The plaintiff, who was a candidate for the office of sheriff at the general election held in November, 1870, contests the election of Charles Lozano, who was declared elected to said office by the returning officers of the State of Louisiana.
The election was held on the seventh of November, the proclamation
The defendant filed a peremptory exception to this suit, averring, .among other grounds of defense, that the petition was not filed within ten days after the election, and therefore that the right to contest the election is barred under the laws of this State. This defense was sustained by the district judge, and the plaintiff has appealed.
We think the judgment of the district court correct. The act of 1855, re-enacted in 1870, declares that “any candidate for either of the offices of the clerk of the district court, parish recorder, sheriff, ■coroner, justice of the peace, and any other parish officer that may be elected by the people, intending to contest an election, shall, within ■ten days after the election, file in the district court for the parish in which the election may have been held, a petition setting forth the facts on which he intends to contest the election.”
It is clear that if this law was in force in November, 1870, the plaintiff’s right of action was prescribed, unless the interpretation put by the plaintiff upon the clause, “ withiu ten days after the election,” be ■correct. He contends that the election was not over until the result of the election had been published by the returning officers, in this case “the fourth of December, 1870; and that the ten days began to run only •from that time, because until the proclamation of the returning officers had been made, the plaintiff could not know who was returned as •elected. The plaintiff refers to the case of Davis v. Maxwell, 22 An. G6, to support his interpretation. Ths only question decided in that •case was that the provisions of the act of the eighteenth of October, 18G8, were prospective in their operations, and therefore could not Tegulate the proceedings to contest an election held in the month of April, 1870. The election was completed on the seventh day of November, 1870, in conformity to article 17 of the Constitution. Ascertaining the result and making proclamation thereof by the returning officers of the State formed no part of tire election.
The act of the sixteenth of March, 1870, entitled “An Act to regulate the conduct and maintain the freedom and purity of elections, to prescribe the mode of making, and designate the officers who shall make the returns thereof,” etc., does not repeal, by implication, section 1419 of Revised Statutes of 1870. We are unable to discover anything •contradictory in the said laws. Neither have we been able to perceive why it was necessary that the publication of the result of the election by the returning officers of the State should be made before the plaintiff could file his suit to contest the election.
Section 53 of the act of sixteenth March, 1870, provides that “the ■supervisor of registration shall, immediately upon the receipt of each
Thus it is clear that if the supervisor of registration did his duty (and we are bound to assume that he did in the absence of proof to the contrary), the plaintiff had the means of knowing that he would not be returned as elected, and every act he complains of must have been as well known to him the day after the election as after the proclamation of the result made by the returning officers.
It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the district court be affirmed, with costs of appeal.