulting inaction amounts

only to an "omission[ ] caused by carelessness." See id. at ----,

113 S.Ct. at 1495. In other words, their failure to comply with

the filing deadline is attributable to negligence. There is no

indication that counsel deliberately disregarded Local Rule 8.06.

Anchor Glass has not argued that Cheney intended to delay the

trial, or that he sought an advantage by filing late. The

nonfiling was simply an innocent oversight by counsel. We find no

bad faith that would warrant forfeiture of Cheney's right to a full

trial of his cause.

On balance, the lack of prejudice to Anchor Glass, the
minimal degree of delay and the reason therefor, and the lack of

impact on the judicial proceedings, when coupled with the lack of

bad faith on the part of Cheney, require a finding by the district

court that the neglect of Cheney's counsel was "excusable." The

district court's failure to so find and to apply the correct legal

standard and factors as announced in Pioneer constitute an abuse of

discretion. For these reasons, we REMAND the case to the district

court for further proceedings on the merits of Cheney's claim.