United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-8809.
Jody SHEALY, Ricky Dudley, Terry Cook, Ronald Rowe, Ted Barton,
Intervenors-Appellants,
v.
The CITY OF ALBANY, GEORGIA, a municipal corporation, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
July 31, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia. (No. 1200), Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., Judge.
Before KRAVITCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior
Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Five white firefighters intervened in this decades-old civil
rights action against the City of Albany, Georgia claiming reverse
discrimination in the promotion of a black to the position of
battalion chief. The district court held an evidentiary hearing
after which it denied the white firefighters any relief. This
appeal ensued. For the following reasons, we vacate a portion of
the district court's order and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
This class action was instituted on August 31, 1972, against
the City of Albany under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983 and the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution alleging a
pattern or practice of racial discrimination in hiring, promotion,
assignment and various other employment practices. On September 2,
1976, the district court for the Middle District of Georgia, Albany
Division, entered a permanent injunction enjoining the City of
Albany (City) from such practices and mandating equal employment
opportunities. To this end, the court required that the City
undertake many affirmative actions designed to achieve "a work
force in which the proportion of total black employees to total
white employees viewed (a) overall, (b) by job classification and
description, (c) by department, and (d) by rate of pay is at least
equal to the proportion of blacks to whites in the working age
population as shown by the most recent Albany, Georgia Standard
Metropolitan Area reports of the Bureau of the Census."
In February of 1994, from a pool of six applicants, the Fire
Chief promoted a black applicant to the position of battalion chief
in the City's Fire Department. The five non-selected applicants
are white. In December of 1994, the white applicants filed a
"Motion of Prospective Plaintiffs For Intervention." 1 The
1
Paragraph 11 of the 1976 Permanent Injunction provides:
Any person who believes that he has been
discriminated against on account of race or that
the provisions of this order have been violated,
may file a written complaint with the Central
Employment Office. The Central Employment Office
shall investigate the complaint and seek to
resolve it.... If the complaining party is not
satisfied with the results as contained in the
report, he or she may, within sixty (60) days of
the date of receipt of the report, file a motion
with the clerk of this court to have the court
determine the matter. The clerk shall cause a
copy of the motion to be mailed to the defendants,
who shall respond to it within ten (10) days. The
clerk shall then refer the motion and the response
to the court. Proceedings shall thereafter be in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In its subsequent order denying relief to the white
applicants, the court stated that it was considering their
complaint under Paragraph 11, as a complaint of persons who
believe they have been discriminated against on account of
intervenors sought broad relief, including the dissolution of the
1976 permanent injunction, the setting aside of the complained of
promotion, and the re-opening of the selection process.2
There was some initial briefing regarding the intervention,
and on May 22, 1995, the district court held an evidentiary
hearing. The Fire Chief, who is black, testified as to the
subjective process he used in selecting the successful applicant
for promotion. The district court limited cross-examination of the
Chief. The five unsuccessful applicants then sought to testify
regarding the superiority of their qualifications over those of the
selected applicant for the promotion in question. The district
court declined to hear that testimony, but indicated that, if
subsequently filed, the court would review the personnel files of
the white applicants to determine their qualifications relevant to
the successful applicant.
Approximately two hours later, and prior to the filing of the
personnel files, the court ruled that there was no evidence of
racial animus in the selection of the black applicant who was
promoted.3
II. Analysis
In reverse discrimination suits, plaintiffs must establish a
race.
2
The district court did dissolve the permanent injunction,
holding that equal opportunity in employment practices by the
City of Albany had been achieved. Neither party appeals this
decision.
3
The court stated: "In the court's best judgment, there is
no evidence to support a claim of racial animus on the part of
the Fire Chief, who is the one who made the selection."
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d
301, 304 (11th Cir.1991). The test requires a reverse
discrimination plaintiff to prove:
1) that he belongs to a class;
(2) that he applied for and was qualified for a job;
(3) that he was rejected for the job; and
(4) that the job was filled by a minority group member or a
woman.
Id. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
Although subjective promotion criteria are not discriminatory
per se, neither may they be used to disguise an impermissible
race-based selection. Hill v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 767 F.2d
771, 775 (11th Cir.1985). Subjective criteria tend to facilitate
the consideration of impermissible criteria such as race. Roberts
v. Gadsden Memorial Hospital, 835 F.2d 793, 798 (11th Cir.1988).
Where it is alleged that a race-based promotion decision has been
made, proof of intent to discriminate racially is necessary. Hill,
767 F.2d at 773. Of course, direct evidence of intent is often
unavailable and a circumstantial case may be proven. Cooper-
Houston v. Southern Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 605 (11th Cir.1994).
Intervenors in this case were not permitted to present
evidence at the May 22nd hearing on the issue of the Fire Chief's
intent to racially discriminate in the selection of a new battalion
chief.4 Intervenors' attempt to testify regarding their
4
A review of the docket reveals that there was no motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment filed by either party.
Plaintiffs, therefore, apparently had no opportunity to file
supporting evidentiary materials.
qualifications and introduce evidence comparing their
qualifications to those of the successful applicant was cut off by
the district court.
In refusing the evidence, the district judge made a plea for
Fire Department collegiality, saying:
The Court has permitted you to examine the individuals who
were involved in the hiring decision, but it declines your
suggestion that now the person selected be examined in this
Court or the persons not selected be examined. As I have
already suggested, all of these people are going to have to
work together after this hearing is concluded. This Court is
not a forum to permit squabbles within public agencies as to
who has already been promoted, and the propriety as between
those people....
While aspirational, this is (1) not sufficient reason to deny
the presentation of admissible evidence; and (2) to no avail, the
complaint having been lodged with its inherent, and unavoidable,
disharmony.
We review the district court's exclusion of intervenors'
evidence for an abuse of discretion. BankAtlantic v. Blythe
Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 955 F.2d 1467, 1476 (11th Cir.1992),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1049, 113 S.Ct. 966, 122 L.Ed.2d 122 (1993).
A district court evidentiary ruling is not disturbed unless there
is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc.
v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 993 (11th Cir.1993). In this
case, however, we are convinced there was such an abuse of
discretion.
In denying intervenors relief, the district court said there
was "no evidence" of racial animus in the selection of the
successful applicant. If, indeed, there had been no evidence, it
would have been because the intervenors were not permitted to
introduce any.5
The intervenors were effectively denied the opportunity to
make out and support a prima facie case by the district court's
refusal to allow them to testify regarding their qualifications or
to review their personnel files as promised. Such testimony may
have raised an inference of intentional discrimination which the
City would have had to rebut.6 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804,
93 S.Ct. at 1825. While we express no views on the merits of their
claim, or of the strength of the evidence they sought to introduce,
intervenors must be allowed the opportunity to make out their prima
facie case.7
5
There was some evidence introduced which the district court
might have found supported the claim of discrimination. Two
Assistant Fire Chiefs testified that the Fire Chief asked them to
give their opinions as to which applicant should be promoted, but
to consider only the two black applicants. There was also some
testimony by the Fire Chief, himself, regarding the relative
qualifications of the black and white applicants.
6
The proffered evidence, as well as that referred to in
footnote 5, dealt with the relative qualifications of the several
applicants. Insofar as this evidence might have supported an
argument that the Fire Chief made a mistake and failed to select
the best qualified, the evidence has no value. The district
judge does not sit as a sort of "super personnel officer" of the
City or its fire department, correcting what the judge perceives
to be poor personnel decisions. See Roberts, 835 F.2d at 802-03
(Hill, J., specially concurring). However, insofar as evidence
of relative qualifications of the applicants amounts to
circumstantial evidence of intent to discriminate on the part of
the Fire Chief, if, indeed, it does so, that evidence must be
received and considered before a finding can be made as to the
Fire Chief's intentions. See Wilson, 934 F.2d at 304.
7
Although this case has been effectively terminated by the
dissolution of the permanent injunction, plaintiffs were allowed
to intervene prior to that dissolution. Therefore, their claims
must be resolved within the context of this case prior to its
being dismissed. Furthermore, we express no opinion on the
effect of the permanent injunction on the permissibility of a
race-based promotion.
Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the district court's
order which denies any relief to intervenors8 and remand for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
VACATED and REMANDED.
8
We do not vacate that portion of the district court order
that dissolves the permanent injunction.