United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-4665.
Vincent D. HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Curtis CHAPMAN, M.J. Piggott, J.W. Barton, T. Kovalsky, R.
Ridley, Sgt. Bentley, and R. Cotterman, Defendants-Appellees.
Oct. 11, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. (No. 90-14061-CIV-UUB), Ursula Ungaro-
Benages, Disrict Judge.
Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and WOOD*,
Senior Circuit Judge.
WOOD, Senior Circuit Judge:
On September 25, 1989 several correctional officers at the
Martin Correctional Institution ("MCI") in Martin County, Florida
forcibly removed Vincent D. Harris from his cell and had his hair
cut, allegedly while beating him and using racial slurs. Harris,
alleging a violation of his constitutional rights under the First
and Eighth Amendments, brought a § 1983 action against the six
officers involved, all of whom are parties to this appeal.1 Harris
is familiar with both such claims and the prison haircut policies
2
which underlie them; this is not his first such challenge. This
*
Honorable Harlington Wood, Jr., Senior U.S. Circuit Judge
for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
1
Curtis Chapman, then the Assistant Superintendent of MCI,
was also named as a defendant in the original complaint. Since
he was not alleged to have taken part in any use of excessive
force, however, the district court entered judgment for Chapman
at trial.
2
See Harris v. Dugger, No. 89-3478, 897 F.2d 536 (11th Cir.
Feb. 8, 1990) (unpublished disposition); Harris v. Dugger, 715
case and appeal present some new issues, however.
The district court dismissed Harris' First Amendment claim,
but allowed his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim to go to the
jury. That jury returned a verdict clearing five of the defendants
but finding for Harris against the sixth, Sgt. John R. Cotterman.3
The jury assessed $500 in punitive damages against Cotterman for
his part in the ordeal but declined to award any compensatory
damages. After receiving the verdict, however, the district court
entered judgment as a matter of law in Cotterman's favor. The
court also vacated an award of sanctions against the defendants for
discovery violations which had been granted by a previous judge.
Harris filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging these and other
rulings.
I. BACKGROUND
When the events in question occurred, Vincent D. Harris was an
inmate at the Martin Correctional Institution ("MCI") in Martin
County, Florida. One of the provisions of the Florida
Administrative Code governing such institutions states that:
[M]ale inmates shall have their hair cut short to medium
length at all times with no part of the ear or collar covered.
Sideburns shall not extend beyond the bottom of the earlobes
and will have straight lines with no flare at the base. All
male inmates shall be clean shaven, provided, however, an
exemption from this requirement may be granted on the basis of
a medical diagnosis when it is determined by the staff
physician that shaving would be detrimental to the inmate's
health.
F.Supp. 364 (S.D.Fla.1989), vacated in part on reconsid., 757
F.Supp. 1359 (S.D.Fla.1991). See also Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d
912, 915 n. 2 (11th Cir.1995) ("Appellant is a very litigious
prisoner." (ten citations omitted)).
3
Apparently omitting his first name in error, the complaint
refers to this defendant as "R. Cotterman."
Fla.Admin.Code Ann. r. 33-3.002(11) (1989). This rule is enforced
by similar Department of Corrections Rules and by MCI's internal
operating procedures. Harris, however, is a Rastafarian.
Rastafarians believe that men should not shave, cut, or comb their
hair or beard. See Note, Soul Rebels: the Rastafarians and the
Free Exercise Clause, 72 Geo.L.J. 1605, 1608 (1984). In accordance
with these beliefs, which the parties assume are sincere, Harris
refused to voluntarily submit to a haircut on several prior
occasions and had been administratively disciplined at MCI for his
reluctance.
On September 25, 1989, after receiving orders to enforce the
hair length rule, several corrections officers at MCI4 forcibly
removed Harris from his cell, took him to the laundry room, and
restrained him while his hair was cut by another inmate. Harris
resisted in a variety of ways throughout the five to six minute
affair (he admitted threatening to kill the prison barber, among
others) and was accordingly restrained. Harris claims, however,
that this restraint exceeded the amount of force authorized. He
alleges that the officers kicked and beat him about the face; also
that a towel was used around his neck to "squelch" and secure him.
Though uncertain about the particular acts of each officer, Harris
specifically charges that Sgt. Cotterman "snapped" his head back
with the towel and twice "mugged" him in the face (a "mugging" or
"palming" is apparently a slap or hit with a palm or open fist).
He also claims that Sgt. Cotterman used various racial slurs and
4
The officers involved are all party to this appeal. They
are Myron Piggott, J.W. Barton, T. Kovalsky, R. Ridley, Sgt.
Bentley, and J. Cotterman.
otherwise taunted him throughout the ordeal. Witness testimony
supported these allegations at least in part. Following the event
Harris was uncooperative with prison medical personnel. The
routine examination which follows an authorized use of force
against an inmate noted no visible injury. Later, however, Harris
complained of back and knee pain resulting from the incident.
In April 1990 Harris filed this § 1983 action against the
defendants-appellees. Harris charged that prison officials and
officers violated his First Amendment right to freedom of religious
expression when they cut his "religiously mandated" hair style. He
further alleged that the officers used excessive force and
subjected him to verbal abuse, thus violating his Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
In September 1991 defendants moved for summary judgment, or in
the alternative for dismissal of Harris's complaint for failure to
state a claim. In May 1992 the district court adopted the findings
of the magistrate and dismissed Harris's verbal abuse claims. The
court also granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
First Amendment claim, finding the hair length rule constitutional,
but also finding that a material issue of fact existed regarding
the excessive force claim.5 Finally, the district court, per Judge
Jose A. Gonzalez Jr., also granted Harris's motion for sanctions
because of the defendants' alleged failure to comply with discovery
5
Defendants contended that Harris had not been injured
during the haircut and thus could not allege the kind of injury
necessary to prevail on a claim of cruel and unusual punishment.
Harris, however, maintained that his back was injured while being
restrained during the haircut and that the use of force was
unnecessary and wanton, the legal benchmark.
requests. The order, however, stated that "[i]mposition of
sanctions will be deferred until the conclusion of the case and
considered at the time of taxing costs."
On December 30, 1992, this case was reassigned to Judge Ursula
Ungaro-Benages. Harris, now represented by counsel (he had
previously proceeded pro se), moved to reinstate his First
Amendment claim. He asserted that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, mandated
the application of a higher standard for First Amendment claims
6
than that applied to his complaint previously. This motion was
denied.
After a four-day trial a jury returned its verdict on Harris's
remaining excessive force claim. The jury found that defendants
Piggot, Barton, Kovalsky, Ridley, and Bentley had neither used
excessive force, nor "acted with malice, willfulness or callous
indifference to the rights of the Plaintiff," the basic
instructions for assessing compensatory and punitive damages,
respectively. They also found, however, that defendant Cotterman
had done both of these. The jury assessed $500 in punitive damages
against Cotterman but declined to assess any compensatory damages.
Despite this verdict Judge Ungaro-Benages dismissed the
charges against Cotterman and entered judgment as a matter of law
in his favor pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). After reviewing the
record, Judge Ungaro-Benages also vacated the previous grant of
sanctions against defendants for their alleged discovery
6
Discussed further below, the RFRA reinstitutes a
"compelling interest" standard in place of the "substantial
interest" standard which applied previously.
violations. Harris filed a timely appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Harris contends on appeal that the trial court erred: 1) in
not reinstating his First Amendment claim; 2) in allowing the
defendants to submit expert testimony to the jury; 3) in granting
Cotterman's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law; and 4) in
vacating the previous award of sanctions. Each of these
contentions will be addressed below.
A. First Amendment Claim/RFRA
The district court, in adopting the findings of the
magistrate, cited Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499 (11th
Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 714, 98 L.Ed.2d
664 (1988), a case that upheld as constitutional a prison hair
length rule virtually identical to the one in this case. In doing
so, the Martinelli court held that hair length regulations were the
least restrictive means of advancing substantial governmental
interests in maintaining prison security and in identifying
escapees. Id. at 1506-07. Under the "substantial governmental
interest" standard, this court has repeatedly found that such rules
were permissible for those reasons. See, e.g., Brightly v.
Wainwright, 814 F.2d 612, 613 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
944, 108 S.Ct. 332, 98 L.Ed.2d 359 (1987); Maimon v. Wainwright,
792 F.2d 133 (11th Cir.1986); Shabazz v. Barnauskas, 790 F.2d
1536, 1540 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1011, 107 S.Ct. 655,
93 L.Ed.2d 709 (1986).
The RFRA, passed by Congress in late 1993, changed the
standard relied on in Martinelli. The RFRA provides that
"[g]overnment may substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person 1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and 2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). This
statute applies retroactively. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a);
Lawson v. Dugger, 844 F.Supp. 1538 (S.D.Fla.1994), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502 (11th Cir.1996).
Harris asserts that the district court's decision did not comply
with the elements of this new standard and perhaps relied on
factors such as economic costs which are not mentioned in RFRA. We
disagree.
As an initial matter, though Harris offered no evidence on the
point, see Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir.1995)
(describing the burden of the religious adherent), we may assume
that the prison's hair length rule "substantially burdens" the
exercise of his religion. Next we turn to the district court's
analysis. Despite the magistrate's citation to Martinelli, it is
clear that the district court was fully aware of the new standards
articulated by RFRA and applied them. Indeed, the court discussed
the issue orally when announcing its ruling:
[I]t seems to me clear that the State has a compelling State
interest in issues relating to the security of prison
facilities and related issues, such as the ability to identify
prisoners, to be able to prevent themselves from disguising
themselves and from secreting objects in their hair and so
forth.
I also am not reluctant to find the least restrictive
means of accomplishing that is to cut the inmate's hair so
that the inmate cannot use his hair to disguise himself[,] to
conceal his identity[,] or to hide objects in it.
Frankly, putting cost aside, from a practical standpoint,
I would be hard pressed to think of any other reasonable means
in order to deal with this problem.
The district court's later omnibus order similarly dealt with the
issue and specifically applied the RFRA statute. We thus find no
merit in Harris's argument. Neither do we fault the district
court's conclusions regarding the compelling interest and least
restrictive means tests. It is well established that states have
a compelling interest in security and order within their prisons,
see Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 512 (11th Cir.1996) (and
citations therein). This is so especially in "close custody"
facilities like MCI which contain extremely violent offenders.
This general interest in security clearly includes other specific
interests articulated by the district court such as the
identification of escapees and the prevention of the secreting of
contraband or weapons in hair or beards. See also Hamilton v.
Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1554-55 (8th Cir.1996) (finding prison hair
length rule applicable to Native American, for similar reasons);
Phipps v. Parker, 879 F.Supp. 734 (W.D.Ky.1995) (finding prison
hair length rule applicable to orthodox Hasidic Jew, for similar
reasons). Furthermore, like the courts cited here, we are unable
to suggest any lesser means than a hair length rule for satisfying
these interests, nor could Harris's counsel at oral argument. We
thus join these courts in finding that a reasonable hair length
regulation satisfies the least restrictive means test. The court's
decision denying reinstatement of the claim is therefore affirmed.
B. Opinion Testimony
Harris next contends that the district court impermissibly
allowed the defendants to introduce "expert testimony" at trial and
that this testimony "severely prejudiced" the presentation of his
Eighth Amendment claims to the jury. We review the district
court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1362 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S.
907, 109 S.Ct. 3192, 105 L.Ed.2d 701 (1989).
Harris claimed that his lower back was injured during his
forced haircut. In an attempt to discredit this assertion,
defendants presented medical records that showed that defendant had
complained of lower back pain nearly ten times in the year
preceding the haircut. These records were admitted into evidence
without objection. The defense then called Dr. Robert Smith, the
Chief Medical Doctor at the South Florida Reception Center, to
7
elaborate on the records. After reading through the various
incident reports for the jury Dr. Smith was asked if, in his
"opinion," Harris's records "indicate[d] a history of lower back
pain." Harris objected to this question as he considered it to be
eliciting an opinion. The district court recognized it as such but
ruled that Dr. Smith could answer. He did so by saying "Yes, they
do."
As the district court recognized, the use of this particular
witness for the task at hand was somewhat suspect, but we believe
the decision to allow his limited response to such a general
7
The defendants added Dr. Smith as a witness on the eve of
trial. Harris objected to the late inclusion of this "expert
witness." The court reluctantly permitted Smith to testify on
the grounds that (1) he offer no expert testimony and (2) he
restrict his comments to interpreting the abbreviated language in
the reports and outlining the procedures by which the reports
would have been made.
question was not an abuse of discretion. "History" is a word that
has no special medical or legal significance. As defined by The
American Heritage College Dictionary (2d ed. 1982), "history" can
be 1) "a narrative of events," 2) "a chronological record of
events," 3) "an interesting past" or 4) "a record of a patient's
medical background." Thus to say that Harris had a "history of
lower back pain" does not say very much. Moreover, one legal
encyclopedia defines "opinion" as "an inference or conclusion drawn
by a witness from facts, some of which are known to him and others
assumed, or drawn from facts which although lending probability to
the inference do not evolve it by a process of absolutely necessary
reasoning." 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 438 (1964) (emphasis added).
Since Dr. Smith expressed nothing in his answer that was not a
restatement of obvious, known facts—namely, that Harris had
numerous documented incidents of lower back pain in the year(s)
preceding the haircut—he stated no "opinion," let alone an expert
one. We find the decision to allow the testimony was within the
district court's discretion.
C. Judgment as a Matter of Law (JNOV)
Although the jury found in favor of the other defendants, it
specifically found that Cotterman violated Harris's constitutional
rights and that his actions were sufficiently callous to award $500
in punitive damages. Judge Ungaro-Benages, however, entered
judgment as a matter of law in favor of Cotterman. The court
stated:
While the jury apparently believed the Plaintiff's testimony
that Defendant Cotterman had restrained the Plaintiff by
wrapping a towel around Plaintiff's head and used racial slurs
during the incident, the fact that the jury exonerated the
other Defendants reflects that the jury rejected Plaintiff's
argument that all of the Defendants acted in concert to
inflict a beating upon the Plaintiff. Consequently, the jury
could award punitive damages against Defendant Cotterman only
if, standing alone, his conduct evidenced callous indifference
or an evil intent or motuve (sic) to violate the Plaintiff's
constitutional rights.
The evidence against Defendant Cotterman was simply
insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that his
conduct was callous and malicious. (cite omitted). There was
no evidence that Defendant Cotterman's actions resulted in any
physical injury to the Plaintiff. Similarly, there was no
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
Defendant Cotterman knew that by wrapping a towel around the
Plaintiff's head that he would violate the Plaintiff's
constitutional rights.
We review a decision to grant a judgment as a matter of law
de novo. Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546, 549 (11th
Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2557, 132 L.Ed.2d
811 (1995). In considering a motion for a judgment as a matter of
law, a court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party. Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581
(11th Cir.1989). The motion should be granted only if upon such
consideration the court finds that reasonable people in the
exercise of impartial judgment could not arrive at a contrary
verdict. Id.
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation a prisoner must
prove that his injury was caused by an "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct.
995, 998, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). The Supreme Court has admonished
that in such cases "the core judicial inquiry is ... whether force
was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Id. at
7, 112 S.Ct. at 999. The absence of "serious injury" alone is
insufficient to dismiss a prisoner's Eight Amendment claim. Id.
Instead, analysis of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim is
contextual and requires that many factors be considered: "the need
for the application of force, the relationship between that need
and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by
the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the
severity of a forceful response." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Only "de minimis" uses of force are beyond
constitutional recognition. Id. at 7-8, 112 S.Ct. at 999.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has suggested that the type of
punishment, rather than some arbitrary quantity of injury, may be
relevant for Eighth Amendment claims. Id. at 8, 112 S.Ct. at 999.
The evidence before the jury included Harris's claims that the
officers as a group (including Cotterman) kicked and beat him, and
that Cotterman specifically snapped his head back with a towel,
"mugged" or slapped him twice in the face, and harassed him with
several racial epithets and other taunts. Harris claimed that some
of these actions, particularly the kicking and use of the towel,
caused or exacerbated the injuries to his back. Testimony
supported both the allegations and the fact of his existing
physical condition to some extent. His allegations were thus not
merely conclusory, see Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th
Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1103, 111 S.Ct. 1003, 112 L.Ed.2d
1085 (1991) (pre- Hudson ), and the jury chose to believe them at
least in part. This is a very close case, but we find that in
these particular circumstances, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Harris, as we must, these claims together
constitute more than a "de minimis" injury.8 We will thus respect
the jury's verdict that Harris's constitutional rights were
violated.
We now turn to the $500 punitive damages award assessed
against Cotterman. In the Eleventh Circuit, "[i]n some
circumstances, punitive damages may be awarded in a § 1983 action
even without a showing of actual loss by the plaintiff if the
plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated." Kelly v.
Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1557 (11th Cir.1994) (internal quotes and
citations omitted). Such an award is authorized where "the
defendant was motivated by an evil motive or intent, or ...
reckless and callous indifference to federally protected rights."
Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 688 (11th Cir.1985).
This standard was made clear to the jury in its instructions. We
find that the evidence, particularly the "mugging" and use of
racial epithets and taunts, supports this relatively small award.
The district court's judgment as a matter of law is thus reversed,
with instructions to reinstate the verdict and $500 punitive
damages award.
D. Sanctions
Finally, Harris claims that Judge Ungaro-Benages abused her
discretion by vacating Judge Gonzalez's 1992 order granting
sanctions against the defendants for discovery violations. We
review a decision of the district court to deny sanctions for abuse
8
The jury was instructed that "de minimis means
insignificant or trifling."
of discretion. United States v. Crosby, 59 F.3d 1133, 1137 (11th
Cir.1995).
The motion for sanctions was originally granted after the
defendants missed a court-imposed deadline to respond to discovery
requests by two days. These discovery requests, however, suffered
from several defects (perhaps resulting from the fact that Harris
was then proceeding pro se) and objections were filed. The
requested discovery was provided in June of 1992, one month after
sanctions were awarded and nearly three years before trial.
Judge Gonzalez's order acknowledged the granting of sanctions,
but imposition of the same was deferred until costs were to be
taxed. At that time, of course, Judge Ungaro-Benages was hearing
the case. Her order vacating the award states that this was done
following a review and consideration of relevant parts of the
record.
District judges are accorded wide discretion in ruling upon
discovery motions, and appellate review is accordingly deferential.
A judge's decision as to whether a party or lawyer's actions merit
imposition of sanctions is heavily dependent on the court's
firsthand knowledge, experience, and observation. At times the
actions of the individual or party involved may be judged over the
course of time. Moreover, individual judges may have slightly
different preferences or expectations. In view of these factors we
find that Judge Ungaro-Benages's decision to vacate the limited
order of Judge Gonzalez was within her discretion. In any event we
see no prejudice in the discovery delay when the requested
information was provided quickly and nearly three years before
trial. The district court's order vacating the prior award of
sanctions is affirmed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part,
and REMAND with instructions. Each party will bear its own costs
in this court.