United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-2759.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Stuart Martin WESTCOTT, Defendant-Appellant.
May 24, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. (No. 94-3-CR-OC-10), Wm. Terrell Hodges,
Judge.
Before BIRCH, Circuit Judge, GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge, and
O'KELLEY*, District Judge.
O'KELLEY, District Judge:
Defendant-appellant Stuart Martin Westcott appeals pretrial
rulings of the district court regarding evidence and jury
instructions. Defendant entered a conditional plea, pleading
guilty to two counts of falsely pretending to be a Special Agent of
the United States Secret Service, while reserving his right to
appeal the challenged pretrial rulings.
The main issue on appeal is whether the district court abused
its discretion in ruling that, if defendant introduced certain
psychiatric testimony, the court would instruct the jury regarding
the insanity defense. We conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in prohibiting defendant from admitting the
proffered testimony without an insanity defense instruction.
FACTS
Defendant Westcott was charged with two counts of falsely
*
Honorable William C. O'Kelley, U.S. District Judge for the
Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation.
representing himself to be a United States Secret Service Agent, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 912. The incidents giving rise to the
charges occurred on January 5 and 6, 1994.
Pursuant to Rule 12.2(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, defendant timely filed notice of his intent to
rely on the insanity defense and of his intent to introduce expert
testimony relating to mental disease or defect. On February 24,
1994, at a status conference before the district court, defendant
withdrew the notice of intent to rely on a defense of insanity,
intending to use expert psychiatric testimony only to demonstrate
that he lacked the necessary mens rea for the specific intent crime
with which he was charged. The United States filed a motion in
limine to prohibit or limit defendant's use of expert testimony.
On March 9, 1994, the district court held a hearing on pending
motions in limine. Defendant proffered the testimony of Dr. Ernest
Miller, a psychiatrist retained by defendant for the purpose of
examining defendant. Dr. Miller testified that defendant suffered
from bipolar disorder and that, due to altered brain chemistry,
defendant believed himself to be a United States Secret Service
Agent. When examined by defense counsel, Dr. Miller testified:
Q: Now, Mr. Westcott's accused of representing himself to be
a Secret Service Agent back in January 5th and January 6th of
this year and attempting to have motel clerks accept his
personal check for payment of a motel room. How does that—or
does his representation that he was a Secret Service agent,
does that relate in any way to his mental condition at the
time?
A: Yes. In my opinion it was a—this misidentification of
himself, which I think he truly believed himself to be a
member of the Secret Service, was a product of the altered
brain chemistry which is associated with this genetically
related metabolic defect, the—which causes what we, what we
have labeled bipolar disorder to manifest itself.
He—he saw himself as a Secret Service agent only because
his brain chemistry alters his ability to perceive himself
correctly.
Q: Are you saying that Mr. Westcott did not know that he was
lying? Assuming that he's not a Secret Service agent. He's
not. Are you saying that Mr. Westcott didn't understand,
didn't know that he really wasn't a Secret Service agent?
A: In my opinion the patient believed himself to be a Secret
Service agent and connected in some manner with the
government, the Treasury Department and/or Secret Service.
* * * * * *
Q: Could a person suffering from Mr. Westcott's mental
disease, in the condition he was at the time of the charged
acts, be able to form or to have what the law refers to as
criminal intent in your opinion?
A: No. My opinion—his mental condition was such that he could
not form the intent.
Q: Could a person, such a person suffering from the disease
Mr. Westcott suffered and the condition he was in at the time,
be said to knowingly and willfully commit the crime that he's
charged with committing?
A: No.
Q: Could you briefly explain to the Court why not?
A: He truly believed himself to be a representative of the
United States government in one of those agencies which I
mentioned. He believed this because of a state involuntarily
placed upon him by way of his genetics and other features
which factor into the development of bipolar disorder.
As a result of this, he was under the illusion, slash,
delusion that he was a representative of the United States
government, and the representations he made, he truly believed
and did not—that these were not fabrications or, or designs on
his part in order to manipulate others to gain a profitable
end, or something of that sort.
Dr. Miller was questioned by the trial judge:
THE COURT: All right. Assume for the purpose of my next
question then that the term "insanity" means a severe mental
disease or defect as a result of which one is unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts.
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. How does that definition of "insanity"
differ, if at all, from the opinions you have given here
concerning Mr. Westcott's mental state on or around January 5,
1994?
THE WITNESS: There is no bottom line difference as I perceive
it, Your Honor.
On the basis of Dr. Miller's testimony, defendant requested
that the jury be instructed that defendant's mental condition could
be considered in determining whether the government had proven the
required element of specific intent, and that no instruction be
given as to the affirmative defense of insanity. On March 21,
1994, prior to the time opening statements were to be given, the
district court ruled that Dr. Miller's proffered testimony
constituted evidence of insanity, as defined by the Insanity
Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 17. Accordingly, the court ruled
that, if defendant introduced Dr. Miller's testimony, the court
would instruct the jury regarding the affirmative defense of
insanity.
Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving
the right to appeal the district court's ruling with respect to Dr.
Miller's testimony.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
Questions of law are subject to de novo review. United
States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1061 (11th Cir.1990). A district
court's decision regarding the admissibility of psychiatric
evidence is generally subject to the abuse of discretion standard
of review. Id. A district court's refusal to give a requested
jury instruction is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
United States v. Maduno, 40 F.3d 1212, 1215 (11th Cir.1994), cert.
denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 123, 133 L.Ed.2d 72 (1995)
(citation omitted). Reversible error occurs if the requested
instruction was substantially correct and not addressed by other
charges which were given, and if failure to give the instruction
seriously impaired the defendant's ability to present an effective
defense. Id.
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion in ruling
defendant's proffered psychiatric testimony to be admissible
only if accompanied by an instruction regarding the insanity
defense?
The district court based its ruling regarding Defendant's
proffered expert psychiatric testimony on the Insanity Defense
Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17. The Insanity Defense Reform
Act provides a statutory definition of insanity and establishes
that insanity is an affirmative defense which the defendant must
prove by clear and convincing evidence. The Act also eliminates
all other affirmative defenses or excuses based upon mental disease
or defect. Through the Act, Congress intended to prohibit the
presentation of evidence of mental disease or defect, short of
insanity, to excuse conduct. United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d
889, 897 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011, 108 S.Ct. 710,
98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988).
The Act does not, however, completely eliminate the use of
mental disease or defect evidence outside of attempts to establish
the affirmative defense of insanity. The Act does not, by its
terms, prohibit psychiatric evidence relevant to issues other than
excuse or justification of otherwise criminal conduct. If a
subjective state of mind is an element of a crime, evidence
regarding the existence or absence of that state of mind is
evidence relevant to whether a crime was in fact committed.
Psychiatric evidence which negates mens rea thus negates an element
of the offense rather than constituting a justification or excuse.
United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1065 (11th Cir.1990). The
plain language of the Act, as well as its legislative history,
indicates that Congress did not intend to exclude psychiatric
evidence which negates the mens rea element of a charged crime.
Id. at 1064-65. Thus, in Cameron, this court held that the
Insanity Defense Reform Act does not bar the admission of
psychiatric evidence to negate mens rea. Id. at 1062.
The Cameron court noted that the use of psychiatric evidence
to negate mens rea "may easily slide into wider usage that opens up
the jury to theories of defenses more akin to justification." Id.
at 1067 (quoting Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 904-05). Therefore, only
psychiatric evidence which supports a "legally acceptable theory of
lack of mens rea " should be admitted. Id. (emphasis in original).
Psychiatric evidence is admissible to negate mens rea when the
evidence focuses on the defendant's specific state of mind at the
time the offense was committed. Id. at 1067. Evidence that a
defendant lacks the capacity to form mens rea is to be
distinguished from evidence that the defendant actually lacked mens
rea. Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 905. While the two may be logically
related, only the latter is admissible to negate the mens rea
element of an offense. Id.
In the instant case, defendant Westcott was charged with a
specific intent crime. Dr. Miller's proffered testimony provides
evidence both that defendant lacked the capacity to form the intent
to commit the crime with which he was charged, and that defendant
actually lacked such intent. Dr. Miller testified that defendant's
"mental condition was such that he could not form the intent"
required for the charged crime. Dr. Miller further stated that
defendant actually "believed himself to be a Secret Service agent"
and truly believed the representations he made which form the basis
of the charges. Dr. Miller's testimony thus focuses on defendant's
state of mind at the time of the allegedly criminal incidents, and
therefore supports the contention that defendant actually lacked
the mens rea required for the charged specific intent crime of
impersonating a United States Secret Service Agent.
Accordingly, under Cameron, Dr. Miller's testimony constitutes
evidence admissible to negate the mens rea element of the charged
crime. And, the district court ruled Dr. Miller's testimony to be
admissible. Defendant argues that the district court erred in
refusing his proposed jury instruction regarding psychiatric
evidence and mens rea. Notably, however, there is no evidence in
the record that the district court intended to give a jury charge
which prevented the jury from considering evidence of mental
abnormality in determining whether the state had proven its case.
See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233-34, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 1101-02,
94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987) (noting the dubious constitutionality of
instructing a jury to consider self-defense evidence only in regard
to the affirmative defense of self-defense and not in regard to
whether the government established its case). In this case, the
district court merely ruled that Dr. Miller's testimony was only
admissible if accompanied by a jury instruction regarding the
affirmative defense of insanity. In so doing, the court noted that
its decision was made "in view of especially Dr. Miller's testimony
that it's his opinion that, due to mental disease or defect at the
time, the defendant was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his conduct, which is precisely the definition of "insanity'
provided by Section 17 of Title 18." Dr. Miller testified that
Defendant's mental condition which caused him to lack the mens rea
required for the charged crime also caused Defendant to meet the
test for insanity, as defined by the Insanity Defense Reform Act.
Defendant objects to the court's ruling that Dr. Miller's
testimony was only admissible if accompanied by a jury instruction
regarding the affirmative defense of insanity. Defendant's desire
to argue that he lacked mens rea rather than that his conduct was
excused by virtue of insanity is strategically warranted. The
government bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that a defendant had the required specific intent to commit a
charged crime, yet the defendant is required to prove the
affirmative defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
See United States v. Moody, 763 F.Supp. 589, 604 (M.D.Ga.1991),
aff'd, 977 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 944,
113 S.Ct. 1348, 122 L.Ed.2d 730 (1993). Moreover, a jury finding
of "not guilty by reason of insanity" results in civil commitment
proceedings, while a finding that mens rea is lacking results in
acquittal. See id.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in ruling that Dr. Miller's testimony must be
accompanied by an insanity defense instruction. In enacting the
Insanity Defense Reform Act, Congress changed the burden and
standard of proof to require the defendant to prove the affirmative
defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence. Cameron, 907
F.2d at 1061. Congress did so based on testimony regarding the
difficulty of proving a defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt.
Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 900. In this case, the district court
determined that allowing defendant to present Dr. Miller's
testimony only to negate mens rea would contravene the requirements
of the Insanity Defense Reform Act. The court was persuaded by the
fact that Dr. Miller's testimony did not relate only to mens rea;
Dr. Miller also testified that defendant's mental condition met the
definition of insanity under the Insanity Defense Reform Act.
Therefore, admitting Dr. Miller's testimony solely as mens rea
evidence would allow defendant to present insanity defense evidence
while avoiding the burden of proof mandated by the Insanity Defense
Reform Act.
Defendant also argues that the district court's ruling
regarding the insanity defense instruction impermissibly imposed an
insanity defense on him. Defendant relies on United States v.
Marble, 940 F.2d 1543 (D.C.Cir.1991), for the proposition that the
insanity defense cannot be imposed over the objection of a
competent defendant. Id. at 1548. Yet defendant's reliance on the
Marble case is misplaced. In Marble, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision not to impose the insanity defense
against the defendant's will. In the instant case, however, the
district court did not insist that the insanity defense be raised
after defendant had waived the defense. Rather, defendant sought
to present evidence of insanity without assuming the burden of
proof required by the Insanity Defense Reform Act. The district
court ruled defendant's proffered evidence to be admissible when
accompanied by a proper jury instruction. The district court did
not improperly impose a defense on defendant.
CONCLUSION
Because defendant's proffered psychiatric testimony both
negates mens rea and provides support for an insanity defense, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the
psychiatric testimony to be admissible only if accompanied by an
insanity defense instruction. Accordingly, the judgment of
conviction is AFFIRMED.