Case: 09-20317 Document: 00511051460 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/15/2010
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 15, 2010
No. 09-20317 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
NASIR QURESHI,
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:09-CV-639
Before DeMOSS, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
HAYNES, Circuit Judge:
Nashir Qureshi appeals from a sua sponte order of the district court
requiring him to obtain the court’s permission before filing suit in any federal
court in the state of Texas. Because the district court entered this injunction
without affording Qureshi prior notice or the opportunity to oppose the order, we
VACATE the injunction and REMAND for further proceedings.
I. Facts & Procedural History
The history of this case is short. On March 3, 2009, Qureshi filed a
complaint against the United States seeking damages under the Federal Tort
Claims Act based on his allegedly unlawful detention by the Department of
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No. 09-20317
Homeland Security. Qureshi never served the United States with the summons
and complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(1). The district
court set an initial conference for June 1, 2009, but, on April 28, 2009, reset the
conference date for May 1, 2009, and specifically directed that Qureshi appear
personally. On April 30, 2009, Qureshi voluntarily dismissed his case with
prejudice as permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Later
the same day, the district court entered an order of dismissal and, sua sponte,
a permanent injunction against Qureshi. In its entirety, the injunction reads:
Since 2005, Nasir Qureshi has filed four lawsuits in the Southern
District of Texas that have been dismissed without prejudice.
Because of this persistent abuse of the judicial process, Qureshi may
not file papers in Texas federal courts without written permission
of Judge Lynn N. Hughes. He may answer a lawsuit filed against
him; however, he may not counter-claim without permission.
Qureshi timely appealed the injunction, arguing that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the injunction or, in the alternative, that the district court
abused its discretion in doing so. The United States defends the validity of the
injunction on appeal.
II. Standard of Review
“We review the district court’s grant of an injunction for an abuse of
discretion, and underlying questions of law de novo.” Newby v. Enron Corp., 302
F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2002). We review claimed defects of subject matter
jurisdiction de novo. Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 186 (5th
Cir. 2008).
III. Discussion
On appeal, Qureshi asserts five grounds for reversal of the district court’s
injunction: (1) that the district court lost jurisdiction when Qureshi filed the
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) voluntary dismissal; (2) that the injunction was entered
without notice and opportunity to be heard; (3) that the terms of the injunction
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do not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d); (4) that compliance
with the order is impossible; and (5) that the order is unnecessary. We conclude
that the district court had jurisdiction to enter the order notwithstanding
Qureshi’s voluntary dismissal, but that the lack of notice and an opportunity to
be heard requires us to vacate the order. In so holding, we do not address the
remainder of Qureshi’s purported grounds for relief.
A. Jurisdiction
Qureshi argues that the district court was without power to take any
action on his case once he filed the notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Under that provision, a “plaintiff may dismiss an action
without a court order by filing . . . a notice of dismissal before the opposing party
serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” F ED. R. C IV. P.
41(a)(1)(A)(i). As the notice of dismissal was filed before the United States had
served its answer or motion for summary judgment, Qureshi’s notice was
undisputedly effective to dismiss the action. We have conclusively explained
that this document is immediately self-effectuating:
Rule 41(a)(1) is the shortest and surest route to abort a complaint
when it is applicable. So long as plaintiff has not been served with
his adversary’s answer or motion for summary judgment he need do
no more than file a notice of dismissal with the Clerk. That
document itself closes the file. There is nothing the defendant can
do to fan the ashes of that action into life and the court has no role
to play. . . . There is not even a perfunctory order of court closing
the file. Its alpha and omega was the doing of the plaintiff alone.
Am. Cyanamid Co. v. McGhee, 317 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1963). In short, in the
normal course, the district court is divested of jurisdiction over the case by the
filing of the notice of dismissal itself.
That the court loses jurisdiction over the litigation does not, however,
deprive the district court of its inherent supervisory powers. After the
termination of an action, a court may nevertheless “consider collateral issues.”
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Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990); see also Ratliff v.
Stewart, 508 F.3d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 2007). For example, the court may,
notwithstanding dismissal of the underlying action, impose sanctions under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 396;1 impose costs,
see Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 169–70 (1939); impose
attorney’s fees, White v. N.H. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 n.13
(1982); or undertake contempt proceedings, see, e.g., United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 294 (1947). As the Supreme Court has explained,
the reason that these actions survive dismissal is that each “requires the
determination of a collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial
process, and, if so, what sanction would be appropriate.” Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S.
at 396. The maintenance of the original action that occasioned the court’s
inquiry into that abuse is irrelevant to the court’s jurisdiction.
We have explained that a court’s authority to impose an injunction against
future filings “flows not only from various statutes and rules relating to
sanctions, but the inherent power of the court to protect its jurisdiction and
judgments and to control its docket.” Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808
F.2d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted). This power further permits the
district court to act sua sponte. Baum, 513 F.3d at 189. The court’s authority
to impose a pre-filing injunction thus derives from the same source as the
remedies that the Supreme Court has concluded may be imposed after dismissal
of the action. Such an injunction also serves the same purpose—namely, a
sanction against abuse of the judicial process—as those remedies. Therefore, we
hold that a pre-filing injunction like the one imposed here falls within the same
1
We acknowledge that Rule 11 has been amended since the Supreme Court’s decision
in Cooter & Gell to limit in certain circumstances the types of sanction that the court may
impose if the party voluntarily dismisses the action, but the general principle underlying the
decision remains unaffected by this change. See, e.g., Ratliff, 508 F.3d at 230–32 (continuing
to apply Cooter & Gell).
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class as sanctions, costs, attorney’s fees, and contempt remedies for purposes of
the court’s jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to enter a pre-filing injunction therefore
also survives dismissal because, like those related remedies, it only “requires the
determination of a collateral issue: whether the attorney [or party] has abused
the judicial process, and, if so, what sanction would be appropriate.” Cooter &
Gell, 496 U.S. at 396.
The district court thus had jurisdiction to enter the injunction.
B. Notice and Hearing
We turn next to the court’s decision to issue the injunction, which we
review for abuse of discretion. As Qureshi argues, our precedent governing the
imposition of pre-filing injunctions on vexatious litigants states unequivocally
that “[n]otice and a hearing are required if the district court sua sponte imposes
a pre-filing injunction.” Baum, 513 F.3d at 189; see also id. at 193 (“[Appellant]
was given notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the imposition of the
pre-filing injunction, which satisfies the requirements of due process in this
case.”). The record is very clear that the district court entered this injunction
without giving any prior notice to Qureshi and without offering him any
opportunity to oppose the injunction or be heard on its merits. Those
prerequisites are mandatory and constitutionally derived; failure to provide
notice and conduct a hearing is an abuse of discretion. See W. Water Mgmt., Inc.
v. Brown, 40 F.3d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that the expansion of an
injunction without “appropriate notice and an opportunity for hearing” was an
abuse of discretion); see also Parker v. Ryan, 960 F.2d 543, 544 n.1 (5th Cir.
1992) (noting that the notice requirement in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65,
which governs the issuance of injunctions, “has constitutional as well as
procedural dimensions”); cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more
than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear:
‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that
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they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’”) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale,
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1864)).
If “a preliminary injunction granted without adequate notice and a fair
opportunity to oppose it should be vacated and remanded to the district court,”
Harris County v. CarMax Auto Superstores Inc., 177 F.3d 306, 326 (5th Cir.
1999) (citing Parker, 960 F.2d at 544), then our treatment of a permanent
injunction entered without notice and hearing cannot be any more deferential.
Regardless of the merits of the injunction—as to which we express no
opinion—we must therefore vacate the pre-filing injunction.
IV. Conclusion
The district court’s order imposing a pre-filing injunction on Qureshi is
VACATED. Finding that the district court does have jurisdiction to enter such
an order in an appropriate case, however, we REMAND to the district court for
the limited purpose of determining the sanctions question after proper notice
and a hearing consistent with the law of this Circuit.2
2
See Baum, 513 F.3d at 189 (“In determining whether it should impose a pre-filing
injunction . . . a court must weigh all the relevant circumstances, including the following four
factors: ‘(1) the party’s history of litigation, in particular whether he has filed vexatious,
harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) whether the party had a good faith basis for pursuing
the litigation, or simply intended to harass; (3) the extent of the burden on the courts and
other parties resulting from the party’s filings; and (4) the adequacy of alternative sanctions.’”)
(quoting Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 818 (4th Cir. 2004)); Farguson, 808
F.2d at 360 (“[T]he injunction against future filings must be tailored to protect the courts and
innocent parties, while preserving the legitimate rights of litigants.”).
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