This action by appellees against appellant was to quiet title to real estate, and to set aside a deed made to appellant for said real estate. There were three paragraphs of complaint, the first to quiet title, the second to set aside a deed to such real estate because of the alleged unsound mind of the grantor at the time of its execution, and to quiet title, and the third to set aside such deed because of undue influence, and to quiet title. Each paragraph was answered in general denial, and the cause was submitted to a jury which returned a general verdict for appellees, with an answer to an interrogatory that the grantor in such deed was not of unsound mind. The verdict was therefore based on the first and third paragraphs of complaint. The only error presented is that the court erred in overruling
It is disclosed by the evidence that appellant’s alleged grantor undertook to dispose of the land to appellant, both by the deed in contest, and by her will devising the .same to him. It is appellant’s contention that appellees can have an interest in the land only when both the deed and the will are set aside, and that as the validity of the will is not involved in this suit, it still stands. It is self evident that if the will which is dated July 2, 1914, is valid, the legal title to the land passed by the devise to appellant regardless of the validity of the deed, which was dated October 1, 1914.
1. The first paragraph of complaint was, as has been noted, a suit to quiet title, to which an answer in general denial was filed. With issues so formed, appellant might, and was required to present every defense, legal or equitable, which he had. Kaufman v. Preston (1902), 158 Ind. 361, 63 N. E. 570; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Grantham (1905), 165 Ind. 279, 75 N. E. 265; Green v. Glynn (1880), 71 Ind. 336.
Appellant claiming title by will, introduced the same in evidence, and it was thereby drawn into issue as a conflicting title. Appellees contend that the jury’s verdict for appellees, followed by the judgment thereon, completely abrogated such will as a muniment of title to the real estate involved. It is to be observed that the will introduced in evidence had been duly admitted to probate, and that the evidence consisted of a certified copy of such will, together with an order admitting the same to probate. The question then which we must determine is as to whether the will can be invalidated by the verdict of the jury in a proceeding such as in the instant case.
4. That the verdict of the jury in this case constitutes a collateral attack upon the will involved will hardly be denied. Appellees have cited the case of Putt v. Putt (1897), 149 Ind. 30, 48 N. E. 356, 51 N. E. 337, as an authority sustaining their contention that any superior title claimed by appellant through a deed, a will, or any other source, is drawn into issue by an answer in general denial, and forever adjudicated by the verdict and judgment, and that appellees having defeated the defense of the will, such will is thereby declared invalid, but the authority is not in point in