delivered the opinion op the ooubt.
A train of the appellant was delayed by the air-brakes failing to work. It was overtaken by a construction train of the company, which was known to those in charge of the passenger train to be but a few minutes behind it, and a collision occurred, the only damage to the passenger train being the destruction of the rear platform of its rear car. The appellee, Mary J. Minogue, who was a passenger upon it, was, *373by the jar of the collision, thrown from her seat to the floor of the car in which she was riding, and for the injuries she thereby sustained she brought this action for damages, averring that they resulted from the gross neglect of the appellant’s agents who were operating the trains. It is claimed this neglect consisted in failing to exercise care in flagging the coming train.
The evidence is somewhat conflicting as to whether this was done in time to have enabled it to stop before overtaking the passenger train; but whether the fault lay in neglect in this respect, or in the rear train, if it had sufficient notice to enable it do so, failing to check up, need not be considered, because, whether the one or the other, the testimony is of such a character as authorized the question of the existence or non-existence of gross neglect upon the part of the company’s agents to be submitted to the jury.
They returned a verdict for ten thousand dollars. It is urged that this verdict is, in view of the evidence, so excessive that, conceding it embraces both compensatory and punitive damages, yet this court should reverse the judgment. The existence of ordinary neglect in such a case authorizes compensatory damages, while gross neglect permits the jury to award those which are both compensatory and punitive. In this instance, the jury, if they thought proper, were authorized by the instructions to find both. Whether they have gone beyond a reasonable limit must be determined by the conduct of the company’s agents connected with the accident, and the character of the appellee’s injuries. While the rule for the measure*374ment of compensatory damages leaves the matter largely to the discretion of the jury, yet the finding must be within the confines of reason. So, too, must exemplary damages be reasonably adequate to the degree of fault.
The appellee sustained external bruises, and her nervous system was greatly shocked. There is evidence tending to show, however, that it had been somewhat impaired by previous events. Immediately after the accident she walked to a friend’s house near by, and soon after rode home in a vehicle, a distance of several miles. She was confined to her bed for seven or eight weeks, and suffered from nervousness and sleeplessness. Since she left .her bed she has walked about her room, and been to town once or twice, but has been unable to do any work. The accident occurred in October; the case was tried in March following, and this, briefly stated, was her condition during that period. None of her bones were broken, but at one time since the accident, if not ever since, she has been troubled with partial paralysis, or an insensibility in one leg from the knee down.
The probable duration of her injuries is not shown by the testimony. Whether they are of a permanent character does not appear. The medical testimony which was introduced is utterly unsatisfactory in this respect. The burden rested upon the appellee to show the extent of her injuries. If of a permanent character, she should have shown it. A perusal of the evidence creates no satisfactory opinion upon this point, and leaves the matter in entire doubt. The physicians who testified say she may recover entirely and she may not.
*375It is impossible to measure with any thing like absolute certainty the amount of punitive damages proper in a case, or the extent of some of the elements of those which are compensatory. The opinion of a jury has been, and properly no doubt, regarded as the best means of even a fair approximation, and every verdict should be treated prima facie as the result of honest judgment upon their part. They are the constitutional triers of the facts of a case, and courts should excercise great caution in interfering with their verdicts. Litigants must not be left, however, to their arbitrary will, and be without remedy in cases where verdicts can be accounted for only upon the theory that they are the result of an improper sympathy or unreasonable prejudice. In such cases it is one of the highest duties of a court to interfere, otherwise great wrongs will often result, and the party be remediless. Whether it should do so is more easily determinable in a case where compensatory damages only are allowable, because they, in part, admit of exact measurement. In such cases this court has often reversed the jury’s finding. We see no reason why it should not do so in a case like this one, but with increased caution perhaps.
In the case now presented there was no intentional injury. An effort was made to flag the coming train, and those in charge of it attempted, upon notice of the danger, to stop it. Whether these efforts were of such a character as left the company open to the charge of gross neglect was a question for the jury; but no purpose to injure is shown; and while it was properly a question for the determination of the jury *376whether the company’s agents had not been guilty of such neglect as merited punishment by way of punitive damages, yet, in our opinion, a case was not presented by the evidence for a verdict of ten thousand dollars, either upon the score of punishment - or compensation, or both. It is true that railroad companies, as to their passengers, should be held to the exercise-of the utmost care and skill which prudent persons would be likely to exercise as to themselves under the like circumstances, and in the conduct of a business so hazardous as railroading; but in the absence-of bad motive or purpose of injury, or a neglect so wanton as to demand the severest punishment, and where it is utterly uncertain what the result of an injury will be, a verdict for such a sum as has been awarded to the appellee strikes one at first blush as the result of either prejudice toward the offending party or an undue sympathy for the one injured.
While absolute certainty as to the result of an injury should not be required, yet a mere conjecture or even a probability do not warrant the giving of damages for future disability, which may never be realized. The future effect of the injury should be shown with reasonable certainty to authorize damages upon the score of permanent injury. This was not done in this case. The evidence shows that the appellee is as likely to entirely recover, and perhaps in a short period of time, as she is to be permanently affected by the injury.
To sustain a verdict like this one under such circumstances would often result in the grossest injustice, and its existence can be accounted for only upon *377the ground that the jury were swayed by prejudice or an improper controlling sympathy.
The judgment is, therefore, reversed, and canse remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion.