Plaintiffs seek the partition of certain real estate, of which they claim to be tenants in common with the defendants. Defendants deny that plaintiffs have any interest in the land. The land was formerly owned by William G. White, who died intestate March 4, 1900,
i: deed: dethfra^erl son: validity of: title. I. The one question thus presented for our consideration is whether the deposit of the deeds with the notary with instructions to deliver them to the grantees after the-grantor’s death and the actual delivery of the-same by the notary upon the happening of the , , _ prescribed event, was, under all the circumstanc-'s, a valid conveyance. At the date of these instruments Mr. White was'over seventy years of age. . His wife-was dead; and it is quite clear that, realizing the proba
2. same: res-life estate. It is well established that a grantor may deposit a deed in the hands of a third person, to hold until after the grantor’s death, and then deliver to the grantee, and that a delivery so made is perfectly valid and effectual to pass a good title to the grantee; Trask v. Trask, 90 Iowa, 318; Hinson v. Bailey, 73 Iowa, 544; Bury v. Young, 98 Cal. 446 (33 Pac. Rep. 338, 35 Am. St. Rep. 186); Wheelwright v. Wheelwright, 2 Mass. 452 (3 Am. Dec. 66); Hathaway v. Payne, 34 N. Y. 106; Foster v. Mansfield, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 412 (37 Am. Dec. 154). See, also, numerous cases cited in 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 157, 158.- Such a conveyance, from the date of its deposit with a third person for delivery after the grantor’s death, operates substantially as a deed, with reservation of a life estate in the grantor. . Cook v. Brown, 34 N. H. 460; Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644 (11 Am. Rep. 592); Bury v. Young, supra.
3. same: future and intent. These general propositions are not seriously disputed by the appellants, but they contend that, to be effective, such deposit must be mad© without any reserved right or power in the grantor to control the deed nr prevent its delivery upon his death. Prutsman v. Baker, supra; Logsdon v. Newton, 54 Iowa, 448; Burk v. Sproat, 96 Mich. 404 (55 N. W. Rep. 985). This may well be conceded to be the law, though the fact
But we find nothing in the record before us to indicate that Mr. White did retain any control over the deeds in controversy. It is true that, in answer to a question by counsel, the notary says he should have redelivered the deeds to the grantor had the latter, in his life time, demanded them; but this statement appears to have been no more than the witness’ interpretation of his duty in the premises, and is without support in the instructions given him by the grantor, or in the circumstances surrounding the execution and deposit of the papers. He testifies without qualification that the deeds were left with him “to be delivered after Mr. White’s death.” He further says that preceding the execution and delivery of the deeds the grantor discussed the question of the legal validity of such a transaction, and that he (witness) said to him “that, if the deeds were executed and deposited with the specific order that they be delivered at his death to the parties, I had not much doubt in my mind but that it would be a good conveyance;” but he adds that he did have some doubt in the premises, and advised against it. Mr. White expressed his preference to thus distribute his property,■ rather than by testamentary disposition, and proceeded to execute the deeds, and ks® ;e them in the witness’ hands, with instructions for thsfe delivery as already set forth, and said nothing to the effect th it he would thereafter send or call for them.
The only circumstance pressed upon our attention as giving color to the belief that the grantor retained or attempted to retain any control over the deeds is the fact
4. Acceptance: legal presumption of. .5. same: when effective, It is íurthér sai I that the grantees had no knowledge of the existence, of the deeds in their favor until after the death of their father, and therefore there could have been no such acceptance of the gifts as will make them effectual in law. While an acceptance is necessary to make a gift effectual, the great weight- of authority upholds the rule that the acceptance of a deed of valuable property will be presumed, although the grantee had no knowledge of the provision for his benefit; and this is especially true where the conveyance imposes no condition or burden upon the grantee. In such •case, if the .grantee accepts the benefit when the fact is brought to his knowledge, the acceptance relates back to the date of the conveyance. Mitchell's Lessee v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 386; Guggenheimer v. Lockridge, 39 W. Va. 461 (19 S. E. Rep. 874); Halluck v. Bush, 2 Root (Conn.) 26, 1 Am. Dec. 60); Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass. 456 (6 Am. Dec. 146); Church v. Gilman, 15 Wend. 656 (30 Am. Dec. 82); Barns v. Hatch, 3 N. H. 304 (14 Am. Dec. 369); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 94 Mich. 11 (53 N. W. Rep. 788); Hatch v. Hatch, 6 Am. Dec. 67; Belden v. Carter, 4 Am. Dec. 185; Parker v. Parker, 56 Iowa, 111. Indeed, the grantees in this case were in no position to expressly refuse or repudiate the conveyances, even had they been advised of the existence thereof, until a delivery to them was made or offered. When the offer was made, they accepted the deeds, and promptly asserted their rights thereunder. This, we think, was sufficient.
The judgment of the district court is aeeirmed.