United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-4962
Non-Argument Calendar.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Michael John Anthony HUTCHINSON, a/k/a Miguel, a/k/a Chino,
Defendant-Appellant.
Feb. 16, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. (No. 94-6150-CR-DTKH), Daniel T.K. Hurley,
Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, and HATCHETT and CARNES, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Hutchinson pleaded guilty to an indictment charging
him with one count of possession of a firearm during a crime of
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and one count of
carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119. His conditional
guilty plea preserved the issue of the constitutionality of the
carjacking statute, which is the only issue he raises on appeal.
Hutchinson contends that 18 U.S.C. § 2119, The Anti-Car Theft
Act of 1992, commonly referred to as the carjacking statute, is a
constitutionally impermissible exercise of Congress' commerce
clause authority in light of the holding in United States v. Lopez,
--- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995).
Hutchinson's contention is foreclosed by our decision in United
States v. Williams, 51 F.3d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
--- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 258, 133 L.Ed.2d 182 (1995), which
specifically held that Congress did not exceed its power under the
commerce clause in enacting the federal carjacking statute. The
Williams decision was released thirteen days after the Lopez
decision, and accordingly stands for the proposition that Lopez
does not require a holding that the carjacking statute is
unconstitutional. If it did, Williams would have been decided
differently.
Hutchinson asks that we "revisit" the holding in Williams,
but one panel of this Court cannot revisit another panel's
decision. E.g., United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th
Cir.1993) ("it is the firmly established rule of this Circuit that
each succeeding panel is bound by the holding of the first panel to
address an issue of law, unless and until that holding is overruled
en banc, or by the Supreme Court"). Moreover, we note that the
five other circuits that have addressed the issue in the wake of
Lopez have all held that notwithstanding that decision the
carjacking statute is a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause
power. E.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 585 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 681, 133 L.Ed.2d 529 (1995);
United States v. Green, 62 F.3d 1418 (6th Cir.) (unpublished
opinion), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 543, 133 L.Ed.2d
447 (1995); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 234, 236-37 (8th
Cir.1995); United States v. Carolina, 61 F.3d 917 (10th Cir.1995)
(unpublished opinion); United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 549-
50 (9th Cir.1995).
AFFIRMED.