United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
No. 96-8095.
Mohamed I. BAH, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CITY OF ATLANTA, Defendant-Appellant.
Jan. 22, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. (No. 1:95-cv-2641-WBH), Willis B. Hunt, Jr.,
Judge.
Before ANDERSON and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and CUDAHY*, Senior
Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Mohamed I. Bah brought this action against the City of
Atlanta, alleging that the City's ordinance establishing a dress
code for drivers of vehicles for hire is unconstitutional. The
City appeals from the district court's grant of a preliminary
injunction enjoining enforcement of the dress code.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1993, the City's Bureau of Vehicles for Hire created a task
force to revise the Vehicles for Hire chapter of the City's Code of
Ordinances. Over almost a year and a half, the task force met
often to discuss problems in the vehicle for hire industry, as well
as possible solutions to those problems. The task force made
recommendations to the City, including a recommendation to amend
the dress code for drivers of vehicles for hire.
On July 5, 1995, the Atlanta City Council adopted a version of
the task force's recommendations, including the dress code. The
*
Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for
the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
new dress code requirement provides that:
In order to maintain a permit to drive a vehicle for hire a
driver must ... [w]ear proper dress while operating a vehicle
for hire. As used herein, the term "proper dress" shall mean
shoes which entirely cover the foot (no sandals) and dark
pants to ankle length or dark skirt or dress and solid white
or light blue shirt or solid white or light blue blouse with
sleeves and folded collar. Shirts or blouses shall be tucked
in. No tee-shirts or sweatshirts shall be worn. If a hat is
worn, it shall be a baseball-style cap with an Atlanta or
taxicab theme. "Proper dress" shall also mean any uniform
adopted by the company and approved by the Bureau. Clothing
shall not be visibly soiled.
Atlanta Code of Ordinances ("Code"), Section 14-8005(d)(2).1
Bah, a taxicab driver, filed this lawsuit on October 19, 1995,
after being cited for a violation of the dress code. His complaint
contends that the dress code is unconstitutional, because it
violates the Equal Protection Clause and his First Amendment rights
of religion and free speech. Bah requested a temporary restraining
order, which the district court converted into a motion for
preliminary injunction.
After a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, the
district court granted it and enjoined the City from enforcing the
dress code. The court held that the dress code violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it was not rationally related to a
legitimate government objective.2 The district court said that the
1
The Atlanta Code of Ordinances was recodified with a new
numbering system effective January 1, 1996. The proceedings in
the district court were conducted when the old numbering system
was in place, and to avoid confusion we, too, will follow that
old numbering system.
2
The district court also held that the dress code was an
arbitrary exercise of police power. This holding was based upon
the district court's finding that the dress code was not
rationally related to a legitimate government objective, the same
basis for its equal protection holding. We will subsume
discussion of the police power holding into our discussion of the
City had put forth two justifications for the dress code: (1) the
need to improve public safety, and (2) the need to identify
unlicensed or "gypsy" taxicab drivers. The court rejected the
first reason because it found no evidence that safety was a problem
in taxicabs or that the dress code would improve safety in
taxicabs. The court rejected the second reason after finding that
the clothing prescribed by the dress code was so common that it
would not help to distinguish gypsy taxicab drivers from licensed
ones.
The district court did not address another justification the
City proffered for the dress code. In its response to the motion
for preliminary injunction, the City explained that drivers of
vehicles for hire are often a visitor's first contact with the City
of Atlanta, which is why many of the drivers refer to themselves as
"ambassadors" for the City. The City contended that, for obvious
reasons, it is in the City's interest that its "ambassadors"
present a safe and professional image to all their passengers. The
dress code would, the City argued, reduce the fears of passengers
and improve the City's image.
Because the district court found the dress code
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, it did not address
Bah's First Amendment arguments. The City appeals from the grant
of preliminary injunctive relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court's decision to grant a preliminary
injunction for abuse of discretion. Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989,
equal protection holding.
993 (11th Cir.1996) (citing Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker,
953 F.2d 1498, 1505 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1122, 112
S.Ct. 1245, 117 L.Ed.2d 477 (1992)). A district court necessarily
abuses its discretion when it bases a ruling on an erroneous view
of the law. E.g., Jones v. International Riding Helmets, 49 F.3d
692, 694 (1995). Any legal determinations made by the district
court in ruling on a preliminary injunction are reviewed de novo.
Teper, 82 F.3d at 993.
III. DISCUSSION
The district court granted the preliminary injunction based
upon its determination that the dress code violated the Equal
Protection Clause. Under an equal protection analysis, "unless the
case involves a suspect class or a fundamental right, the Equal
Protection Clause requires only that the classification be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Panama City
Medical Diagnostic Ltd. v. Williams, 13 F.3d 1541, 1545 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 93, 130 L.Ed.2d 44
(1994) (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10-11, 112 S.Ct.
2326, 2331-32, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) and City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-41, 105 S.Ct. 3249,
3254-55, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)). Bah does not contend on appeal
that the dress code burdens a fundamental right or targets a
suspect class. Both Bah and the City agree that rational basis is
the appropriate level of scrutiny.
In a rational basis analysis, the legislative enactment
carries a "strong presumption of validity." F.C.C. v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101-02,
124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993) (citing Lyng v. Int'l Union, United Auto.
Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 370, 108 S.Ct. 1184, 1192, 99 L.Ed.2d 380
(1988)). Review of enactments must be "a paradigm of judicial
restraint." Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 314, 113 S.Ct. at
2101. "[T]hose attacking the rationality of the legislative
classification have the burden to negative every conceivable basis
which might support it." Id. at 315, 113 S.Ct. at 2101 (citation
omitted); Panama City, 13 F.3d at 1546. The legislature need not
actually articulate its reasons for enacting a statute. Heller v.
Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d
257 (1993) (citation omitted). In fact, "it is entirely irrelevant
for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the
challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature." Beach
Communications, 508 U.S. at 315, 113 S.Ct. at 2102. "In other
words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom
fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported
by evidence or empirical data." Id.
Following these decisional directives, we readily conclude
that the district court erred in finding that the dress code is not
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. With
regard to the public safety purpose, the district court
inappropriately placed the burden on the City to come forward with
evidence showing that public safety in taxicabs was a problem,
which is not how the burdens are allocated in rational basis
analysis.
Moreover, even if the district court was correct in rejecting
the two reasons it discussed—public safety and identification of
gypsy taxicab drivers—there is another reason for the dress code
that is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. As
the City explained in the district court and this Court, the dress
code is rationally related to its legitimate interest in promoting
a safe image. Drivers of vehicle for hire, particularly taxi cab
drivers, are often among the first people that out-of-town visitors
encounter. Such visitors often find themselves getting into a
vehicle for hire driven by a total stranger, sometimes at night and
sometimes while they are alone. It is in the City's interest to
promote a safe appearance and image, and a rational way to do that
is by prescribing that its self-styled "ambassadors" wear
innocuous, conventional, relatively uniform clothing.
Bah also argues that the dress code is unconstitutional
because it applies only to drivers of vehicles for hire, while
other occupations licensed by the City—persons at food
establishments, bellhops, door-to-door salespersons and operators
of motion picture theaters—are not subject to a dress code.3 We
reject that argument. The differential treatment accorded drivers
of vehicles for hire is justifiable because they are often the
initial contact for visitors to the City. Moreover, visitors do
not get into automobiles alone with bellhops, servers at
restaurants, and the like. The City could rationally decide that
it has a greater interest in having drivers of vehicles for hire
3
An examination of the Code provisions cited by Bah
indicates that the licensing requirement for persons in food
establishments was repealed in 1978, Code Section 14-6144, and
that the licensing requirement for operators of motion picture
theaters is more concerned with the safety of the theater than
with the appearance of the operator, Code Sections 14-3081 and -
3082.
appear safe and presentable, which is accomplished through the
dress code.
For these reasons, we conclude that the dress code does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause. We decline to reach Bah's
First Amendment arguments, because the district court has not yet
addressed them.
IV. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the district court's grant of the preliminary
injunction and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.