United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-2550
Non-Argument Calendar.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Brady Lavick ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
May 29, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida. (No. TCR 94-04045-01), William Stafford,
Judge.
Before ANDERSON, EDMONDSON and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-appellant Brady Lavick Adams was convicted of
kidnapping his wife, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201, as well as
using and carrying a firearm during the kidnapping, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e), by a jury in
Federal court. He was sentenced to life in prison for the
kidnapping count, as well as five years to be served consecutively
for the § 924(c) violation and 30 years to be served concurrently
for the §§ 922(g) and 924(e) violation. Adams perfected this
appeal, alleging that (1) the indictment handed down by the Federal
grand jury in this case does not contain an essential element of
the § 1201 kidnapping offense, namely, that the kidnapper hold the
victim "for ransom or reward or otherwise," rendering the
indictment fatally defective, and (2) the evidence presented at
trial was insufficient to prove this same element. For the reasons
set forth below, we affirm his conviction.
The victim in this case, Sharee Lovett Adams, married the
defendant in 1991. According to the evidence presented by the
government, Mrs. Adams left her husband four or five times, and
each time Mr. Adams would find her and threaten her with physical
harm in order to force her to return to him. In early 1994, while
the couple was living in Brunswick, Georgia, Mrs. Adams left the
defendant again, first moving to a women's shelter and then to the
home of the defendant's sister, from which the defendant had been
banned. On this occasion as well, the defendant gained entry into
his sister's house by ruse, physically assaulted his wife and
forced her to return with him.
In July of 1994, Mrs. Adams left her husband and moved in with
her cousin, Delores Uwaezuoke, who resides in Atlanta. She left
the defendant a letter asking him to file for divorce, and said
that she would do so if he did not. Three to four weeks later, the
defendant found his wife. He went to Ms. Uwaezuoke's apartment,
but was refused entry on two occasions, first by Ms. Uwaezuoke, and
then by Mrs. Adams, who at that time was in possession of a rifle.
When Mr. Adams would not leave, Mrs. Adams grabbed the rifle, drove
to a telephone and called police. Mr. Adams refused to leave until
forced to do so by police. On the following day, a Sunday, a local
judge refused to grant Mrs. Adams a stalking warrant, and told her
to return on Monday.
On Monday morning, the defendant returned to Uwaezuoke's
apartment. He threw a brick through a sliding glass door, entered
the apartment, and held a handgun he had purchased in Atlanta to
Ms. Uwaezuoke's head. He ordered Mrs. Adams to come out of hiding.
When Mrs. Adams entered the room, the defendant took her and freed
Uwaezuoke. As he walked Mrs. Adams out to his car, the defendant
said, "Bitch you done fucked up now. You know what I told you I
was going to do if you left me." RII-43.
The defendant tried to force Mrs. Adams into his car, but she
fought to free herself. When she did break free and attempt to run
away, the defendant shot her in the abdomen, forced her into the
car, and sped away. He refused to take her to a hospital, going
instead to a hotel in Madison, Florida. There he twice attempted
to force Mrs. Adams to have sex with him. The F.B.I. eventually
convinced Mr. Adams to free his wife, and then took him into
custody. Mrs. Adams eventually underwent five operations to repair
the wound inflicted by the defendant.
The sufficiency of the indictment
In the defendant-appellant's first assignment of error, he
insists that the Federal grand jury indictment handed down against
him does not include an essential element of the § 1201 kidnapping
offense. That section defines as kidnappers:
Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys,
kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or
reward or otherwise any person ... when— ... (1) the person is
willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce ...
18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994) (emphasis added). The defendant notes that
his indictment does not contain an allegation that he held his wife
"for ransom or reward or otherwise," and argues that the indictment
is therefore fatally defective.1
1
The indictment states:
The original version of § 1201, enacted into law in 1932 and
known as the "Lindbergh Act," punished only those who kidnapped
another person "for ransom or reward." See 18 U.S.C. § 408a
(1932), quoted in Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 125-126, 56
S.Ct. 395, 395-396, 80 L.Ed. 522 (1936). Section 408a was amended
on May 18, 1934, to include within its sweep those who kidnap "for
ransom or reward or otherwise." 18 U.S.C. § 408a (1934) (emphasis
added). The phrase "or otherwise" in the amended statute was
construed broadly in Gooch to "prevent transportation in interstate
... commerce of persons who were being unlawfully restrained in
order that the captor might secure some benefit to himself."
Gooch, 297 U.S. at 128, 56 S.Ct. at 397. The application of
ejusdem generis was rejected. The Senate Judiciary Committee
stated:
The object of the addition of the word "otherwise' is to
extend the jurisdiction of this act to persons who have been
kidnapped and held, not only for reward, but for any other
reason.
S.Rep. 534, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., quoted in Gooch, 297 U.S. at 127,
n. 1, 56 S.Ct. at 396-397, n. 1 (emphasis added); see also H.Rep.
1457, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., quoted in Gooch, 297 U.S. at 128, 56
That between on or about August 1, 1994, and on or
about August 2, 1994, in the Northern District of
Florida and elsewhere, the defendant,
BRADY LAVICK ADAMS
did unlawfully seize, confine, kidnap, carry away and
hold against her will Sharee Lovett Adams, and did
transport Sharee Lovett Adams in interstate commerce
from the state of Georgia to Madison County, Florida;
All in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1201.
S.Ct. at 397 (expression of identical intent by House Judiciary
Committee); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 850 (11th
Cir.1984) ("The statute broadly prohibits the interstate
transportation of a person against his will if the captor hopes to
obtain any benefit to himself from the abduction.").
The Supreme Court has subsequently held that § 1201 is not
limited to kidnappings committed for an otherwise illegal purpose.
United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 81-82, 84 S.Ct. 553, 557-558,
11 L.Ed.2d 527 (1964). In Healy, the defendants kidnapped a pilot
and forced him to fly them to Cuba. Id. at 76, 84 S.Ct. at 554.
The district court dismissed the indictment against the defendants
on the ground that the kidnapping was not committed for pecuniary
benefit. Id. at 76-77, 84 S.Ct. at 554-555. The Supreme Court
first stated that "the addition of "otherwise' was intended to make
clear that a nonpecuniary motive did not preclude prosecution under
the statute." Id. at 81, 84 S.Ct. at 557. The Court then disposed
of defendants' argument that § 1201 at a minimum requires that the
kidnapping be committed for an illegal purpose.
This contention is without support in the language of the
provision, its legislative history, judicial decisions and
reason. The wording certainly suggests no distinction based
on the ultimate purpose of a kidnapping ...
Id. at 82, 84 S.Ct. at 557. The Court noted that there were no
policy considerations supporting defendants' assertion that § 1201
requires an illegal purpose.
A murder committed to accelerate the accrual of one's rightful
inheritance is hardly less heinous than one committed to
facilitate a theft; by the same token, we find no compelling
correlation between the propriety of the ultimate purpose
sought to be furthered by a kidnapping and the undesirability
of the act of kidnapping itself.
Id. at 82, 84 S.Ct. at 557.
In Clinton v. United States, 260 F.2d 824 (5th Cir.1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 948, 79 S.Ct. 731, 3 L.Ed.2d 681 (1959),
this Court's predecessor construed § 1201 in circumstances quite
2
similar to the case at bar. The indictment in Clinton also
omitted the phrase "for ransom or reward or otherwise." The court
noted, "It is difficult to see how the addition of the words "for
ransom or reward or otherwise' would have added anything to the
indictment because obviously "otherwise' comprehends any purpose at
all." Id. at 825 (emphasis added). See also United States v.
Atchison, 524 F.2d 367, 370-371 (7th Cir.1975) ("[I]t now appears
to be well settled that purpose is not an element of the offense of
kidnapping and need not be charged or proved to support a
conviction under the kidnapping statute, a defect in the
indictment's allegation of purpose is collateral in nature.")
Adams argues that Clinton does not control the result here for
two reasons. First, he argues that the holding in Clinton stands
in contravention of the Supreme Court's holding in Chatwin v.
United States, 326 U.S. 455, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946).
However, the defendant misreads Chatwin. The Court inChatwin held
that the statutory language "held for ransom or reward or
otherwise" in the Federal Kidnapping Act "implies an unlawful
physical or mental restraint for an appreciable period against the
person's will and with a willful intent so to confine the victim."
2
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th
Cir.1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all
of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to
the close of business on September 30, 1981. Id. at 1209.
Id. at 460, 66 S.Ct. at 235. The Court found that the person
allegedly kidnapped by the defendants in that case was not held
against her will, and was free to leave at any time. Id. The
Court reversed the defendants' convictions because the government
"failed to prove an act of unlawful restraint." Id.
Chatwin holds that, for an act of transporting a person across
state lines to constitute kidnapping under the predecessor to §
1201, the victim so transported must be held against his or her
will. In this regard, Chatwin is in no way inconsistent with the
holding of the court in Clinton. Further, the indictment handed
down against Adams clearly states that he "did unlawfully seize,
confine, kidnap, [and] carry away" Mrs. Adams and " hold [her]
against her will."
However, part of the dicta in Chatwin relates to Adams' second
argument that Clinton does not control our decision in this case.
Adams correctly notes that the court in Clinton upheld an
indictment that, although it lacked the words "for ransom or reward
or otherwise," did in fact charge the defendant with "unlawfully
and knowingly" transporting the victim in interstate commerce after
kidnapping her. The court found that indictment sufficient. Adams
argues, in essence, that the indictment handed down against him
contains no statement regarding his mens rea because there is no
language in it that could serve as a substitute for the purpose
requirement of § 1201.
The Supreme Court stated as dicta in Chatwin that one of the
elements of the Federal kidnapping offense is that the kidnapper
act "with a willful intent so to confine the victim." Chatwin, 326
U.S. at 460, 66 S.Ct. at 235.3 Adams argues that, in Clinton, the
intent element in that indictment served as a substitute for the
purpose of the kidnapping element. He insists that his indictment
contains no language that could serve as a substitute for "ransom
or reward or otherwise," and thus an essential element of the
offense is missing from it. However, Chatwin deals not with the
sufficiency of an indictment, but instead with the sufficiency of
the government's proof after trial. An indictment, on the other
hand, is sufficiently detailed if it: (1) contains the essential
facts underlying each element of the offense, such that the
defendant is properly informed of the proof he must meet, and (2)
is specific enough to permit the defendant to use it to protect
himself from a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-764, 82 S.Ct. 1038,
1046-1047, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962). It cannot be disputed that the
indictment in this case, given its degree of factual and temporal
specificity, meets the second of these two criteria.
We also readily reject Adams' claim based on the first Russell
criterion. The factual specificity of the indictment more than
adequately made him aware of the proof against him and the
3
Because the Court's primary concern and holding in Chatwin
was that the predecessor to § 1201 required that the restraint
applied by the kidnapper be exercised against the victim's will,
the Court did not elaborate on the dicta noted above. The logic
of this dicta is that § 1201 should not be construed to punish a
person who unknowingly and unintentionally transports across
state lines a restrained individual, against that individual's
will. For example, if a trash hauler locks a dumpster, which
unknown to him also holds an intoxicated reveler, picks it up and
moves it in interstate commerce, he should not be guilty of
kidnapping even though he restrained the individual and carried
him across state lines, because he did not form the necessary
intent to do so.
allegations to which he must answer. The incident at issue is
clearly defined, down to the date of the alleged offense. The only
arguable deficiency in the indictment is a failure to explicitly
charge willfulness. Our resolution of this issue is facilitated by
the posture in which Adams' assignment of error is brought to this
Court. Adams did not object to the indictment in the district
court, but instead makes this argument for the first time on
appeal.
When the adequacy of an indictment is challenged for the
first time on appeal, this Court "must find the indictment
sufficient unless it is so defective that it does not, by any
reasonable construction, charge an offense for which the defendant
is convicted." United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 734-35
(11th Cir.1991) (internal quotations omitted). Hooshmand
explained, quoting from United States v. Chilcote, 724 F.2d 1498,
1505 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1218, 104 S.Ct. 2665, 81
L.Ed.2d 370 (1984):
[P]ractical, rather than technical, considerations govern the
validity of an indictment. Minor deficiencies that do not
prejudice the defendant will not prompt this court to reverse
a conviction.
Hooshmand, 931 F.2d at 735.
We readily conclude that Adams suffered no actual prejudice as
a result of this indictment. In addition to the factual
specificity noted above, the indictment specifically refers to §
1201. See Chilcote, 724 F.2d at 1505 ("Moreover, when the
indictment specifically refers to the statute on which the charge
was based, the statutory language may be used to determine whether
the defendant received adequate notice."). Therefore, the ruling
of the district court is affirmed.4
AFFIRMED.
4
Adams' challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence against
him is without merit and warrants no discussion.