United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-8751.
SUNAMERICA CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, f/k/a Sun Life
Group of America, Sun Life Insurance Company of America, a Maryland
Corporation, Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants,
v.
SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, a Canadian Corporation, Sun
Life Assurance Company of Canada (U.S.), a Delaware Corporation,
Defendants-Counterclaimants-Appellees.
March 19, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. (No. 1:89-CV-1315), Jack T. Camp, Judge.
Before DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and MILLS*, District
Judge.
CARNES, Circuit Judge:
This trademark case concerns a dispute between two insurance
companies over the right to use the mark SUN LIFE. The plaintiffs
are SunAmerica Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Sun
Life Insurance Company of America ("Sun Life of America")
(collectively, "SunAmerica"). The defendants are Sun Life
Assurance Company of Canada and its subsidiary, Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada (U.S.) (collectively, "Sun Life of Canada").
SunAmerica appeals from a judgment entered in favor of Sun Life of
Canada on a counterclaim it brought against SunAmerica. The
district court's judgment permanently enjoined SunAmerica from
further use of any SUN LIFE mark.
Although Sun Life of Canada is the senior user of the SUN LIFE
*
Honorable Richard Mills, U.S. District Judge for the
Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
mark, it acquiesced in SunAmerica's use of the mark. That
acquiescence would estop Sun Life of Canada from asserting its
counterclaim, were it not for the existence of "inevitable
confusion" in the marketplace. The existence of inevitable
confusion operates to revive a senior user's claim that is
otherwise estopped by acquiescence. However, we hold in this
opinion that where such revival occurs, the district court must
consider the feasibility and efficacy of relief other than a
complete injunction against the junior user. Because the district
court's order is ambiguous as to whether it adequately considered
the feasibility and efficacy of alternative forms of relief, we
remand the case for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June 1989, SunAmerica brought federal unfair competition
and trademark infringement claims, and related state law claims,
against Sun Life of Canada, alleging that Sun Life of Canada's use
of the marks SUN LIFE (U.S.) and SUN LIFE, without any reference to
the geographic modifier "of Canada," was causing unacceptable
marketplace confusion. In response, Sun Life of Canada
counterclaimed against SunAmerica for trademark infringement,
seeking to enjoin SunAmerica from all use of the SUN LIFE mark.
Both parties moved for summary judgment.
The district court found confusing similarity between the
parties' marks. In particular, the district court found that the
mark SUN LIFE (U.S.) was likely to be confused with the mark SUN
LIFE OF AMERICA. Accordingly, the district court permanently
enjoined Sun Life of Canada from using the mark SUN LIFE (U.S.)
without some form of the geographic modifier "of Canada." Sun Life
of Canada appealed.
On appeal, in a brief per curiam opinion, this Court held that
the district court had erred by entering a permanent injunction
without first resolving Sun Life of Canada's counterclaim. We
vacated the permanent injunction issued by the district court and
remanded the case for consideration of that counterclaim.
SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1505,
1506, 974 F.2d 1348 (11th Cir.1992) (hereinafter "SunAmerica I ").
In a concurring opinion, Judge Birch provided not only a thorough
summary of the facts and procedural history of the case through
that stage, but also a detailed analytical framework to guide the
parties and the district court on remand. Id. at 1506-13, 974 F.2d
1348 (Birch, J., concurring). We adopt Judge Birch's concurring
opinion in its entirety as our statement of the facts and
procedural history up through the time of the SunAmerica I
decision. We also adopt as the law of the circuit his opinion's
pronouncements about the relevant law. Because Judge Birch's
concurring opinion in SunAmerica I has not previously been
published in the Federal Reporter system, we attach that opinion
and the per curiam opinion it accompanied, as an appendix to this
opinion, infra pp. ---- - ----.
On remand after SunAmerica I, the district court found that
Sun Life of Canada had enforceable rights in its SUN LIFE marks and
that a likelihood of confusion existed between the names SUN LIFE
OF AMERICA and SUN LIFE OF CANADA. The district court also found,
however, that Sun Life of Canada had acquiesced to SunAmerica's use
of its allegedly infringing marks. Such acquiescence operates to
estop a senior user's trademark claim against a junior user's use
of the mark unless there is inevitable confusion between the marks.
Coach House Restaurant v. Coach and Six Restaurants, 934 F.2d 1551,
1564 (11th Cir.1991). Applying that standard to the facts, the
district court found that inevitable confusion existed between the
parties' names and that this inevitable confusion revived Sun Life
of Canada's trademark rights. Accordingly, the district court
permanently enjoined SunAmerica from any further use of the SUN
LIFE mark.1
SunAmerica filed motions to alter or amend the judgment, to
stay the judgment pending appeal, and for a new trial. The
district court denied these motions, and SunAmerica filed with this
Court an Emergency Motion to Stay Injunction Pending Appeal and to
Expedite Appeal. We denied the motion to stay, but granted the
motion to expedite the appeal. While the appeal was pending,
SunAmerica complied with the injunction by changing the name of Sun
Life of America to "SunAmerica Life Insurance Company."
II. WHETHER THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS MOOT
A. THE ESTOPPEL ISSUE
In support of its motion to stay the injunction pending
appeal, SunAmerica repeatedly represented to the district court
that if it complied with the district court's injunction by
changing its name from Sun Life Insurance Company of America, it
would be impossible, from both a commercial and regulatory
1
The district court also enjoined SunAmerica from further
use of SUN FINANCIAL SERVICES, but SunAmerica does not appeal
that aspect of the injunction.
standpoint, to later revert back to that name if SunAmerica
prevailed on appeal. For example, SunAmerica's senior
vice-president and general counsel stated in an affidavit that once
a name change had been implemented, the change would be
"essentially irreversible" and that reverting back to the prior
name would be "commercially impossible." SunAmerica's counsel made
numerous representations to the district court to the effect that
"[e]ven if Sun Life of America were to prevail on appeal, it could
not revert, either as a legal or practical matter, to its Sun Life
of America name," and that "to deny a stay is to effectively deny
any appellate relief." The district court rejected this argument
and denied SunAmerica's motion for a stay, finding that a name
change could be reversed if SunAmerica prevailed on appeal.
Echoing its refrain from the district court, SunAmerica made
repeated representations to this Court, in connection with its
emergency motion to stay, that compliance with the district court's
injunction would "effectively moot and deny appellate rights and
relief." SunAmerica made no fewer than eight such representations
in its Emergency Motion to Stay Injunction Pending Appeal and to
Expedite Appeal, including, for example, the following statements:
(1) [I]mplementing a name change is irreversible and would
effectively moot Appellants' right of appeal.
(2) [O]nce [SunAmerica] begins to implement a name change, as a
matter of commercial practicality it cannot reverse it. It
will have lost ... its right to an appeal.
(3) [U]nless its initiation of the [compliance] process is stayed
pending appeal, ... Sun Life of America's right of appeal will
be a nullity.
A panel of this Court nonetheless denied SunAmerica's motion for a
stay pending appeal, and SunAmerica has complied with the
injunction by changing its name.
The vigor with which SunAmerica argued that the name change
would moot this appeal is matched only by the vigor with which it
now argues, having been forced to change its name, that the appeal
is not moot after all. The same corporation and attorneys who
unequivocally represented to the district court and this Court that
a name change would be irreversible "as a matter of commercial
practicality," now just as unequivocally represent to this Court
that the practical effects of the name change are, in fact,
reversible. Such a sea change in factual representations prompted
us to ask SunAmerica's counsel at oral argument which of their
statements were false: the ones they made while seeking a stay, or
the ones they made after the stay was denied.
The essence of counsel's response was that the representations
were not really inconsistent because, even if it were commercially
impractical for SunAmerica to "officially" revert back to its
former name, relief from the injunction would permit SunAmerica to
make other beneficial use of the SUN LIFE mark, such as using the
mark in connection with a subsidiary created to market insurance
products that the marketplace already associated with the Sun Life
of America name. Therefore, reasoned counsel, the name change did
not moot this appeal. Of course, SunAmerica was careful to omit
any mention of the possibility of subsidiary use of the mark when
it was insisting that a name change would moot this appeal.
SunAmerica's representations to the district court and this Court
that the name change would be irreversible and as a result its
appeal would be moot necessarily carried with them a representation
that, absent a stay, no relief would be available to SunAmerica if
it prevailed on appeal. Or, as SunAmerica put it, unless the name
change was stayed its "right of appeal [would] be a nullity."
Either an appeal is mooted by a particular event or it is not.
Whether a particular event moots an appeal does not change
depending upon whether a party wishes that event to occur. Here,
SunAmerica made a clear factual representation, backed up with
affidavits, that a name change would moot this case, but now
unabashedly makes the opposite factual representation. Attorneys
should not, in the guise of "effective advocacy," make, or
participate in making, factual representations to courts that are
not true. If a party represents to the court that the opposite of
what he previously has represented about a factual matter is true,
he owes the court a satisfactory explanation for the contradictory
representations. This is especially the case where, as here, the
factual matters being represented (or misrepresented) are
particularly within the knowledge of the parties whose attorneys
are making the representations.
The type of tactics SunAmerica's counsel have employed in
this case invite us to fashion a doctrine that would estop
SunAmerica from asserting at this stage of the appeal the opposite
of what it had asserted earlier. In other words, we could hold
that because SunAmerica repeatedly represented to the district
court and to this Court that a name change would be irreversible
and would moot this appeal, it is now estopped from denying that
fact. We decline to dispose of this case on that ground for two
reasons. First, we have not previously put parties and their
counsel on notice of such a doctrine, at least not in the context
of mootness questions. We do so now. All future parties and their
counsel are on notice that if they make factual representations in
the district court or in this Court that denial of a stay will moot
the appeal, they may be estopped from arguing after the stay is
denied that the appeal is not moot.2 The second reason that we
will not hold that SunAmerica is equitably estopped from denying
that the name change is irreversible and the case is moot is that
the district court expressly found to the contrary. In denying the
motion for stay pending appeal, the district court rejected
SunAmerica's representations and found as a fact that a name change
would not be irreversible. In other words, the district court was
not fooled. The outcome of the estoppel analysis could well be
different in a future case where there is no express factfinding
2
SunAmerica argued to this Court that if we were to hold
that this case is moot, we would be under a duty to vacate the
judgment and injunctive orders of the district court under the
principles of United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36,
39, 71 S.Ct. 104, 106, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950) (noting the
"established practice" of vacating judgments in moot cases).
Because we decline to dismiss SunAmerica's appeal as moot on
equitable principles, it is unnecessary for us to resolve
definitively this question. We do note, however, that vacatur is
an equitable remedy. E.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner
Mall Partnership, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. 386, 390-
92, 130 L.Ed.2d 233 (1994). Were we to enforce an equitable
doctrine of mootness by estoppel, we would apply equitable
principles in determining whether to vacate the district court's
judgment in order to "dispose[ ] of the moot case[ ] in the
manner "most consonant to justice.' " Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at
391 (quoting United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-
Actien Gesellschaft, 239 U.S. 466, 477, 36 S.Ct. 212, 216, 60
L.Ed. 387 (1916) (quoting South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v.
Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U.S. 300, 302, 12 S.Ct. 921,
921, 36 L.Ed. 712 (1892))). We could hardly be expected to grant
the equitable remedy of vacatur where doing so would have the
inequitable effect of rewarding a party for making inconsistent
representations to this Court.
contrary to the representation in question.
B. TRADITIONAL MOOTNESS ANALYSIS
Having decided not to bar SunAmerica's present position on
the mootness issue, we must now decide, using traditional doctrine,
whether the case became moot when SunAmerica complied with the
district court's injunction by changing the name of Sun Life
Insurance Company of America. We conclude that it did not, because
this Court could grant meaningful relief to SunAmerica if it were
to prevail on this appeal.
Regardless of whether it is, in fact, "commercially
impossible" for SunAmerica formally to reverse the name change
process, relief from the district court's injunction would permit
other commercial utilization of the SUN LIFE mark, such as using
the mark in connection with a subsidiary created to market
insurance products that the marketplace already associates with the
Sun Life of America name. In other words, we think that
SunAmerica's latest factual representations are true; its earlier
ones were not. A case does not become moot simply because an
appellate court is unable completely to restore the parties to the
status quo ante. Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S.
9, 12-14, 113 S.Ct. 447, 450, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992). The ability
of the appellate court to "effectuate a partial remedy" is
sufficient to prevent mootness. Id.; see also, e.g., United
States v. Florida Azalea Specialists, 19 F.3d 620, 622 (11th
Cir.1994) (holding that appeal was not moot because the appellate
court "could effectuate a partial remedy"). Because potential
relief remains available to SunAmerica, we hold that this case is
not moot and that we have jurisdiction to decide the merits of this
appeal. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92
S.Ct. 402, 404, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971) (holding that federal courts
must resolve questions of mootness before assuming jurisdiction).
III. WHETHER THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF GRANTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT
WAS APPROPRIATE
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Determination of this appeal requires consideration of: (1)
the factfindings of the district court; (2) the district court's
application of the law; and (3) the injunctive relief granted. We
review the factfindings of the district court, to the extent they
are properly presented on appeal, under the clearly erroneous
standard. E.g., Newell v. Prudential Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 644, 649
(11th Cir.1990). The district court's application of the law is
subject to de novo review. E.g., Church v. City of Huntsville, 30
F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir.1994). We review the district court's
grant of injunctive relief for abuse of discretion, e.g., Panama
City Medical Diagnostic v. Williams, 13 F.3d 1541, 1545 (11th
Cir.1994), meaning we must affirm unless we at least determine that
the district court has made a "clear error of judgment," United
States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 745 (11th Cir.1989), or has applied
an incorrect legal standard, Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container
Corp., 71 F.3d 848, 849 n. 2 (11th Cir.1996).
B. FACTFINDINGS OF THE DISTRICT COURT
A review of the key factfindings of the district court
provides the backdrop to the legal analysis governing this case.
Among the key ones are findings that:
(1) Sun Life of Canada is the senior user of the SUN LIFE mark.
(2) The likelihood of confusion among the SUN LIFE marks used by
Sun Life of Canada and SunAmerica is "powerful" and
"substantial." In fact, the confusion among the marks is
"inevitable."
(3) The present confusion is not the result of Sun Life of Canada's
actions.
(4) Neither the use of geographic modifiers nor the subdivision of
channels of distribution is sufficient to remedy the present
confusion.
In its brief to this Court, SunAmerica states that the issues
it raises on appeal are questions of law subject to de novo review.
SunAmerica has not explicitly argued in the briefs or at oral
argument that any of the district court's factfindings are clearly
erroneous. With one possible exception, SunAmerica does not even
implicitly challenge any of the district court's findings of fact.
As this Court has held repeatedly, "[a]n argument not made is
waived." Continental Technical Servs. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 927
F.2d 1198, 1199 (11th Cir.1991); see also, e.g., Stepak v.
Addison, 20 F.3d 398, 412 (11th Cir.1994) (holding that issue not
addressed on appeal is waived); Roach v. M/V Aqua Grace, 857 F.2d
1575, 1578 n. 1 (11th Cir.1988) (stating that district court's
factual determination "has not been contested on appeal, and
appellant's argument to the contrary has thus been abandoned").
Although SunAmerica does not challenge directly any of the
district court's findings of fact, it does argue that the district
court erred in failing to consider "whether the actions of Sun Life
of Canada after acquiescence served to create additional
confusion." The premise of this argument is contradicted by the
district court's express finding that the "[p]laintiffs have not
shown that the present confusion is the result of Defendant's
actions." That finding is not clearly erroneous. Because all of
SunAmerica's potential challenges to the district court's
factfindings are waived, without merit, or both, we turn now to a
discussion of the legal issues.
C. THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVING ACQUIESCENCE, INEVITABLE
CONFUSION, AND THE REVIVAL OF CLAIMS
To establish a prima facie case in an ordinary trademark
infringement suit, a claimant need only demonstrate that: (1) it
enjoys enforceable rights in its mark, and (2) the alleged
infringer adopted a mark that is the same or confusingly similar.
E.g., Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1512 (11th
Cir.1984). Sun Life of Canada demonstrated both of these elements
to the district court, something that SunAmerica does not dispute.
Because Sun Life of Canada established a prima facie case, the
district court was required to analyze SunAmerica's affirmative
defenses. SunAmerica I, 24 U.S.P.Q. at 1509, 974 F.2d 1348, infra
pp. ---- - ---- (Birch, J., concurring).
SunAmerica raised the affirmative defense of acquiescence.
Acquiescence is an equitable defense that denotes active consent by
a senior user to another's use of the mark. Coach House, 934 F.2d
at 1558. The defense requires proof of three elements: (1) the
senior user actively represented that it would not assert a right
or a claim; (2) the delay between the active representation and
assertion of the right or claim was not excusable; and (3) the
delay caused the defendant undue prejudice. Id. The district
court considered SunAmerica's proof on these points and concluded
that "[i]n this case, the facts show that Sun Life of Canada
acquiesced to [SunAmerica's] use of the allegedly infringing
marks." Sun Life of Canada does not challenge that conclusion.
Ordinarily, an acquiescence defense estops a senior user from
asserting rights against a party for the use of the mark to which
the senior user consented. See SunAmerica I, 24 U.S.P.Q. at 1511,
974 F.2d 1348, infra pp. ---- - ---- (Birch, J., concurring);
Coach House, 934 F.2d at 1564. Additionally, the existence of
acquiescence creates a legal duty on the part of the senior user to
respect the junior user's mark and to avoid creating confusion with
it. SunAmerica I, 24 U.S.P.Q. at 1511, 974 F.2d 1348, infra pp. --
-- - ---- (Birch, J., concurring). Insofar as the senior user's
and junior user's rights and duties respecting one another are
concerned, acquiescence causes both users' marks to "stand in
parity." Id. at 1512, 974 F.2d 1348, infra p. ----. "After
acquiescence, the senior user and junior user must treat one
another's marks with equal dignity." Id. at 1511, 974 F.2d 1348,
infra p. ----.
However, the defense of acquiescence is not absolute. Upon
a showing that "inevitable confusion"3 arises from the continued
dual use of the marks, a senior user's claim may be revived from
estoppel. Id. at 1510, 974 F.2d 1348, infra p. ----; Coach House,
934 F.2d at 1564; Iodent Chem. v. Dart Drug Corp., 207 U.S.P.Q.
602, 607 (T.T.A.B.1980). As we explained in Coach House, the
3
Due to the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry,
"inevitable confusion" does not lend itself to a formulaic,
mechanical definition. For present purposes, it is sufficient to
note that "the standard of confusion required for a finding of
inevitability of confusion is an increment higher than that
required for a finding of a likelihood of confusion." Coach
House Restaurant v. Coach and Six Restaurants, 934 F.2d 1551,
1564 (11th Cir.1991).
purpose of such a revival is to vindicate the public interest in
avoiding inevitable confusion in the marketplace: "Although [the
senior user] has acquiesced in use of their logo by the [junior
user], the public interest in preventing confusion around the
marketplace is paramount to any inequity caused the [junior user].
Consequently, if there is an inevitability of confusion, [the
senior user's] law suit may be revived from estoppel." Coach
House, 934 F.2d at 1564. Here, the district court found inevitable
confusion and held that the public interest required revival of Sun
Life of Canada's prior trademark rights.
As noted previously, SunAmerica does not dispute the district
court's factual finding of inevitable confusion. Instead, it
advances two alternative theories to challenge the district court's
legal analysis about inevitable confusion. First, SunAmerica
argues that the concept of inevitable confusion applies solely to
trademark registration and has no application in the infringement
suit context. This argument is squarely foreclosed by our contrary
holding in Coach House, 934 F.2d at 1564. See, e.g., Davis v.
Estelle, 529 F.2d 437, 441 (5th Cir.1976) (holding that "[o]ne
panel of this Court cannot disregard the precedent set by a prior
panel").
Second, SunAmerica argues that the district court erred by
"automatically" reviving Sun Life of Canada's claim from estoppel.
As SunAmerica correctly notes, we said in Coach House that "if
there is an inevitability of confusion, petitioner's law suit may
be revived from estoppel." Coach House, 934 F.2d at 1564.
SunAmerica seizes on the single word "may" to urge that a district
court has considerable discretion in determining whether a senior
user's claim should be revived from estoppel after a finding of
inevitable confusion, and argues that a court should engage in an
intricate balancing test before deciding how to exercise that
discretion. This argument illustrates the misunderstandings that
can arise from a myopic focus on a single word.
We do not read Coach House to require district judges to
engage in a complex balancing test to determine whether, after a
showing of inevitable confusion, a senior user's claim is revived
from estoppel. As we explained elsewhere in the Coach House
opinion, "In the event that petitioner ... proves the inevitability
of confusion required to survive the estoppel by acquiescence in
use at trial, the district court will have to address petitioner's
newest claims of servicemark infringement and unfair competition."
Id. at 1565 (emphasis added). In other words, unless an
acquiescent senior user shows inevitable confusion, estoppel bars
the senior user's claims; those claims may not (meaning "cannot")
be revived. When inevitable confusion is shown, however, the
senior user is no longer estopped; thus we say that the
previously-estopped claims "may" now be heard, not because a
discretionary test has entered the analysis, but because that which
was previously disallowed is now allowed. When that happens, the
district court, as we said, "will have to address" the senior
user's claims.
Moreover, SunAmerica's proposed balancing test would add an
additional layer of complexity to an analysis that is already, of
necessity, complex. Accordingly, the district court did not err by
reviving, upon a showing of inevitable confusion, Sun Life of
Canada's claims that were otherwise estopped by acquiescence. The
kind of balancing and exercise of discretion for which SunAmerica
calls is appropriate when the district court must decide what
relief to fashion after a senior user prevails on a revived claim,
but not earlier in the process when the district court is deciding
whether the senior user has "prove[n] the inevitability of
confusion required to survive the estoppel by acquiescence." Coach
House, 934 F.2d at 1565.
D. FASHIONING EQUITABLE RELIEF FOR REVIVED CLAIMS
Once a senior user demonstrates the inevitable confusion
required to revive a claim otherwise estopped by acquiescence, the
district court must determine the scope and nature of relief to be
granted. The senior user's ability to make out a prima facie case
will already have been established before consideration of
affirmative defenses, such as acquiescence. See SunAmerica I, 24
U.S.P.Q. at 1509, 974 F.2d 1348, infra pp. ---- - ---- (Birch, J.,
concurring). Therefore, the only task remaining before the
district court will be to determine the remedy best suited to meet
the goals of eliminating the inevitable confusion and protecting
the public interest.
Section 34(a) of the Lanham Act directs district courts to
apply traditional equitable principles when fashioning injunctive
relief in trademark cases: "The several courts vested with
jurisdiction of civil actions arising under this Act shall have
power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity
and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable ...." 15
U.S.C.A. § 1116(a) (West Supp.1995) (emphasis added). Equitable
principles require consideration of the unique circumstances of
each case, with due regard for flexibility, practicality, and the
public interest:
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the
Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the
necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than
rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and
practicality have made equity the instrument for nice
adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and
private needs as well as between competing private claims.
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30, 64 S.Ct. 587, 592, 88
L.Ed. 754 (1944).
In trademark cases, the scope of the injunction to be entered
depends upon the manner in which plaintiff is harmed, the
possible means by which that harm can be avoided, the
viability of the defenses raised, and the burden that would be
imposed on defendant and the potential effect on competition
between the parties.... "The law requires that courts closely
tailor injunctions to the harm that they address."
4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, § 30.03[1] (4th ed. 1995) (quoting ALPO Petfoods v.
Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 972 (D.C.Cir.1990)). Therefore,
we have stated that "[t]he equitable relief that is granted should
be only that which is required to distinguish the two products, and
no more." B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co., 451 F.2d
1254, 1270 (5th Cir.1971).
Although the equitable principles reviewed above are relevant
to the relief stage of any trademark case, they apply with unique
force in cases involving acquiescence. In such cases, but for the
presence of inevitable confusion, the competing marks would "stand
in parity" and be of "equal dignity." See SunAmerica I, 24
U.S.P.Q. at 1511-12, 974 F.2d 1348, infra pp. ---- - ---- (Birch,
J., concurring). For this reason, acquiescence cases are
distinguishable from ordinary trademark infringement actions, in
which complete injunctions against the infringing party are the
order of the day. See, e.g., First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 929 F.2d 382, 384-85 (8th Cir.1991)
(upholding complete injunction where substantial evidence of actual
confusion was shown). In contrast, where competing marks are of
equal dignity due to acquiescence, any restriction of the junior
user's previously unrestricted freedom to use its mark results in
a certain degree of undeserved, albeit necessary, hardship. The
law requires this hardship because "the public interest in
preventing confusion around the marketplace is paramount," Coach
House, 934 F.2d at 1564, but the legitimate coexisting interests of
the parties in an acquiescence case counsels for minimizing the
hardship on either party to the extent possible consistent with the
public interest. Therefore, the hardship of a total injunction
against a junior user in an acquiescence case is permissible only
if the junior user fails to demonstrate the availability of a
feasible and effective alternative means of redressing the senior
user's revived claim and vindicating the public interest in
eliminating marketplace confusion, without causing undue hardship
to the senior user.4
4
As an additional factor in fashioning equitable relief
while avoiding unnecessary hardship to the junior user, the
district court should consider the history leading to the
inevitable confusion that revives the senior user's claims.
Specifically, it should consider whether the senior user comes to
the court with "unclean hands" wrongfully seeking to appropriate
the goodwill of the junior user's mark. The district court
should not enter injunctive relief that rewards a senior user
that has intentionally created inevitable confusion in order to
The underpinnings of the foregoing rule of law are illuminated
by a brief consideration of the basic values at stake in such a
case. When inevitable confusion occurs in the marketplace due to
unrestricted dual use of a trademark, the "paramount" value of the
public interest demands some adjustment to the status quo; some
remedy must be fashioned. The confusion must be remedies even
where, as here, dual use after acquiescence causes the competing
marks otherwise to stand in parity. Any adjustment to the status
quo, however, will work some hardship on one or both of the
parties, because the court's imposition of a remedy will end the
previously unrestricted use of the mark by both parties. Someone
must suffer the remedy, and the law demands it not be the public.
That leaves only the parties to shoulder the hardship necessary to
end the confusion. Accordingly, the question becomes how the
requisite hardship will be allocated between the parties while
giving due consideration to their legitimate interests in the mark.
The court should give due consideration to the parties'
legitimate interests by considering the full range of remedial
alternatives available to cure marketplace confusion and to redress
the senior user's revived claim. When feasible and effective, the
court should fashion a remedy less harsh than the strong medicine
of a total injunction. On occasion, however, only that strong
revive its claim from estoppel, after acquiescing in a
competitor's use of a mark while that competitor establishes
goodwill in the mark. SunAmerica argues that this case presents
us with just such a scenario, but the district court found as a
fact that Sun Life of Canada did not cause the present confusion.
Should this hypothetical materialize in a future case, we are
confident that district courts will be able to fashion injunctive
relief that avoids the unjust enrichment of a predatory senior
user.
medicine will do and a total injunction must issue against one
party or the other. In that circumstance, it is to be expected
that usually the injunction will issue against the junior user.
That presumption is justified, if for no other reason, because the
senior user had the mark first, and it was the junior user who
began the mutual use that led eventually to inevitable confusion.
Stated differently, a junior user assumes the risk that, even if
the senior user acquiesces to the junior's use, inevitable
confusion may someday arise in the marketplace and that the only
feasible and effective way to eliminate this confusion will be a
complete injunction following revival of the senior user's claim.
In determining whether a remedy less than a total injunction
against the junior's use is feasible and effective, a court should
bear in mind that absent some overriding consideration, the senior
user ordinarily should not be required to stomach more of the
remedial medicine than the junior user. The same considerations we
have discussed that support the presumption that a total
injunction, where necessary, should ordinarily fall on the junior
user also support a presumption that in most cases the senior user
should not have to shoulder more of the remedial burden than the
junior user. Neither of these presumptions are insurmountable, and
we hedge by saying "ordinarily" and "in most cases," because we
cannot predict all the variables that will arise and, after all, we
are in the domain of equity, which is not easily fenced.
That point leads us to a discussion of our scope of review of
a district court's decision about how to remedy inevitable
confusion following from acquiescent use. As in virtually every
other area of the law, we will review factfindings only for clear
error. We will also review, essentially de novo, to ensure that
the district court applied the correct legal principles, which we
have previously discussed, to the facts. The applicable law does
not, however, function like a mathematical formula. The same facts
plugged into the same analytical framework will not necessarily
yield the same decision. The legal principles are not that
precise; there is room for judgment and for the exercise of
equitable discretion.
Accordingly, where the district court has not clearly erred
in finding the facts and has applied the correct legal principles,
we will review its ultimate remedial decision only for abuse of
discretion. The abuse of discretion standard of review is not
uniform across the law. It is applied more narrowly in some areas
than in others. See United States v. Cox, 995 F.2d 1041, 1043-44
(11th Cir.1993) (explaining that, although both grants and denials
of new trial motions are reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard, "we have ... accorded grants of such motions less
deference than denials"). What we mean here when we say that we
will review the district court's ultimate decision about how to
remedy post-acquiescence inevitable confusion is that the district
court will be given considerable leeway, that there will be a wide
decisional range within which we will not reverse the court even if
we would have reached a different decision. See Macklin v.
Singletary, 24 F.3d 1307, 1311-12 (11th Cir.1994) (discussing abuse
of discretion review in terms of the district court's range of
permissible decisional choices).
E. THE REMEDY DECISION IN THIS CASE
We turn now to a review of the district court's remedy
decision in this case. After finding that Sun Life of Canada had
demonstrated the inevitable confusion required to revive its claim
from estoppel by acquiescence, the district court entered an order
enjoining SunAmerica from any further use of any SUN LIFE mark.
The district court completely enjoined SunAmerica's use of the
mark, even though SunAmerica proposed to the district court five
alternatives to a complete injunction: (1) requiring both parties
to use geographic modifiers in connection with their SUN LIFE
marks; (2) subdividing the distribution market such that
SunAmerica could use the SUN LIFE mark in the independent
broker-dealer market while Sun Life of Canada could use the mark
only through its career agent sales force; (3) prohibiting the use
of the SUN LIFE (U.S.) mark by Sun Life of Canada; (4) requiring
the parties to conduct mutual educational campaigns to
differentiate the parties and their marks; and (5) imposing
guidelines regarding the use and prominence of geographic modifiers
and/or corporate logos in connection with the SUN LIFE marks.
SunAmerica suggested that combinations of these alternatives should
be considered.
The district court considered and rejected the first three
alternatives. As to the first, the district court found that
geographic modifiers would be insufficient to alleviate the high
levels of confusion in the marketplace. As to the second, the
court found that the distribution market could not be meaningfully
subdivided. As to the third, the court found that Sun Life of
Canada had not used the SUN LIFE (U.S.) mark since May 1992,
indicating that an injunction barring use of that mark by Sun Life
of Canada would not effectively eliminate marketplace confusion.
None of these factfindings—and they are factfindings—is clearly
erroneous.
We are unable to determine, however, whether the district
court considered SunAmerica's other two proposed remedies before
enjoining SunAmerica from all further use of the SUN LIFE mark. We
are also unable to determine if the district court considered
whether the use of geographic modifiers in combination with
educational efforts and guidelines regarding the use and prominence
of those modifiers and/or corporate logos would have been feasible
and effective. The district court may have considered and rejected
all of these alternatives, but we cannot tell for sure. If the
court did consider and reject them—if it found as a fact that they
would not end inevitable public confusion over the marks—our review
of the record indicates that such a finding would not have been
clearly erroneous. However, we are not prepared to say at this
time that a contrary finding—such as that some combination of the
alternatives would have sufficed to protect the public interest
against marketplace confusion—would be clearly erroneous.
Therefore, we remand this case for the limited purpose of
providing the district court an opportunity to consider whether any
of SunAmerica's proposed alternatives to a complete injunction
would have sufficiently vindicated the public interest in
eliminating marketplace confusion. We leave to the sound
discretion of the district court the determination of whether
further hearings are needed for this purpose. If the district
court finds that none of the other alternatives, by themselves or
in combination, would end inevitable confusion, then the district
court's complete injunction against SunAmerica's use of the marks
is the only feasible and effective remedy. If, on the other hand,
the district court finds as a fact that some remedy or remedies
other than a complete injunction would be feasible and effective,
then the court should exercise its discretion, guided by the
general principles we have discussed previously, to choose among
all of the available remedies.
We REMAND this case to the district court for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We leave the permanent injunction in
place for the district court to revisit if the results of the
proceedings it conducts consistent with this opinion indicate that
it should.
Because of the nature and complexity of the issues in this
case, our familiarity with them, and the nature of the remand, this
panel will exercise jurisdiction over a future appeal, should there
be one.
APPENDIX
DO NOT PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 91-8860
D.C. Docket No. 1:89-cv-1315-JTC
SunAmerica Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, f/n/a Sun Life
Group of America; Sun Life Insurance Company of America, a
Maryland corporation, Plaintiffs, Counterclaim-Defendants,
Appellees,
versus
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, a Canadian corporation;
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (U.S.), a Delaware
corporation, Defendants, Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
(September 9, 1992)
Before BIRCH, Circuit Judge, HILL and ESCHBACH*****, Senior Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case involves important trademark issues that are
factually and legally complex. Plaintiffs SunAmerica Corporation
and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Sun Life Insurance Company of
America ("Sun Life of America") (collectively, "SunAmerica"),
brought suit against defendants Sun Life Assurance Company of
Canada and its subsidiary, Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada
(U.S.) ("Sun Life of Canada (U.S.)") (collectively, "Sun Life of
Canada"). SunAmerica uses the mark SUN LIFE OF AMERICA; Sun Life
of Canada uses the mark SUN LIFE OF CANADA. In essence, each party
has now charged the other with employing confusingly similar marks
to designate its insurance products, in violation of the trademark
laws.
In the district court, both sides moved for summary judgment
on various claims and legal theories. The district court correctly
discerned that disputed issues of material fact precluded summary
judgment on the vast majority of these claims. However, the court
*****
Honorable Jesse E. Eschbach, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge
for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
concluded that one claim could be resolved on summary judgment—Sun
Life of Canada's use of the abbreviated mark SUN LIFE (U.S.) to
designate products affiliated with its American subsidiary. The
district court found the SUN LIFE (U.S.) mark to be confusingly
similar to SunAmerica's use of SUN LIFE OF AMERICA. Accordingly,
the court permanently enjoined Sun Life of Canada from using SUN
LIFE (U.S.) without some form of the geographical modifier "of
Canada." The propriety of this injunctive relief is all that is
before us on this appeal.
We hold that the issuance of the permanent injunction at this
stage of this case was improper. This is a complicated trademark
dispute, rife with subtle and pivotal interrelationships. The
district court's resolution of one trademark claim in this unique
case, without careful and proper regard for these
interrelationships, was error. In particular, the trial court
failed to explicitly delineate and resolve the issues raised by Sun
Life of Canada's counterclaim. In that counterclaim, Sun Life of
Canada alleges that SunAmerica is not entitled to receive
protection for any "Sun Life" mark because SunAmerica is the junior
user of a "Sun Life" mark. In other words, Sun Life of Canada
claims that its use of SUN LIFE (U.S.) cannot be enjoined in order
to avoid confusion with SUN LIFE OF AMERICA because SunAmerica has
no enforceable rights in the mark SUN LIFE OF AMERICA. We agree
with Sun Life of Canada that the resolution of this issue was a
prerequisite to determining SunAmerica's entitlement to a permanent
injunction. In failing to rule explicitly on all aspects of this
subject, the trial court's summary judgment injunction was
premature.
Therefore, we VACATE the permanent injunction entered by the
district court and REMAND the case to the district court for
further proceedings.
BIRCH, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
The majority has found the district court's analysis and
development wanting. Since I am convinced that simply remanding
the case to the district judge without any comment may result in
future problems, I have succumbed to temptation and will endeavor
to provide some observations relative to the issues presented in
this complex case. The parties and the district court may well
choose to ignore these offerings, but hopefully, all concerned may
find them to be of some benefit in reaching a resolution of this
conflict.
I.
A.
The district court found that over the past few years, Sun
Life of Canada and SunAmerica have been "engaged in providing
similar [insurance] products and services, through similar trade
channels to similar customers, often through similar advertising
media." R15-137-13. This was not always the case. Sun Life of
Canada is the older and larger of the companies. Founded in Canada
in 1865, Sun Life of Canada began operations in the United States
in 1895, and it is not disputed that it was the first user of a
"Sun Life" mark for insurance products in this country. From its
inception, Sun Life of Canada has promoted and sold a variety of
insurance products to investment-oriented clients, including
traditional life insurance, immediate annuities, and deferred
annuities.
Although the current subsidiary of SunAmerica was founded in
Maryland in 1890, the company did not operate under the name Sun
Life Insurance Company of America until 1916. Sun Life of America
was always smaller and more specialized. Throughout most of its
history, Sun Life of America's business was primarily constituted
by the sale of basic mortality-based life insurance to industrial
workers in the Middle-Atlantic states. Despite the similarity of
names, then, Sun Life of Canada and Sun Life of America coexisted
peacefully for much of their history, apparently because they sold
different products in different markets to different clients. Both
parties admit to this harmonious coexistence. In fact, relations
were so cordial that "[i]n every circumstance in which the two
companies sought to expand into the same states, the first
registered company, typically Sun Life of Canada, gave its consent
to the newly-entering company seeking registration." R15-137-3.
Beginning in the early 1970s, seeds of tension were planted.
Sun Life of Canada created its American subsidiary, Sun Life of
Canada (U.S.), and began occasional abbreviation of that name to
"Sun Life (U.S.)" in 1973. Sun Life of Canada also began exploring
new means of distribution for its products; in particular, the
lucrative channels of national and regional stock brokerage firms
and broker-dealers. In 1978, Sun Life of Canada contracted with
Merrill Lynch for the distribution of annuities. In 1982, Sun Life
of Canada acquired Massachusetts Financial Services Company
("MFS"), one of the largest investment advisors in the United
States. By 1983, then, Sun Life of Canada and Sun Life of Canada
(U.S.) were marketing insurance products via brokerage houses and
broker-dealers utilizing the name, at least to some extent, "Sun
Life (U.S.)."
The early 1970s were also the origins of change for Sun Life
of America. The conglomerate Kaufman & Broad, Inc. ("Broad Inc.")
acquired Sun Life of America in 1973. Under the direction of Broad
Inc., Sun Life of America began to modernize and expand. By the
end of the 1970s, Sun Life of America had experimented with
different products, different distribution channels, and different
clients. In particular, Sun Life of America began experimenting
with the sale of annuities, through broker-dealers, to
investment-oriented clients. By the early 1980s, the seeds of
tension were beginning to take root. Sun Life of Canada (U.S.) was
sprouting with a shortened name; Sun Life of America was sprouting
with a different business. The clash was almost inevitable.1
Sun Life of America first protested Sun Life of Canada's use
of the mark SUN LIFE (U.S.) in June 1983. Sun Life of Canada
declined to stop its use of the shortened name of its American
subsidiary. Before Sun Life of America objected again in 1988, Sun
Life of Canada had sold some 4 billion dollars worth of innovative
annuity products, designated (at least in part) by the mark SUN
LIFE (U.S.), through MFS and other brokerage houses and
1
Two attempts to pretermit the clash failed. An agreement
reached in 1980—providing for the inclusion of the geographic
modifiers "of Canada" and "of America"—was limited to specified
names and marks. A broader "understanding" about the inclusion
of geographic modifiers was reached in 1982, but this
understanding was never formalized.
broker-dealers. On the other side of this developing conflict, Sun
Life of America continued its transformation into a company that
would also sell annuities to investment-oriented clients through
broker-dealer channels of distribution. In 1984, Sun Life of
American began its first significant development and marketing of
annuity products. Sun Life of America would shortly acquire
several brokerage firms. Sun Life of Canada claims that by the end
of 1989, Sun Life of America had completely abandoned its
origins—selling mortality-based life insurance to industrial
workers in the Middle-Atlantic states—in favor of a sophisticated
and revamped insurance business that competed directly with Sun
Life of Canada.
Shortly after Sun Life of America adopted its new name in
1916, Sun Life of Canada wrote the following in a letter to Sun
Life of America: "Under the circumstances, there is nothing to be
done in the matter, but to endeavor as far as possible, to avoid
any confusion through this similarity of names." R15-137-3. In
June 1989, the endeavoring ended and the litigation began.
B.
SunAmerica's lawsuit asserted various state and federal claims
against Sun Life of Canada. However, only SunAmerica's trademark
claim concerning Sun Life of Canada's use of SUN LIFE (U.S.) is at
issue in this appeal.2 SunAmerica's principal allegation with
2
SunAmerica also challenged (1) Sun Life of Canada's
adoption of a new "S" logo that allegedly infringes SunAmerica's
"S" logo, (2) Sun Life of Canada's use of the name "Sun Financial
Group" that allegedly infringes SunAmerica's use of "Sun
Financial Services," and (3) the continuing vitality of various
other Sun Life of Canada marks.
respect to this claim is that the use of SUN LIFE (U.S.) falsely
suggests to the public that Sun Life of Canada's insurance products
originate with SunAmerica, in violation of SunAmerica's trademark
rights under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a) (1988).
In addition to responding to SunAmerica's allegations, Sun
Life of Canada counterclaimed. The counterclaim relevant to this
appeal3 contended that
Sun Life of Canada began using its name SUN LIFE OF CANADA in
the United States many years before plaintiffs began using SUN
LIFE OF AMERICA, that plaintiffs' usage of SUN LIFE OF AMERICA
has caused, and is likely to cause, confusion with defendants'
SUN LIFE OF CANADA name, and that plaintiffs should therefore
be enjoined from all further use of the SUN LIFE OF AMERICA
name and any other name or mark containing the salient words
SUN LIFE.
Appellants' Br. at 3. Although no party moved for summary judgment
with respect to Sun Life of Canada's counterclaim, both parties
submitted cross motions for summary judgment with respect to
SunAmerica's challenge to the use of SUN LIFE (U.S.).
The district court granted summary judgment to SunAmerica.
The trial court quickly found a likelihood of confusion based upon
an analysis of the marks at issue. Echoing this circuit's
seven-factor test for likelihood of confusion, see Dieter v. B & H
Indus., 880 F.2d 322, 326 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, [498] U.S.
[950], 111 S.Ct. 369, 112 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990); Jellibeans, Inc. v.
Skating Clubs, 716 F.2d 833, 840 (11th Cir.1983), the district
court ruled that there was a risk of confusion because SUN LIFE
(U.S.) could be considered "synonymous" with SUN LIFE OF AMERICA.
3
Sun Life of Canada also challenged (1) SunAmerica's "S"
logo, and (2) SunAmerica's right to use the name "SunAmerica."
In support of its finding, the court cited the companies' now
similar products, distribution channels, clients, and advertising,
as well as evidence of actual confusion. See R15-137-13-14.
Accordingly, the court permanently enjoined Sun Life of Canada from
using SUN LIFE (U.S.) standing alone in any advertisements,
promotional materials, press releases or other materials. Sun Life
of Canada's counterclaim—asserting that SunAmerica had no
enforceable rights in any "Sun Life" mark whatsoever—remained
pending.
II.
A.
Sun Life of Canada contends that the district court improperly
granted a permanent injunction without first completely resolving
the issues raised by the counterclaim:
[T]he District Court's summary judgment injunction should be
reversed because it is based on the invalid assumption that
plaintiffs have a continuing right to use the name SUN LIFE OF
AMERICA. Defendants' counterclaim ... asserts that the
confusion between the parties is caused by the fact that their
full names both begin with SUN LIFE, that defendants
admittedly used SUN LIFE OF CANADA long prior to plaintiffs'
first use of SUN LIFE OF AMERICA, and that the only effective
way to prevent confusion is to enjoin plaintiffs, the junior
users of a SUN LIFE name, from all further use of SUN LIFE OF
AMERICA. If defendants prevail on this claim at trial, the
sole basis for the summary judgment injunction—the finding
that defendants' use of SUN LIFE (U.S.) is likely to be
confused with plaintiffs' use of SUN LIFE OF AMERICA—will be
eliminated.
Appellants' Br. at 23. I agree with Sun Life of Canada.
An explicit determination of the issues raised by Sun Life of
Canada's counterclaim was required before the district court could
properly enter a permanent injunction in favor of SunAmerica.
SunAmerica's claim was based upon section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
which provides in relevant part:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, ... uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol,
or device, ... which
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of
his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial
activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes
that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). This court has repeatedly held that
in order to be entitled to injunctive relief under section 43(a) of
the APPENDIX—Continued
Lanham Act, a plaintiff must establish both "(1) that it has
trademark rights in the mark or name at issue ... and (2) that the
defendant adopted a mark or name that was the same, or confusingly
similar to the plaintiff's mark, such that there was a likelihood
of confusion...." ConAgra, [Conagra] Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d
1508, 1512 (11th Cir.1984) (citation omitted); see Investacorp,
Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519, 1521-22 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, [502] U.S. [1005], 112 S.Ct. 639, 116 L.Ed.2d
657 (1991); American Television and Communications Corp. v.
American Communications and Television, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546, 1548
(11th Cir.1987). Sun Life of Canada's counterclaim undertakes
directly to refute the existence of the first element that
SunAmerica must establish under section 43(a)—that SunAmerica has
enforceable trademark rights in the mark or name SUN LIFE OF
AMERICA. By skipping to the confusion issues and failing to rule
explicitly on SunAmerica's right to use any "Sun Life" mark, the
district court issued a permanent injunction that was premature.
As the moving party, Sun Life of America was required to
establish that there was no genuine issue of material fact about
its right to use SUN LIFE OF AMERICA and that it was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on that issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);
see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548,
2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The district court did not make a
specific ruling on the precise issue of Sun Life of America's right
to use "Sun Life" in light of Sun Life of Canada's counterclaim.
Indeed, the court did not make any specific findings of fact or
conclusions of law with respect to this matter. Although,
generally, a district court may not be required to make such
findings and conclusions in support of summary judgment rulings,
see Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), the cases have stressed the importance of
such findings to facilitate meaningful appellate review. See,
e.g., Clay v. Equifax, Inc., 762 F.2d 952, 956-58 (11th Cir.1985);
Hanson v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 625 F.2d 573, 575-76 (5th
Cir.1980).
SunAmerica claims that the district court did reach a decision
on the issues raised by Sun Life of Canada's counterclaim. I do
not agree. The district court did give isolated commentary about
SunAmerica's right to use "Sun Life," but I do not consider this
commentary to be an adequate disposition of these issues. Sun Life
of Canada's counterclaim and its impact upon SunAmerica's
entitlement to a permanent injunction was not specifically
addressed by the district court. On this particular record, then,
one cannot discern whether the district court ruled, after a full
and fair consideration of the issue, that Sun Life of America has
a protectible trademark interest in the use of "Sun Life." Perhaps
just as important, even assuming the district court did rule on the
issue, the court's factual and legal bases for doing so are
unclear, making appellate review of the purported decision
difficult if not impossible.
B.
I am not convinced that the district court's isolated
commentary on the issues raised by Sun Life of Canada's
counterclaim constituted a ruling on the subject, that commentary
persuades me to further delineate and describe the precise issues
that will likely confront the district court on remand. The
district court's discussion evinces the need for doctrinal
moorings. In suggesting that SunAmerica has enforceable rights in
SUN LIFE OF AMERICA, the district court stated that Sun Life of
Canada was precluded from challenging the use of SUN LIFE OF
AMERICA because it had permitted another party to use that mark for
such a long period of time. The district court sporadically
invoked various legal doctrines in support of its suggestion, but
did not expand upon the elements of any one. See R15-137-14
(acquiescence); id. (equitable estoppel); id. at 15 (laches);
id. at 26 (waiver). Moreover, the district court did not rely upon
any trademark case law in touching upon the issues raised by Sun
Life of Canada's counterclaim. I believe that a more methodical
approach, complete with an analysis of the issues as clarified by
this circuit's trademark jurisprudence, is essential in this case.
Resolution of complex intellectual property issues is seldom
properly accomplished in a broad and conclusory opinion format.
With respect to the issues raised by Sun Life of Canada's
counterclaim, the starting point must be Sun Life of Canada's
ability to establish a prima facie case under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.4 Once again, pursuant to the case law established in
this circuit, Sun Life of Canada is required to demonstrate both
4
Sun Life of Canada registered SUN LIFE OF CANADA in 1967.
However, such a registration would not defeat Sun Life of
America's prior rights (if any) created by its long prior use of
SUN LIFE OF AMERICA. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1051 (1988).
Sun Life of Canada has also registered the following "Sun"
marks:
SUN LIFE OF CANADA 1967
FOLLOW THE SUN FOR LIFE 1967
SUN FUND 1971
SUN FUND (plus design) 1971
SUN PLAN 1981
SUN LIFE OF CANADA (stylized) 1981
SUN LIFEMASTER 1984
SUNPLAN 2 1984
SUN INTERESTMASTER 1985
SUN PENSIONMASTER 1985
SUN INTERESTMASTER-Q 1985
SUN EXECUMASTER 1986
SUN ULTRATERM 1987
SUN FINANCIAL GROUP 1987
SunAmerica has only registered its name "SunAmerica."
that it enjoys enforceable rights in its SUN LIFE OF CANADA mark
and that Sun Life of America's use of SUN LIFE OF AMERICA generated
a likelihood of confusion. E.g., ConAgra [Conagra ], 743 F.2d at
1512. With respect to the first factor, Sun Life of Canada would
need to demonstrate not only its first use of the unregistered
mark,5 but also that it acquired a protectible interest in SUN LIFE
OF CANADA (or the shortened form SUN LIFE6), either because the
mark is inherently distinctive or because the mark has acquired
secondary meaning. E.g., Investacorp, 931 F.2d at 1522. With
respect to the confusion issue, the district court's analysis
should once again be guided by the seven-factor test utilized in
cases like Dieter and Jellibeans.
Only after first discerning the extent of Sun Life of
Canada's protectible interest and any likelihood of confusion
should the district court proceed to an analysis of SunAmerica's
potential affirmative defenses. Although the district court
loosely characterized SunAmerica's putative defense, it appears
from the record that in all probability SunAmerica's defense sounds
in acquiescence. The distinguishing feature of the acquiescence
defense is the element of active or explicit consent to the use of
an allegedly infringing mark. Coach House Restaurant v. Coach and
Six Restaurants, 934 F.2d 1551, 1558 (11th Cir.1991). SunAmerica
has clearly claimed that Sun Life of Canada granted SunAmerica
express permission to use the SUN LIFE OF AMERICA mark;
5
Apparently, Sun Life of Canada was the first user of a "Sun
Life" mark in 45 of the 50 states.
6
Sun Life of Canada's mark may have been occasionally
abbreviated to just SUN LIFE as early as 1914.
demonstrated, for example, by Sun Life of Canada's aid in helping
Sun Life of America clear the hurdles imposed by the insurance
regulators of various states.7
SunAmerica can establish an acquiescence defense only if it
shows:
(1) That [Sun Life of Canada] actively represented that it
would not assert a right or a claim;
(2) that the delay between the active representation and
assertion of the right or claim was not excusable; and
(3) that the delay caused [Sun Life of America] undue
prejudice.
Coach House, 934 F.2d at 1558.8 Acquiescence would estop Sun
Life of Canada from APPENDIX—Continued
extinguishing SunAmerica's use of SUN LIFE OF AMERICA, unless there
is an inevitability of confusion between the two marks. Id. at
1564. I express no opinion on SunAmerica's ability to establish
7
The laches defense is associated with more passive consent,
usually demonstrated by a long period of silence. Coach House,
934 F.2d at 1558. Although "estoppel" or "estoppel by laches" is
sometimes used in the trademark area, the district court appears
to have borrowed its "equitable estoppel" language from the
workers' compensation context, as evidenced by the court's
citation to DeShong v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 737 F.2d 1520
(11th Cir.1984). The district court's invocation of "waiver" has
no trademark roots.
8
Sun Life of Canada's arguments on appeal imply that even if
SunAmerica could establish these three elements of an
acquiescence defense, Sun Life of Canada could still "revoke" its
acquiescence because acquiescence is merely an "implied license"
to use a mark. See ConAgra [Conagra ], 743 F.2d at 1516. I
disagree. ConAgra [Conagra ] stated that "[a]cquiescence alone
is analogous to an implied license to use the name." Id.
(emphasis added). By this, the court meant that if only the
first element is established—active consent—then the permission
is revocable. Once the remaining elements of acquiescence are
established, however, the permission is not revocable. Id. at
1516-18; see also Coach House, 934 F.2d at 1558 & n. 18, 1563-
64.
this defense to Sun Life of Canada's counterclaim. I note only
that the court's analysis of the first and third elements should be
straightforward based upon the evidence in the record;
accordingly, I will not comment further on those elements.
However, I believe that the second element requires additional
guidance.
In determining whether or not a prior user's delay is
"excusable," the district court must not limit itself solely to a
raw calculation of the time period involved. Rather, the court
should also examine the reasons for any delay. In the context of
this case, Sun Life of Canada has at least advanced a colorable
excuse: Sun Life of Canada contends that it had no reason to
assert an early challenge to Sun Life of America's use of a "Sun
Life" mark because until 1989, Sun Life of America sold different
products in a different market through different distribution
channels. Moreover, it may be that Sun Life of Canada could not
have successfully prosecuted an earlier infringement challenge
because until Sun Life of America changed its business, there was
negligible likelihood of confusion. Pursuit of an infringement
action may have been futile. Once again, I express no opinion on
whether or not any delay on the part of Sun Life of Canada was
"excusable." "Careful consideration of these factors, the possible
need for additional evidence, the finding of facts on the elements
of the ... defense, and the sound exercise of discretion based on
the facts are matters best left to the district court on remand."
ConAgra [Conagra ], 743 F.2d at 1518.
C.
Citing Forum Corp. v. Forum Ltd., 903 F.2d 434 (7th Cir.1990),
Sun Life of Canada argues that this is an easy case simply because
Sun Life of America is admittedly the junior user of a "Sun Life"
mark. Sun Life of Canada contends that because Sun Life of America
is a second comer, it has a continuing duty to avoid confusion with
the first user's mark. Moreover, Sun Life of Canada presses, Sun
Life of America's duty to avoid confusion exists even when the
first user shortens or abbreviates its mark. In essence, Sun Life
of Canada contends that Sun Life of America has acted at its peril
since adopting a "Sun Life" mark in 1916.
The theory argued by Sun Life of Canada is legally
cognizable, but only to a point. There is ample support for the
proposition that a second user of a mark has a duty to avoid
confusion with a first user's mark. In the words of Professor
McCarthy:
It is well-settled that one who adopts a mark similar to the
mark of another for closely related goods acts at his peril
and any doubt there might be must be resolved against him. If
there is evidence that the junior user in fact knew of the
senior user's mark before beginning use, the "acting at one's
peril" rationale finds stronger support.
2 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:21, at
106-07 (2d ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted). The second comer's duty
to avoid confusion also requires the second comer to anticipate the
possibility that the senior user will shorten or abbreviate its
mark to its salient portions. For example, in Forum Corp., the
Seventh Circuit held the junior user of a mark responsible for
avoiding confusion even though the senior user had abbreviated its
name:
It is the second user's responsibility to avoid confusion in
its choice of a trademark, and that responsibility must
include choosing a mark whose salient portion would not likely
be confused with a first user's mark....
....
... [E]ven if [senior user The Forum Corporation of North
America] had shortened the form of its trademark throughout
the years, [junior user The Forum, Ltd.] would not be freed
from its responsibility to avoid confusion since the salient
and memorable feature of [the senior user's] mark is "Forum."
903 F.2d at 440, 441; cf. E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int'l
Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir.1985) (shortening REMY
MARTIN to "Remy"); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846
F.2d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir.1988) (shortening CENTURY 21 to
"Century").
However, the duty to avoid confusion takes a different hue if
the first user has actively permitted the second comer's use of a
mark containing a salient portion of the senior user's mark. In
other words, if the first user of a trademark affirmatively
acquiesces to a second user's adoption and use of a mark that
contains the memorable aspect of the first user's mark, the senior
user cannot later complain that the second comer's mark creates
confusion with an anticipated or actual abbreviation of the first
user's mark. True, in Forum Corp., senior user The Forum
Corporation of North America could hold junior user The Forum,
Ltd., accountable for the confusion resulting from the senior
user's abbreviation to "The Forum," but only because the junior
user had no permission or right to incorporate into its own mark
the salient aspect of the senior user's mark. But The Forum
Corporation of North America could not affirmatively acquiesce to
a second comer's use of "The Forum, Ltd." and then change its own
name to "The Forum, Ltd." after an inexcusable delay accompanied by
9
undue prejudice. See supra slip op. at [----] - [----].
Similarly, Remy Martin could not consent to another cognac's use of
"Remy Smith" and then adopt for itself the name "Remy Smith," and
Century 21 could not acquiesce to the use of "Century 42" only to
later appropriate "Century 42" for itself.
Accordingly, if the junior user can establish the three
requisite elements of an acquiescence defense, then the duty to
avoid confusion becomes mutual. Typically, where the senior user
acquiesces to the junior user's mark, the senior user is estopped
from challenging that mark under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
It follows that the senior user should also be estopped from
adopting the junior user's mark for itself and from changing its
own mark in a manner that significantly heightens the risk of
confusion. After acquiescence, the senior user and the junior user
must treat one another's marks with equal dignity.
In the context of this dispute, then, the fact that Sun Life
of America is the junior user of a "Sun Life" mark is dispositive
only if Sun Life of Canada has not acquiesced to the use of SUN
LIFE OF AMERICA. Absent Sun Life of Canada's affirmative
acquiescence, Sun Life of America would have a duty to avoid
confusion with Sun Life of Canada's mark, including the duty to
anticipate both the shortening of SUN LIFE OF CANADA to SUN LIFE
and the designation of Sun Life of Canada's subsidiary in America
9
Again, this discussion must always be viewed against the
backdrop of the likelihood of confusion determination, which
necessarily involves an analysis of the seven-factor test;
including, for example, similarity of products, channels of
commerce and advertising media.
as SUN LIFE (U.S.). If Sun Life of Canada has acquiesced to the
use of SUN LIFE OF AMERICA, however, Sun Life of Canada also has a
duty to respect that mark and avoid creating confusion with it.
Once again, I express no opinion on the acquiescence defense. As
this issue will require a careful, fact-intensive consideration, I
shall leave it for the district court and its informed discretion
on remand. See ConAgra [Conagra ], 743 F.2d at 1518.
III.
Because the majority has vacated the permanent injunction for
the reasons stated above, I need not review the specifics of the
district court's resolution of SunAmerica's challenge to Sun Life
of Canada's use of SUN LIFE (U.S.). However, my review of the
record again indicates the need for doctrinal guidance and the
necessity of a methodical approach.
The starting point for the analysis of the claim that SUN LIFE
(U.S.) is confusingly similar to SUN LIFE OF AMERICA is, once
again, whether or not SunAmerica can establish a prima facie case
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. As indicated above, the
case law requires SunAmerica to establish (1) that it has a
protectible trademark interest in SUN LIFE OF AMERICA, and (2) that
Sun Life of Canada's use of the mark SUN LIFE (U.S.) creates a
likelihood of confusion with SUN LIFE OF AMERICA. With respect to
the first element, SunAmerica must not only survive Sun Life of
Canada's counterclaim, see supra slip op. at [----], but also
establish the acquisition of protectible trademark rights, either
because SUN LIFE OF AMERICA is inherently distinctive or because it
has acquired secondary meaning. See Investacorp, 931 F.2d at 1522.
With respect to confusion, the district court's analysis should
again follow the seven-factor test as established in cases like
Dieter and Jellibeans to determine whether or not Sun Life of
Canada's use of SUN LIFE (U.S.) creates a likelihood of confusion
with SUN LIFE OF AMERICA.
I think it also prudent to address Sun Life of Canada's
"causation" argument. Sun Life of Canada argues repeatedly on this
appeal that the "cause" of public confusion (if any) is not its use
of SUN LIFE (U.S.), but the combination of SunAmerica's use of a
mark that begins with "Sun Life" and SunAmerica's relatively recent
entrance into the business of selling annuities through
broker-dealers. Sun Life of Canada is certainly correct in
pointing out that the only reason the change in geographical
designation might make a difference is that in this case, both
parties have operated under names that begin with "Sun Life."
Nevertheless, historical similarities occasioned by the
parties' dual use of "Sun Life" would not necessarily disqualify
Sun Life of America from obtaining an injunction. Should the
district court find it necessary to reach the issue of whether or
not SUN LIFE (U.S.) is confusingly similar to SUN LIFE OF AMERICA,
it will only be because there has been a prior finding that
SunAmerica has a protectible trademark interest in SUN LIFE OF
AMERICA and that Sun Life of Canada has acquiesced to that
interest. At such a point, SunAmerica's mark and Sun Life of
Canada's mark would stand in parity. Under these circumstances,
even if Sun Life of America then took advantage of industry trends
by shifting to the sale of annuities through broker-dealers, it
would be entitled to assume that no party would take further steps
that would generate a greater likelihood of confusion than that
which previously existed at the time of acquiescence. Therefore,
if SunAmerica has enforceable rights in SUN LIFE OF AMERICA, it is
not fatal to SunAmerica's claim that a "but-for" cause of public
confusion might be SunAmerica's expansion into annuity products and
the broker-dealer markets, or that there may have been residual
similarities stemming from the parties' respective uses of "Sun
Life" for 75 years. As long as the district court finds, based
upon a careful analysis of the evidence, that Sun Life of Canada's
use of SUN LIFE (U.S.) now creates an additional likelihood of
confusion, an injunction will lie.10
Finally, after resolving the issues raised by Sun Life of
Canada's counterclaim and reaching a decision as to whether
SunAmerica can establish a prima facie case under section 43(a),
the district court should consider the two affirmative defenses
proffered by Sun Life of Canada—laches and acquiescence. The trial
court may not have understood that Sun Life of Canada's affirmative
defenses focus upon a different time period than SunAmerica's
apparent defense to the counterclaim. Sun Life of Canada's
defenses focus not upon the long history of the two companies, but
upon the relatively shorter period of time that Sun Life of Canada
has been utilizing the mark SUN LIFE (U.S.).
Sun Life of Canada first argues that SunAmerica should be
10
Sun Life of Canada also contests the admissibility and
authenticity of certain evidence before the district court. I
express no opinion on this issue. I trust that on remand, the
district court will ascertain that the evidence it considers is
admissible and authentic.
estopped from contesting the use of SUN LIFE (U.S.) because
SunAmerica had actual knowledge of the use of SUN LIFE (U.S.) in
1982, yet waited until June 1989 to file suit, after Sun Life of
Canada sold 4 billion dollars of products under the SUN LIFE (U.S.)
mark. Such delay, Sun Life of Canada contends, constitutes laches.
To establish this defense, Sun Life of Canada must prove:
(1) a delay in asserting a right or a claim,
(2) that the delay was not excusable, and
(3) that there was undue prejudice to the party against whom the
claim is asserted.
Ambrit [AmBrit], Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1545 (11th
Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041, 107 S.Ct. 1983, 95 L.Ed.2d
822 (1987). Stated differently, SunAmerica is only estopped from
asserting its SUN LIFE (U.S.) claim if Sun Life of Canada
demonstrates that it suffered undue prejudice while SunAmerica
inexcusably delayed in asserting its rights. While I express no
opinion on the laches argument, I anticipate that the district
court will consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances
before reaching a conclusion on this equitable defense.
Sun Life of Canada next alleges that SunAmerica should be
estopped from contesting the use of SUN LIFE (U.S.) because
SunAmerica implicitly acquiesced to the use of SUN LIFE (U.S.) by
acting as an agent of Sun Life of Canada and selling Sun Life of
Canada's products under the name SUN LIFE (U.S.). Put another way,
Sun Life of Canada contends that by selling products designated by
SUN LIFE (U.S.), SunAmerica implicitly consented to Sun Life of
Canada's use of that specific mark (even if potentially confusing).
To establish this acquiescence defense, Sun Life of Canada would
need to establish the three elements identified above: active
representation, inexcusable delay, and undue prejudice. See supra
slip op. at [----] - [----]. I note for the district court that an
"active representation" need not come via a "specific endorsement"
or formal agreement, see R15-137-16; rather, implied acquiescence
may be inferred from a clear encouragement of the use of the
allegedly infringing mark, as when, for example, the plaintiff
substantially contributes to the marketing of the allegedly
infringing products. See, e.g., Coach House, 934 F.2d at 1563-64;
ConAgra [Conagra ], 743 F.2d at 1516-18; Land O'Lakes, Inc. v.
Land O'Frost, Inc., 224 U.S.P.Q. 1022, 1029-30 (TTAB 1984);
Hitachi Metals Int'l v. Yamakyu Chain Kabushiki, 209 U.S.P.Q. 1057,
1067 (TTAB 1981). Once again, in deciding this issue, the district
court should carefully consider SunAmerica's proffered reasons for
its alleged acquiescence and delay. See supra slip op. at [----] -
[----].
IV.
SunAmerica has described this case as "open-and-shut" because
Sun Life of Canada has allegedly used an identical mark for
competitive products. See Appellees' Br. at 4 n. 2 (citing 2 J.
Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:3, at 56
(2d ed. 1984)). As evidenced by my discussion, I am unpersuaded as
to that conclusion. This case has a complex and unique history
that spans over 100 years. Both parties to this dispute have
persuasive claims, counterclaims, and defenses. All are
interrelated. All require not only a careful analysis of each
party's trademarks, products, markets, clients, and distribution
channels, but also an analysis of how circumstances may have
changed over time. Arguably, in this case, convergence has created
competition and confusion. Only precise, step-by-step detailed
analysis can illuminate an appropriate resolution that is capable
of meaningful appellate review. To suggest otherwise ignores the
complexity and subtlety presented in this case.