United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-6889.
Joel TINNEY, Lisa Tinney, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Edith SHORES, Defendant,
Bill Franklin, as Sheriff of Elmore County and in his individual
capacity, Paul Henderson, as Deputy Sheriff of Elmore County and in
his individual capacity, Defendants-Appellants,
Elmore County, Alabama, Defendant.
March 8, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama. (No. CV 93-A-762-N), W. Harold Albritton, III,
Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, CARNES, Circuit Judge, and JOHNSON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
In this appeal from the Middle District of Alabama, Bill
Franklin, Sheriff of Elmore County, and Paul Henderson, Chief
Deputy Sheriff of Elmore County (collectively, "Appellants"),
appeal the district court's denial of their motion for summary
judgment with respect to the claims of Joel and Lisa Tinney under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983 (West 1994) and under various state laws. We reverse the
denial of summary judgment on the substantive and procedural due
process claims. We also reverse the denial of summary judgment on
the state law claims, based on Appellants' sovereign immunity.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual Background
Joel and Lisa Tinney lived in their house-trailer with their
two young children on land leased from Edith Shores. On or about
July 13, 1991, Shores told the Tinneys that their rent was
approximately $400 in arrears. After they failed to pay, the
Tinneys received an eviction notice, and the landlord instituted
eviction proceedings.
On August 8, 1991, Appellants served Mr. Tinney with eviction
papers. Mr. Tinney told them that the house-trailer would be moved
by noon that day. Shortly thereafter, however, Henderson returned
and informed the Tinneys that, over the telephone, a bank had given
Shores a lien on the house-trailer and that the Tinneys were not
permitted to move it. The Tinneys were not served with any
official attachment papers. Nevertheless, they were told that they
would have until noon to remove their personal possessions from the
house-trailer. After moving one load of possessions in a small
automobile, the couple returned to find the house-trailer
padlocked; they were unable to remove any more of their
possessions.
Soon thereafter, the Tinneys received a letter from Shores'
attorney, informing them that the house-trailer would be sold
unless they paid the rent in arrears. Shores did not file suit to
recover either the unpaid rent or payments on the house-trailer.
Nonetheless, Shores sold the house-trailer and the Tinneys'
possessions were not returned.
B. Procedural History
In June 1993, the Tinneys filed this action in federal
district court naming as defendants Shores, Appellants, and Elmore
County. The Tinneys asserted state law claims for conversion and
trespass and Section 1983 claims based on deprivations of their
14th Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights and
their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. In July 1993, the Tinneys amended their complaint to
sue Appellants in both their individual and their official
capacities.
In December 1993, the district court dismissed all claims
against Elmore County and all claims against Appellants in their
official capacities. In June 1994, Appellants moved for summary
judgment on the remaining claims, both on the merits and on
qualified, quasi-judicial and state sovereign immunity grounds. In
August 1994, the district court granted Appellants' motion with
regard to the Fourth Amendment claim but denied it with regard to
the due process claims and the state law claims. Appellants timely
filed their notice of interlocutory appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Appellants contend (1) that the district court
erred in denying summary judgment based on Appellants' qualified
immunity from the Tinneys' substantive due process and procedural
due process claims, and (2) that the district court erred in
denying summary judgment on the state law claims based on state
sovereign immunity.
A. Qualified Immunity
Because qualified immunity provides the right not to be
burdened by trial, and not simply a defense to liability, this
Court has jurisdiction to review interlocutory appeals from orders
denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411
(1985). Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1345 (11th Cir.1991).
We review this question of law de novo. Oladeinde v. City of
Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1487 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 987, 113 S.Ct. 1586, 123 L.Ed.2d 153 (1993). In so doing, our
inquiry is confined to whether the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, reveals
violations of clearly established law. Rogers v. Miller, 57 F.3d
986 (11th Cir.1995).
Qualified immunity protects government actors in their
individual capacities from civil damage claims, provided that their
conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights.
Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146,
1149 (11th Cir.1994). The Supreme Court has stated that "[a]
necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the
constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is "clearly
established' at the time the defendant acted is the determination
of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a
constitutional right at all." Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226,
232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). Accordingly, we
first examine whether the Tinneys have asserted a cognizable
constitutional claim. See Wooten v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 696, 699
(11th Cir.1995). Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1564 (11th
Cir.1994).
1. The Substantive Due Process Claim
Relying on Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865,
104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), Appellants contend that the district court
erred by denying them summary judgment on the Tinneys' substantive
due process claim, arguing that the Fourth Amendment provides
whatever protection, if any, the constitution guarantees in a
seizure case like this one. In Graham, the Supreme Court held that
where a particular amendment "provides an explicit textual source
of constitutional protection" against a particular sort of
government behavior, "that Amendment, not the more generalized
notion of "substantive due process' must be the guide for
analyzing" the claim. Id. at 395, 109 S.Ct. at 1871. Graham
involved a claim that law enforcement officers used excessive force
during an investigatory stop. The Court held that all cases
involving allegations of the use of excessive force in an arrest,
an investigatory stop, or any other seizure, should be analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
More recently, in Albright v. Oliver, the Supreme Court held
that an allegation of prosecution without probable cause must also
be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, without reference to the
more general considerations of substantive due process. --- U.S.
----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 807, 817, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994). "The
protections of substantive due process have for the most part been
accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation and
the right to bodily integrity ..." Albright, --- U.S. at ----, 114
S.Ct. at 812.
Soldal v. Cook County makes clear that the Fourth Amendment is
the textual source of the Tinneys' constitutional protection. In
Soldal, the Supreme Court held that police officers' participation
in the seizing and carrying away of a family's mobile home was a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 506 U.S. 56, ----, 113 S.Ct.
538, 549, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992). Thus, the Tinneys' substantive
due process claim is foreclosed by Albright and Soldal. Because
the Tinneys have failed to assert a cognizable constitutional
claim, the district court erred by denying Appellants summary
judgment.
2. The Procedural Due Process Claim
The Tinneys assert, and the district court held, that
Appellants' failure to adhere to Alabama's pre-deprivation takings
procedure constituted a procedural due process violation.
Conversely, Appellants contend that the district court erred in
denying them summary judgment on the procedural due process claim
because adequate post-deprivation remedies were available under
state law. In other words, Appellants maintain that the
deprivation in this case was not complete because a property
deprivation does not occur until the state has been given the
opportunity to remedy the state employees' error and has failed to
do so.
Appellants' contention rests on Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled in part not
relevant by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31, 106 S.Ct.
662, 664-65, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). Parratt involved a prisoner's
loss of property due to the random, negligent act of a state
employee. The Supreme Court held that the state tort remedies
available to the prisoner satisfied the prisoner's due process
rights because due process does not require a pre-deprivation
hearing where such a hearing would be impracticable—i.e., where the
deprivation results from an employee's negligent act. In Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3202, 82 L.Ed.2d 393
(1984), the Court extended Parratt 's reasoning and held that "an
unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state
employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment if a
meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available." The
state's action is not complete unless and until it refuses to
provide a post-deprivation remedy. Id.
The Tinneys contend that application of the Parratt rule in
cases like this one amounts to a requirement that a Section 1983
plaintiff seeking to redress a violation of procedural due process
must exhaust his or her state remedies before suing in federal
court. The Supreme Court rejected such a requirement in Patsy v.
Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172
(1982). However, the Tinneys' contention lacks merit. In a recent
public employment case brought under Section 1983, this Court,
sitting en banc, explained the difference between Patsy 's import
and Parratt 's:
In Patsy the Supreme Court held that section 1983 plaintiffs
were not required to avail themselves of available state
remedies before suing in federal court; the Court's holding
presumed the presence of a valid constitutional claim. In
this case, McKinney cannot state a valid constitutional claim
under Parratt and Bishop because Florida provides an adequate
process to remedy McKinney's alleged injury....
McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1563 n. 20 (1994) (en banc ), cert.
denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 898, 130 L.Ed.2d 783 (1995).
As in McKinney, Patsy is inapplicable here. Under Parratt and
Hudson, the Tinneys have failed to state a valid procedural due
process claim because they have not alleged that Alabama law
provided them with an inadequate post-deprivation remedy.1 Thus,
the district court erred by denying summary judgment.2
B. State Sovereign Immunity
Appellants also contend that the district court erred in
denying them summary judgment on the state law claims. Appellants
maintain that they are entitled to state sovereign immunity under
Alabama law. Both parties invoke this Court's jurisdiction under
Griesel v. Hamlin, 963 F.2d 338, 341 (11th Cir.1992), which held
that denials of sovereign immunity under Georgia law are
1
In holding that Parratt was inapplicable to the instant
case, the district court relied upon Fetner v. City of Roanoke,
813 F.2d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir.1987), wherein we wrote "[t]he
touchstone in Parratt was the impracticability of holding a
hearing prior to the claimed deprivation." On the basis of this
language, the district court held: "[a]ttachment is a daily
occurrence and because the State has pre-deprivation procedures
in place, [Appellants] cannot maintain that pre-deprivation
process was impracticable." The district court misconstrued the
notion of "impracticability" as it is used in Parratt. The
question is whether the state can anticipate and therefore
control the action of a state employee. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at
533, 104 S.Ct. at 3203. Once a state has established procedures
for the effectuation of an attachment—which Alabama undisputedly
has—it cannot predict whether or not, in a given situation, those
procedures will be followed or ignored. Thus, as with an
employee's negligence or an employee's intentional wrongful act,
Appellants' actions in this case were not preventable beforehand
by the state. Therefore, under Parratt and Hudson, no procedural
due process violation occurs unless the state fails to provide
the opportunity to redress the situation after the fact. The
Tinneys argue only that the due process violation was complete at
the time of the attachment, without regard to the availability of
post-attachment remedies, and thus they have failed to establish
a procedural due process violation. Because the Tinneys have not
challenged the adequacy of Alabama's post-deprivation remedies,
we have no occasion to decide whether Alabama law does in fact
provide adequate avenues for making the Tinneys whole.
2
Appellants also challenge the district court's denial of
summary judgment on the basis of absolute quasi-judicial
immunity. Because we decide that summary judgment was proper on
other grounds, we need not reach this issue.
immediately appealable. See also, Cummings v. DeKalb County, 24
F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir.1994). Griesel reasoned that sovereign
immunity in Georgia is immunity from suit, not merely a defense
from liability. Id. This same rationale applies equally to a
claim of sovereign immunity under Alabama law.
Alabama grants sovereign immunity to its state executive
officers pursuant to Article I, Section 14 of the Alabama
Constitution of 1901. Section 14 states that "the State of Alabama
shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity."
Under Alabama law, both sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are considered
executive officers of the state, immune from suit under Section
14.3 See Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 443 (Ala.1987). Parker
v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1475 (11th Cir.1989). Drain v. Odom,
631 So.2d 971, 972 (Ala.1994). Like Georgia, then, Alabama
intended for its state officers to be immune from suit. As such,
the denial of summary judgment based on sovereign immunity is
properly before us on interlocutory appeal.
Sovereign immunity is a question of law we review de novo.
Cummings, 24 F.3d at 1353. Under Alabama law, sheriffs and deputy
sheriffs, in their official capacities and individually, are
absolutely immune from suit when the action is, in effect, one
against the state. Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So.2d 81, 83
(Ala.1989). The district court noted, though, that Phillips and
Gill v. Sewell, 356 So.2d 1196, 1198 (Ala.1978) identify a number
3
Alabama law affords § 14 immunity to state officers sued in
both their official and individual capacities. See Phillips v.
Thomas, 555 So.2d 81, 83 (Ala.1989). Gill v. Sewell, 356 So.2d
1196, 1198 (Ala.1978).
of exceptions to Section 14 immunity. Specifically, the district
court held that sovereign immunity does not protect state officials
who act under a mistaken interpretation of law. Based on this
exception, the district court found that Appellants were not
entitled to sovereign immunity.
Recent Alabama case law makes it clear, however, that the
exception relied upon by the district court is inapplicable in this
case. In Alexander v. Hatfield, 652 So.2d 1142, 1143 (Ala.1994),
the plaintiff sued the sheriff for negligence and bad faith service
of process. The Alabama Supreme Court explained that under Article
I, § 14, the only exceptions to a sheriff's immunity from suit are
actions brought to enjoin the sheriff's conduct. Id. at 1143.4
See also Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th
Cir.1990). Because the sheriff in Alexander was being sued for
damages and not injunctive relief, the court held that the
exceptions to Section 14 were inapplicable and therefore the
sheriff was immune from suit. Id.
Like Alexander, Appellants in this case are being sued for
damages, based upon claims of conversion and trespass, and not for
4
The court stated:
Under Article I, Sec. 14, of the Alabama
Constitution of 1901, the only exceptions to the
sovereign immunity of sheriffs are actions brought
(1) to compel him to perform his duties, (2) to
compel him to perform ministerial acts, (3) to enjoin
him from enforcing unconstitutional laws, (4) to enjoin
him from acting in bad faith, fraudulently, beyond his
authority, or under mistaken interpretation of the law,
or (5) to seek construction of a statute under the
Declaratory Judgment Act if he is a necessary party for
the construction of the statute. (citations omitted).
injunctive relief. Therefore, Appellants are entitled to sovereign
immunity from the state law claims. Accordingly, we reverse the
district court's denial of summary judgment on these claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court's
denial of summary judgment on the Tinneys' substantive due process
and procedural due process claims. We also REVERSE its denial of
summary judgment based on Appellants' sovereign immunity from the
state law claims.