[TAC] PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 94-8519
D.C. Docket No. 1:91-CV-1926-JEC
VICTORIA DOYLE, DUFFEY DOYLE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
VOLKSWAGENWERK AKTIENGELELLSCHAFT,
VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia
(June 12, 1997)
Before TJOFLAT and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and CLARK, Senior
Circuit Judge.
CLARK, Senior Circuit Judge:
This is a defective products case brought by
plaintiffs-appellants Victoria and Duffey Doyle in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Victoria Doyle alleged that she purchased a new 1989 Volkswagen
Jetta, which was manufactured by defendant-appellee Volkswagen
Akteingesellschaft and imported into the United States by
defendant-appellee Volkswagen of America, Inc. The Jetta was
equipped with an automatic shoulder belt that required no action by
the vehicle occupants. By design, the Jetta did not have a lap
belt at the driver's or front seat passenger's position; instead,
it used knee bolsters to prevent a person from sliding under the
belt during a collision.
On August 18, 1989, while driving her new Jetta, Victoria
Doyle was struck in the rear by another vehicle. As a result of
the collision, Ms. Doyle sustained severe injuries to her right
breast. Ms. Doyle's experts are prepared to testify that these
injuries were caused by the shoulder belt and were exacerbated by
the absence of a lap belt: without a lap belt to absorb a portion
of the force of the impact, a majority of the force of the impact
was focused on Ms. Doyle's right breast.
Plaintiffs' complaint set out three theories of
liability: negligence, strict liability, and breach of the implied
warranty of fitness. Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary
judgment with the district court and provided the court with
various literature outlining the alleged known dangers of the
2
shoulder belt only system. Defendants also filed a motion for
partial summary judgment. They alleged that the Jetta seat belt
system complied with the Federal motor vehicle safety standards
promulgated under the authority of the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act;1 defendants argued that they were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because either (1) they had no duty
under Georgia law to exceed these federal standards, or
(2) plaintiffs' common law claims were preempted by the federal
standards.
The district court granted defendants' motion for partial
summary judgment and denied plaintiffs' motion. The court
concluded that the Jetta seat belt system complied with the
applicable federal standards, notwithstanding the absence of a lap
belt. We concur in that conclusion. The district court further
concluded that Georgia law as delineated in Honda Motor Co. v.
Kimbrel2 does not hold automobile manufacturers to a higher
standard than federal requirements; thus, a plaintiff cannot
recover under Georgia law for negligently creating a defective
condition when the manufacturer is in compliance with federal
standards. Because the Jetta seat belt system at issue was in
compliance with federal standards, the court concluded that
defendants could not be liable to plaintiffs as a result of the
absence of a lap belt. Finding plaintiffs' claims precluded under
1
Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431).
2
189 Ga. App. 414, 376 S.E.2d 379 (Ga. App. 1988), cert.
denied (Feb. 15, 1989).
3
Georgia law, the district court found it unnecessary to reach the
preemption issue.
At a time after the district court's decision, this
Circuit held that standards promulgated under the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act do not preempt common law claims.
Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 13 F.3d 1516 (11th Cir.), cert. granted,
U.S. , 115 S.Ct. 306. 130 L.Ed.2d 218 (1994). The Supreme
Court affirmed this Circuit's decision. Freightliner Corp. v.
Myrick, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995).
On April 24, 1996, we certified to the Georgia Supreme
Court a question respecting whether Georgia law precludes personal
injury product liability claims when an automobile manufacturer
sells an automobile to a Georgia citizen and the automobile is in
compliance with the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.
The Georgia Supreme Court answered our certified question in the
negative. Reference should be made to that court's holding, but we
quote two separate statements:
Georgia common law permits a Georgia citizen
to sue an automobile manufacturer despite the
manufacturer's compliance with the standards
established by the National Automobile Safety
Act.3
and
The focus of the Safety Act is to reduce
deaths and injuries from automotive accidents
by promoting and enhancing safer automobile
design. To that end, we determine that our
state common law permits its citizens to
pursue a personal injury product liability
claim again an automobile manufacturer even if
3
481 S.E.2d 518, 519 (Ga. 1997).
4
the automobile is in compliance with the
Safety Act. This decision will not make the
manufacturer an insurer of its product, for
there is no duty to design an accident-proof
vehicle. All we do today is affirm that proof
of compliance with federal standards or
regulations will not bar manufacturer
liability for design defect as a matter of
law.4
In light of the Georgia Supreme Court's interpretation of
the relationship between Georgia common law and the National
Automobile Safety Act, we REVERSE the district court's decision in
this case and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
4
Id. at 521.
5