Villarreal v. Woodham

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 96-2146.

Frutoso VILLARREAL, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

William A. WOODMAN, Sheriff, Gadsden County, Gadsden County,
Defendants-Appellees.

May 29, 1997.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida. (No. 94-CV-40583-WS), William Stafford, Judge.

Before DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and COHILL*, Senior
District Judge.

DUBINA, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Frutoso Villarreal ("Villarreal") appeals the

district court's order dismissing his complaint for failure to

state a claim under either the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),

29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209, or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Villarreal alleges that

when he was a pretrial detainee in the Gadsden County Correctional

Facility ("GCCF"), Sheriff Woodham required him to perform

translation services for other inmates, medical personnel, and

court personnel. Villarreal contends that Sheriff Woodham told him

that the Sheriff's Department would compensate him for his

services, but he never received any compensation. In an issue of

first impression for our circuit, we hold that pretrial detainees

who perform services at the direction of correction officials and

for the benefit of the correctional facility are not covered under

*
Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr., Senior U.S. District
Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
designation.
the FLSA. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.

DISCUSSION

This court reviews de novo the dismissal of a complaint for

failure to state a claim, accepting all allegations in the

complaint as true and construing the facts in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Harper v. Thomas, 988 F.2d 101, 103

(11th Cir.1993). A district court may not dismiss a complaint

"unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief." Pataula Elec. Membership Corp. v. Whitworth, 951 F.2d

1238, 1240 (11th Cir.1992) (quotations omitted). Additionally,

"[a] determination of employment status under the FLSA ... is a

question of law subject to de novo review." Antenor v. D & S

Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 929 (11th Cir.1996).1

FLSA Claim

Congress enacted the FLSA to eliminate "in industries engaged

in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, ... labor

conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard

of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being

1
After hearing oral argument, we raised sua sponte the
question of whether we had jurisdiction over this appeal. See
Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 399 (11th Cir.1986). We
specifically questioned our jurisdiction over the County and the
sheriff in his individual capacity. After requesting
supplemental briefing by the parties, we are convinced that we
have jurisdiction. See Mt. Healthy City Board of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 572-73, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)
(jurisdiction over the County); Hufford v. Rodgers, 912 F.2d
1338, 1341-42 (11th Cir.1990) (jurisdiction over the sheriff);
and Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-85, 106
S.Ct. 1292, 1298-1301, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (jurisdiction over
the parties with respect to Villarreal's § 1983 claim).
of workers" because such conditions "constitute[ ] an unfair method

of competition in commerce[.]" 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). In general,

work constitutes employment when there is an expectation of in-kind

benefits in exchange for services. See Tony & Susan Alamo

Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 & 303-04, 105

S.Ct. 1953, 1961 & 1962-63, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985).

The minimum wage provisions of the FLSA apply only to workers

who are "employees" within the meaning of the Act. 29 U.S.C. §

206(a)(1). Under the FLSA, an "employee" is defined as "any

individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). An

"employer" includes "any person acting directly or indirectly in

the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes

a public agency,...." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). To "employ" is defined

as to "suffer or permit to work." 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). The Supreme

Court has held that courts should apply these terms in light of the

"economic reality" of the relationship between the parties.

Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-op., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33, 81 S.Ct.

933, 936-37, 6 L.Ed.2d 100 (1961).

The economic reality test includes inquiries into:

whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and
fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee
work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the
rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment
records.

Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470

(9th Cir.1983). In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority,

469 U.S. 528, 546-47, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1015-16, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016

(1985), the Supreme Court overruled National League of Cities v.

Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 2474, 49 L.Ed.2d 245
(1976), which had erected a bar to the application of the federal

minimum wage to state employees. In overruling Usery, the Court

opened the possibility that prison authorities might be deemed FLSA

employers if the Bonnette factors were literally applied. The

first post-Garcia court of appeals decision addressing the

relationship between prison labor and the FLSA applied an economic

reality test to the facts of its case in light of the policies

behind the FLSA and held that the labor in question was covered by

the Act. See Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1554 (5th Cir.1990).

In Watson, inmates in a sheriff's custody were assigned to

work for a construction company owned by the sheriff's daughter and

son-in-law. The construction company used inmate labor and

subcontractors to perform the work. The inmates were paid twenty

dollars a day. The district court applied theBonnette factors and

concluded that the inmates were not employees under the FLSA. The

Fifth Circuit reversed, concentrating on the economic reality of

the relationship in light of the policies underlying the FLSA. The

court noted that the construction company received the benefit of

the labor in the private economy without having to pay FLSA wages.

The court found that such competition tended to undermine

compliance with the FLSA. "Such a situation is fraught with the

very problems that FLSA was drafted to prevent—grossly unfair

competition among employers and employees alike." Watson, 909 F.2d

at 1555.

Decisions subsequent to Watson universally have denied FLSA

wages to prisoners, although the factual contexts of those

decisions differ from that in Watson. These cases generally have
involved inmates working for prison authorities or for private

employers within the prison compound. See, e.g., Gambetta v.

Prison Rehabilitative Industries and Diversified Enterprises, Inc.,

No. 96-4253 ___ F.3d ___ (11th Cir., May 15, 1997); Danneskjold v.

Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 43 (2nd Cir.1996); Reimonenq v. Foti, 72

F.3d 472, 475 n. 3 (5th Cir.1996); Henthorn v. Department of Navy,

29 F.3d 682, 684-87 (D.C.Cir.1994); McMaster v. Minnesota, 30 F.3d

976, 980 (8th Cir.1994); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1392-98

(9th Cir.1993) (en banc); Franks v. Oklahoma State Indus., 7 F.3d

971, 972 (10th Cir.1993); Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d

131, 133 (4th Cir.1993); Miller v. Dukakis, 961 F.2d 7, 8-9 (1st

Cir.1992); Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809-10 (7th

Cir.1992); Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320,

1325 (9th Cir.1991).

Our sister circuits have concluded that the underlying

policies of the FLSA mandate that prisoners not be included as

"employees" under the FLSA. Moreover, these decisions recognize

that, although prisoners do not fall within the FLSA's list of

exempted workers,2 there is no evidence of Congressional intent to

include prisoners as employees. Finally, these decisions note that

the "economic reality" test does not apply in the inmate-jailer

context because the FLSA presupposes a free-labor situation

constrained by the Thirteenth Amendment, which does not apply to

convicted inmates. By so holding, our sister circuits have adopted

a broader approach to situations involving the FLSA and prisoners.

This approach focuses on the economic reality of the situation as

2
See 29 U.S.C. § 213.
a whole. We agree with this approach and adopt the reasoning

articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 809-12,

in rejecting the Bonnette four factor standard in the prison

context.

Thus, numerous courts have addressed the issue of whether a

convicted prisoner is an "employee" under the FLSA. However, no

court of appeals has addressed the specific issue with which we are

presented: whether a pretrial detainee is an "employee" under the

FLSA. Nevertheless, we find these cases helpful because pretrial

detainees are similar to convicted prisoners in that they are

incarcerated and are under the supervision and control of a

governmental entity. Alvarado Guevara v. I.N.S., 902 F.2d 394, 396

(5th Cir.1990). Clearly, pretrial detainees are in a custodial

relationship like convicted prisoners. Correctional facilities

provide pretrial detainees with their everyday needs such as food,

shelter, and clothing. Convicted prisoners are likewise provided

these same basic needs. Additionally, like convicted prisoners,

pretrial detainees suffer from loss of freedom of choice and

privacy due to the nature of their confinement. In light of these

similarities, we deem persuasive the cases addressing the

applicability of the FLSA to convicted inmates.

One case which is analogous to the present one is Danneskjold,

82 F.3d 37 (2d Cir.1996). In that case, a consortium hired inmate

Danneskjold to tutor other inmates. For his work, the correctional

facility paid Danneskjold between $.95 and $1.45 per day in

accordance with the facility's inmate wage system. Danneskjold

filed suit alleging that he was a FLSA employee and was entitled to
receive the federal minimum wage. The district court granted the

facility's motion for summary judgment and the court of appeals

affirmed. The Second Circuit rejected the four-part
Bonnette test,

finding that it did not involve prison labor and was not

well-suited to determining the status of prison labor under the

FLSA. The court concluded that prison labor for the prison is not

subject to the FLSA. The court stated:

The relationship is not one of employment; prisoners are
taken out of the national economy; ...; prisoners' living
standards are determined by what the prison provides; and
most such labor does not compete with private employers.

....

As a result, no Court of Appeals has ever questioned the power
of a correctional institution to compel inmates to perform
services for the institution without paying the minimum wage.
Prisoners may thus be ordered to cook, staff the library,
perform janitorial services, work in the laundry, or carry
ou[t] numerous other tasks that serve various institutional
missions of the prison, such as recreation, care and
maintenance of the facility, or rehabilitation. Such work
occupies prisoners' time that might otherwise be filled by
mischief; it trains prisoners in the discipline and skills of
work; and it is a method of seeing that prisoners bear a cost
of their incarceration.

Id. at 42-43. The court concluded that as long as the labor

produces goods and services utilized by the prison, prisoners'

labor is not subject to the FLSA. Id. at 43.

As in Danneskjold, Villarreal's translation services were

performed for the benefit of the correctional institution.

Villarreal's job, like Danneskjold's, was cerebral in nature and

posed no risk of harm to him. Moreover, Villarreal's relationship

with the Sheriff and the GCCF was a custodial relationship, not an

employment relationship. Villarreal could not walk off the job

site at the end of the day. Villarreal performed his services for
the benefit of the correctional facility and other pretrial

detainees and convicted prisoners. There was no "bargained-for"

exchange of labor which occurs in a true employer—employee

relationship. Gilbreath, 931 F.2d at 1325.

Focusing on the economic reality of the situation in its

entirety, we conclude that Villarreal is not an "employee" under

the FLSA. The purpose of the FLSA is to protect the standard of

living and general well-being of the American worker. Because the

correctional facility meets Villarreal's needs, his "standard of

living" is protected. In sum, "the more indicia of traditional,

free-market employment the relationship between the prisoner and

his putative "employer' bears, the more likely it is that the FLSA

will govern the employment relationship." Henthorn, 29 F.3d at

686. Villarreal's situation does not bear any indicia of

traditional free-market employment contemplated under the FLSA.

Accordingly, we hold that Villarreal and other pretrial detainees

in similar circumstances are not entitled to the protection of the

FLSA minimum wage requirement.

Eighth Amendment violation

Villarreal also claims that his forced performance of

translation services constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. His claim is more properly

analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment following the Supreme

Court's pronouncement on the treatment of pretrial detainees in

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1871-72

& n. 16, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).

Whether a restriction or condition accompanying pretrial
detention is punishment turns on whether the restriction or

condition is reasonably related to a legitimate government

objective. Id. at 538-39, 99 S.Ct. at 1873-74. "[A]s a matter of

due process, pre[ ]trial detainees may suffer no more restrictions

than are reasonably necessary to ensure their presence at trial."

Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 999 (7th Cir.1976). A necessary

restriction is the confinement of the pretrial detainee. Bell, 441

U.S. at 537, 99 S.Ct. at 1873. "Loss of freedom of choice and

privacy are inherent incidents of confinement in such a facility."

Id. A court "must decide whether the disability [placed on the

pretrial detainee] is imposed for the purpose of punishment or

whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental

purpose." Id. at 538, 99 S.Ct. at 1873. "[I]f a particular

condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably

related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not,

without more, amount to "punishment.' " Id. at 539, 99 S.Ct. at

1874.

To qualify as cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that is

not inherently punitive must involve more than an ordinary lack of

due care for a prisoner's safety or welfare. See Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-22, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-86, 89 L.Ed.2d

251 (1986). There is no evidence that Sheriff Woodham's intent in

requesting that Villarreal perform these translation services was

punitive in nature. Also, these services were not restrictions

placed upon Villarreal. We can assume that the performance of

these services actually served to occupy Villarreal's time, keep

him out of trouble, and allow him interaction with other inmates
and various individuals (e.g., doctors, probation officers, and

other court personnel). Most significantly, the cerebral task of

language translation posed no risk to Villarreal's safety or

welfare.3 Accordingly, we see no Eighth Amendment violation in

this case.4

CONCLUSION

We agree with the district court that Villarreal does not

state a claim under either the FLSA or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment of dismissal.

AFFIRMED.

3
Villarreal claims that while engaging in translation
services, other inmates could threaten him or impose harm on him;
however, Villarreal fails to support this allegation with any
specific instance of threat.
4
Villarreal also alleges that his forced translation
services constitute involuntary servitude and therefore violate
his rights under the Thirteenth Amendment. This issue was not
presented to the district court and is therefore not properly
preserved for our review. FDIC v. Verex Assur., Inc., 3 F.3d
391, 395 (11th Cir.1993).