Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Company

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-9202.

Christopher Todd MAYFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PATTERSON PUMP COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

Dec. 20, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. (No. 2:94-CV-0005-WCO), William C. O'Kelley,
Judge.

Before EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, FAY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
ALDRICH*, Senior District Judge.

FAY, Senior Circuit Judge:

Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), Appellant,

Christopher Todd Mayfield ("Mayfield"), an African-American

employee of Appellee, Patterson Pump Company ("Patterson") filed

suit against Patterson alleging that he was discriminated against

on the basis of race.1 Patterson moved for summary judgment

contending, among other reasons, that Mayfield was fired for a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of Patterson on all counts. Mayfield

appeals only the district court's determination that no issue of

fact exists as to whether he was unlawfully terminated on the basis

*
Honorable Ann Aldrich, Senior U.S. District Judge for the
Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
1
More specifically, Mayfield contends he was unlawfully
terminated on the basis of race, subjected to a racially hostile
environment, and subjected to disparate treatment on the basis of
race.
of his race. Because we find that Mayfield was fired for a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and that Mayfield has failed

to present any evidence of pretext, we agree with the district

court and affirm its order granting summary judgment.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On November 6, 1989, Mayfield was hired by Patterson, a

manufacturer of fire pumps as a Pump Test Mechanic. Approximately

one month after being hired, Mayfield was promoted to Test

Technician on the recommendation of his supervisor Rod Pelot

("Pelot"). Pelot, pleased with Mayfield's performance as a Test

Technician, and the company, believing he had the potential to

advance in management, recommended that Mayfield be sent to

Patterson's supervisory development training program.

On April 1, 1992, after Mayfield's completion of the

supervisory development training program and upon another

recommendation from Pelot, Mayfield was promoted to Senior Test

Technician, a newly created supervisory position. In this

capacity, Mayfield supervised other employees in the cleaning room

and test pit. As Senior Test Technician, instead of receiving an

hourly wage, Mayfield was paid an annual salary. Pelot further

encouraged Mayfield to attend school in order to obtain future

promotions, and Mayfield was also allowed to arrange his work

schedule to accommodate his school schedule.

According to Pelot, upon Mayfield's promotion to Senior Test

Technician his performance began to decline. Noting this decline,

Pelot talked with Mayfield about his poor performance. On

September 25, 1992, Pelot terminated Mayfield. The written reason
for the termination was "[i]ncompetence or failure to meet

reasonable standards of efficiency and repeated failure to meet

production standards which results in loss of earnings to an entire

group of employees." In particular, Pelot pointed to three

incidents that resulted in Mayfield's dismissal. The parties

disagree on some of the circumstances surrounding the three

incidents. Because we are legally obligated to view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we will resolve

all inferences in Mayfield's favor.

The first incident involved an unexcused absence that occurred

in August of 1992. On August 20, 1992, a Thursday, Mayfield asked

Pelot if he could be excused from work on Saturday, August 22,

1992, in order to help a local church put a roof on his father's

house. Pelot granted the request. The parties agree that it

rained on Saturday, making it difficult to put a roof on Mayfield's

father's house. On Friday, August 21, 1992, Mayfield asked to be

excused from work that day because of an Internal Revenue Service

audit taking place in Atlanta. Again, Pelot gave Mayfield

permission to miss work. On Monday, August 24, 1992, Mayfield had

a friend notify Pelot that he was stranded in Indianapolis, Indiana

and would not be able to make work. At this point, Pelot asserts

that he realized Mayfield had lied about his plans for the

weekend.2 Based on Mayfield's unexcused absence on August 24th,

2
Mayfield contends that since Patterson and Pelot did not
know the IRS excuse was a lie until after he was terminated, they
are precluded from using this "after acquired" evidence as a
reason to terminate him. While Mayfield may be correct that
Pelot at the time did not know the IRS excuse was a lie, Mayfield
offers no evidence to contradict Pelot's belief that Mayfield had
given him some false information. It is also clear that prior to
Pelot issued him a written warning. In part the warning states

that the absence on August 24th, "will be considered an unexcused

absence because he failed to call me personally, of his absence.

Todd is well aware of policy that either myself or Jack Claxton be

notified of any absences." Mayfield contends that the reason he

did not personally call Pelot on August 24th was because he did not

find it necessary to wake up at 5:00 a.m. and place a call through

two or three long distance carriers, when a friend could more

easily take care of it. Furthermore, upon his return, Mayfield

stated he was in Indianapolis interviewing with a competitor of

Patterson.

The second incident involved the approval and shipment of a

fire pump. Prior to its shipment, Pelot discovered that the test

data of this pump, which had been approved by Mayfield for

shipment, did not meet the owner's specifications. Pelot had

further work done on the pump to meet the owner's approval.

Mayfield affirms that the problem with the pump lay with the pump

containing an erroneous number for the impeller pattern. As a

result of this incident, Pelot issued Mayfield a second

disciplinary reprimand.

Finally, the last event Patterson proffers as specific

evidence of Mayfield's incompetence is the warranty completion of

the "Sandario 2 Pump." The Sandario 2 Pump was one pump out of

approximately ten that had been returned to Patterson for repairs.

As Senior Test Technician, Mayfield was in charge of the cleaning

September 25, 1992, (the day Mayfield was terminated) Pelot knew
Mayfield had lied about his plans for the weekend.
and testing of the pump. Mayfield's primary responsibility was to

polish and grind the Sandario 2 Pump's impeller in a timely

fashion.

The final completion date for the Sandario 2 Pump was set for

September 21, 1992. The impeller, a part of the pump, needed to be

individually tested and installed in the pump prior to September

21, 1992, the date the entire pump would be tested. As supervisor

of the cleaning room and test pit, it was Mayfield's responsibility

to ensure the project was completed on time.

On Thursday, September 17, 1992, the Sandario 2 Pump's

impeller was received in the cleaning room. Two of Patterson's

more experienced employees were unavailable to grind and polish the

impeller. Terry Metcalfe ("Metcalfe") was assigned by Pelot to

perform the task. Mayfield asserts that Pelot placed Metcalfe on

the job, despite Mayfield's opposition because Mayfield wanted

Lewis Curry ("Curry") to clean the impeller.

Metcalfe proceeded to work on the impeller on September 17th.

According to Mayfield, whenever he checked on Metcalfe's progress,

everything was proceeding satisfactorily. Pelot, however, asserts

that when he reviewed the impeller's progress, Metcalfe seemed to

be having difficulties. Metcalfe continued to work on the impeller

during Friday, September 18, 1992. Curry worked on the impeller

Friday night. Mayfield was not required to work on Friday night

and he did not. He previously had informed Pelot that he would be

attending a wedding in Atlanta on Saturday, September 19, 1992, and

would be unable to work all day Saturday. However, Mayfield told

Pelot that he would check on the progress of the impeller on
Saturday morning.

Sometime between four and six in the morning of Saturday,

September 19, 1992, Mayfield inspected the impeller. Mayfield did

not see anybody else at the plant that morning. Metcalfe

apparently arrived at work at five in the morning on Saturday, but

never saw Mayfield. Following his early Saturday morning

inspection, Mayfield concluded the work could be completed that

day.

Upon Pelot's arrival at Patterson on Saturday morning (he also

never saw Mayfield), Pelot discovered that the supply of polishing

pads to clean the impeller was running low, and he had to implement

another procedure in order to complete the polishing on time. In

sum, Pelot avers that he was required to perform Mayfield's job in

order to ensure timely completion of the Sandario 2 Pump's

impeller. Mayfield returned to Patterson on Sunday, September 20,

1992. Based primarily on these three incidents, Mayfield was

dismissed by Pelot on September 25, 1992.

Mayfield, believing he was dismissed due to racial reasons

filed the instant suit against Patterson. In support of his

allegation of a discriminatory dismissal, Mayfield offers three

incidents which he claims show racial animus.

The first incident occurred in July, 1991, when Gibbs Crumpton

("Crumpton"), a Patterson supervisor, used the word "nigger" in

Mayfield's presence. Mayfield reported the incident to Pelot, who

filed a written complaint about the episode. Jim Davis, Crumpton's

supervisor, verbally reprimanded Crumpton and informed him that if

it were to happen again, he would be terminated.
 The next incident took place in June, 1992. Roger Poole, a

Patterson employee, told Pelot to "keep his nigger [Mayfield] away

from him." Pelot relayed this statement to Mayfield. Poole was

issued a written warning and told if it were to happen again he

would be fired.

The last episode occurred at the end of July 1992. Mayfield,

while on vacation, learned from other employees that the words

"Mayfield Nigger" were written on a Patterson bathroom wall.

Initially, Reese Mayfield, a Patterson employee (no relation to

Appellant Mayfield), informed Pelot and Al Huber, the President of

Patterson, about the writing on the wall. After Reese Mayfield

told Pelot and Huber, Appellant Mayfield, while on vacation, called

Pelot and Huber inquiring about what was being done. Huber told

Mayfield that the words had been immediately removed and he was

scheduling a meeting with the company's supervisors to advise them

about the company's policy concerning racial slurs. At the

scheduled meeting, Huber stated that anyone caught using racial

slurs would face immediate disciplinary action.

Notwithstanding these three isolated incidents, Mayfield at

his deposition stated that Pelot, the person who terminated him,

was not racist and did not evaluate him on the basis of race.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court "reviews grants of summary judgment de novo,

applying the same legal standard employed by the district court in

the first instance." Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co., 9 F.3d

913, 918 (11th Cir.1993), reh'g denied and reh'g en banc denied, 16

F.3d 1233 (11th Cir.1994). Summary judgment is proper if the
pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show that there is no

genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)

(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The evidence must be viewed in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Augusta Iron & Steel

Works, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th

Cir.1988).

III. ANALYSIS

Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin in a variety of employment

practices. See Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548,

1555 (11th Cir.1995).3 In an employment discrimination case, the

plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that the defendant

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Texas Dept. of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089,

1093-94, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).

Because direct evidence of discrimination can be difficult to

produce, the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), created a framework

on the burden of production and order of presentation of proof to

analyze circumstantial evidence of discrimination. See Nix v. WLCY

Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1184, reh'g denied, 747

3
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) provides: "It shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin."
F.2d 710 (11th Cir.1984) (noting that McDonnell Douglas framework

is valuable tool for analyzing disparate treatment cases). To

prove discriminatory treatment through circumstantial evidence:

(1) a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case, (2) then

the burden shifts to the defendant to produce legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action, and

(3) then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that

these reasons are pretextual. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-

04, 93 S.Ct. at 1824-25.

Under the first part of the McDonnell Douglas test, a

plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that:

(1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for

the job, (3) he was terminated despite his qualifications, and (4)

after his termination the position remained open and the employer

continued to seek applicants of similar qualifications. McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. The parties seem to

agree that Mayfield can demonstrate a prima facie case through the

four-part test in McDonnell Douglas. Although Patterson "does not

concede" that Mayfield can establish a prima facie case, Patterson

does not argue against it. Accordingly, because we believe

Mayfield can establish a prima facie case and because Patterson

implicitly agrees, we will not address this part of the McDonnell

Douglas test.

Under the second part of the McDonnell Douglas test, the

burden shifts to Patterson to produce legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for Mayfield's discharge. Pelot, in his affidavit, stated

that he fired Mayfield because he "viewed [Mayfield's] conduct as
intentional neglect of his job responsibilities and felt that the

only appropriate way to respond to such failure to perform was to

terminate [Mayfield's] employment with Patterson Pump Company."

The written reason for the termination was Mayfield's

"[i]ncompetence or failure to meet reasonable standards of

efficiency and repeated failure to meet production standards which

results in loss of earnings to an entire group of employees." In

support of its employment decision, Patterson offered three

specific incidents as evidence of Mayfield's incompetence. The

three incidents proffered by Patterson and Pelot are as discussed

earlier: (1) Pelot's belief that Mayfield lied concerning his

whereabouts the weekend of August 22, 1992, (2) Mayfield's approval

of a pump for shipment despite its failure to meet the owner's

specifications, and (3) Mayfield's performance or lack thereof on

the timely completion of the Sandario 2 Pump's impeller.

These are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to terminate

Mayfield. We believe that Patterson has met its burden under the

second part of the McDonnell Douglas test. Thus, we must now turn

to the third part of the McDonnell Douglas test, which requires

Mayfield to establish that Patterson's reasons for his discharge

are pretextual. In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), the Supreme

Court elaborated on the third part of the McDonnell Douglas test:

The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now
must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered
reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading
the court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
 employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.

Burdine, U.S. 450 at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 (citing McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05, 93 S.Ct. at 1825-26).

In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct.

2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), the Supreme Court again attempted to

clarify the McDonnell Douglas test. Addressing the third part of

the test, the Supreme Court stated that if "the defendant has

succeeded in carrying its burden of production, the McDonnell

Douglas framework—with its presumptions and burdens—is no longer
relevant." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. Instead,

"the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question:

whether plaintiff has proven "that the defendant intentionally

discriminated against [him]' because of his race." Id. at 511, 113

S.Ct. at 2749 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-

94 (alteration not in original).4

4
Unfortunately, Hicks has not clarified the issue among the
circuit courts of what proof must be presented by the plaintiff
to avoid summary judgment based upon a contention that the
employer's explanation was false. See generally Waldron v. SL
Industries, Inc., 849 F.Supp. 996, 1004 n. 11 (D.N.J.1994)
(discussing circuit split), rev'd, 56 F.3d 491 (3d Cir.1995). In
fact, an apparent conflict exists within this circuit on the
issue. See Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97
F.3d 436 (11th Cir.1996) (noting and discussing conflict in this
circuit); Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548,
1560-65 (11th Cir.1995) (J. Johnson's specially concurring
opinion discussing conflict). As stated in more detail in
Isenbergh and NationsBank, the disagreement stems mainly from
some language used in the Supreme Court's opinion in Hicks, the
procedural setting of Hicks—a bench trial, and some opinions in
this circuit which have held that the fact finder's rejection of
defendant's proffered reasons is enough to defeat judgment for
the employer. See Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 527 (11th
Cir.1994) ("fact finder's rejection of defendant's proffered
reasons is sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which to base
a judgment for the plaintiff.") (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-
11, 113 S.Ct. at 2748-49); Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ.
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 920-21 (11th Cir.1993), reh'g denied and reh'g
 In any event, for purposes of the case before us, we need not

resolve the apparent conflict within this circuit on whether a fact

finder's possible disbelief of the employer's proffered reasons is

sufficient to defeat judgment for the defendant or whether a

plaintiff must show both that the employer's reason for the

decision was false and that discrimination was the real reason,

because Mayfield has failed to produce any evidence that

Patterson's explanation is false or unworthy of credence.

In this case, Mayfield had to produce evidence that

Patterson's reasons for his discharge were a pretext for

discrimination. A plaintiff may prove pretext "either directly by

persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely

motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's

proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Burdine, 450 U.S.

at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. "[B]ecause the plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing pretext [for discrimination], he must

present "significant probative' evidence on the issue to avoid

summary judgment." See Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales,

Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 443-44 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting Young v. General

Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 829 (11th Cir.1988)) (quoting Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-

11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "Conclusory allegations of

en banc denied, 16 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir.1994) (plaintiff can
establish pretext by showing that proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence). Contrary to Howard and Hairston, the
Isenbergh panel interprets Hicks as requiring a plaintiff to show
"that the employer's proffered reason for the adverse employment
decision was false and that discrimination was the real reason."
Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436,
440 (11th Cir.1996) (emphasis added).
discrimination, without more, are not sufficient to raise an

inference of pretext or intentional discrimination where [an

employer] has offered ... extensive evidence of legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons for its actions." Isenbergh v. Knight-

Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 443-44 (11th Cir.1996)

(quoting Young v. General Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 830 (11th

Cir.1988)) (quoting Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590,

597 (11th Cir.1987)).

Mayfield makes the following arguments to establish that

Patterson's explanation for his discharge was a pretext for

discrimination: (1) the reasons are filled with inconsistencies,

(2) the reasons are not worthy of belief, and (3) a discriminatory

reason was more likely the real motivation for Patterson. However,

none of Mayfield's arguments are supported in the record.

First, Mayfield asserts that the written reason for his

termination which states that "[i]ncompetence or failure to meet

reasonable standards of efficiency and repeated failure to meet

production standards which results in loss of earnings to an entire

group of employees" is inconsistent with the three specific

examples proffered by Patterson. Instead, Mayfield contends that

Patterson changed the reason it terminated him. The district court

found that "[t]he consistent reason offered for [Mayfield's]

termination is failure to perform his job duties adequately.

Pelot's later statements simply offer more details regarding

perceived inadequacies in plaintiff's job performance." We agree

with the district court. There is nothing inconsistent between the

written reason and the more specific reasons justifying Mayfield's
termination. The gravamen of Mayfield's termination was his

failure to adequately perform his duty as Senior Test Technician.

The more particular reasons given by Pelot are just specific

examples of how Mayfield was incompetent and failed to meet

reasonable standards of efficiency.

Next, Mayfield attempts to show that Patterson's reasons for

his discharge are not worthy of belief. Mayfield, in his affidavit

and depositions asserts that there are questions of fact

surrounding the three incidents which indicate that the incidents

were false or, at the very least, raise issues of fact that

preclude the entry of summary judgment. Although there may be some

questions concerning some of the details, Mayfield fails to offer

evidence that the reasons for his discharge are false. He also

refutes totally any suggestion that Pelot was motivated by race.

For example, Mayfield attempts to create an issue of fact

regarding his approval of the pump for shipment. Mayfield concedes

he approved the shipment of the pump, despite test data that

revealed the failure of the pump to meet its owner's

specifications. Rather, Mayfield offers as an explanation for this

mishap that the pump had a wrong number for the impeller pattern.

Even if we were to accept Mayfield's explanation as true, it does

not explain how he would have approved shipment of the pump even

though it did not satisfy the owner's specifications.

Another example concerns the Sandario 2 Pump's impeller. All

that Mayfield asserts on this example is that he disagreed with the

person who Pelot assigned to do the work. Mayfield does not

disagree or raise a question of fact that it was his responsibility
to oversee the timely completion of the project nor that it was

Pelot and not Mayfield who oversaw the cleaning and grinding of the

impeller.

Finally, Mayfield alleges that a discriminatory reason more

likely motivated Patterson and Pelot's decision to terminate him.

In support of this pretextual argument, Mayfield proffers the three

racial incidents and his unexcused absence on August 24, 1992.

Mayfield proffers the unexcused absence as additional evidence

that discrimination was the true reason he was terminated. On

August 24, 1992, Mayfield was issued a written reprimand for

failing to call Pelot or Jack Claxton personally about being absent

on August 24th. Mayfield does not contest that he was absent,

instead Mayfield argues this incident depicts he was treated

differently than white supervisors at Patterson. According to

Mayfield, white supervisors did not have to call Pelot or Claxton

personally when they were going to be absent. There is simply

nothing offered in support of this statement.

It is uncontroverted that Pelot recommended Mayfield for each

of his promotions. It is also undisputed that Pelot immediately

took corrective action following the three racist incidents

referred to him by Mayfield. It is also uncontested that Pelot

made the decision to fire Mayfield. Furthermore, Mayfield during

his deposition stated that Pelot was not racist and did not

evaluate him on the basis of race.5 In sum, Mayfield has failed to

5
A: [Pelot] didn't understand the racism down here. He was
from California, so he didn't understand that.

Q: Did, did, uh, did you detect any, uh, or perceive
any racism on his part?
offer any evidence to show that a discriminatory reason more likely

motivated Pelot's decision to terminate him or that Pelot treated

Mayfield differently from other white supervisors. Rather, the

evidence shows that Pelot was not racist and that Mayfield was

fired for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there are no

genuine issues of material fact and that the district court

properly granted Patterson's motion for summary judgment. The

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

A: No, I did not.

Q: Do you think that he, uh, evaluated you based upon
you as an individual, rather than you—than your race?

A: Yes, he did.