Alexander v. Ieyoub

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 94-40554.

Becky H. ALEXANDER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Richard IEYOUB, et al. Defendants-Appellees.

May 19, 1995.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana.

Before WISDOM, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Becky H. Alexander (Alexander) appeals the

district court's dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the

Defendants-Appellees, the former and current parish district

attorneys (DAs) of Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, and two parish

assistant district attorneys (ADAs) (collectively Defendants)1,

stemming from the 1988 seizure of Alexander's car by officials of

the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Department. Concluding that neither

the Parratt/Hudson doctrine nor the Younger abstention doctrine

justifies dismissal of Alexander's § 1983 claim, we reverse and

remand.

I

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In September 1988, police officers from the Calcasieu Parish

1
The district court granted the dismissal motions of two
other defendants, District Judges William McLeod and Charley
Quienalty, on the basis of judicial immunity. Alexander does not
appeal that part of the district court's ruling.

1
Sheriff's Department, acting pursuant to an investigation of

suspected drug activity, seized Alexander's automobile after its

driver attempted to elude arrest. The officers arrested the driver

of the car, Winston Joseph Fruge, and the car's passenger, David

Lee Anthony Charney. A search of the car did not uncover any drugs

or other contraband. The DA's office charged Fruge, Charney, and

Alexander (who was not present at the time of the car's seizure)

with various drug counts. In exchange for Charney's guilty pleas

to the counts, however, the DA's office in October 1989 dismissed

the charges against Alexander.

Although Alexander repeatedly requested the return of her car

through a certified letter and several phone calls, the Defendants

refused to release Alexander's car from custody. The Defendants

told Alexander that the DA's office was holding her car on the

belief that she was a consenting party to the drug violations.

Under Louisiana law, property seized incident to an arrest is

forfeited only after the DA institutes a hearing and shows that

essential factors for forfeiture have been met.2 In a forfeiture

proceeding, dismissal of the charges against the owner of the

2
La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 32:1550(C)(1)-(3) (West 1989) provides
that the property seized:

"shall be forfeited in a hearing instituted by the
district attorney upon ... a showing by the district
attorney that the seizure was constitutional or that
the seizure was made upon reasonable grounds to believe
the seizure was constitutional[,] ... that the owner of
the conveyance was knowingly and intentionally a
consenting part or privy to a [drug] violation ...
[and] that the value of the contraband was in excess of
five hundred dollars or that the contraband was
intended for commercial sale."

2
seized property creates a rebuttable presumption that the property

will not be forfeited, unless the DA shows a compelling reason for

such forfeiture by clear and convincing evidence.3

In October 1990, more than two years after the Defendants

seized Alexander's car, she filed suit in state court seeking

damages and the return of her car. In August 1991, one month

before the state suit was set for trial and nearly three years

after the car's seizure, the DA's office finally filed a motion to

forfeit the car—instituting the forfeiture hearing necessary for

determining the proper final disposition of the car. In October

1991, however, after the parties had submitted evidence and

presented testimony in the forfeiture proceeding, the presiding

judge suspended the forfeiture proceeding and transferred it to the

judge presiding over Alexander's state tort action.

Approximately two weeks after the forfeiture proceeding was

suspended, Alexander filed a § 1983 claim against the Defendants in

district court, alleging that the Defendants had conspired to

deprive Alexander of her constitutional right to due process. The

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants

on the basis of absolute immunity. On appeal, we reversed the

district court's ruling that the Defendants were entitled to

absolute immunity and remanded the case to the district court.4

The Defendants then filed a motion in the district court to

3
See La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 32:1550(C)(4) (West 1989).
4
See Alexander v. Ieyoub [Alexander I], 997 F.2d 881, No.
92-4278 (5th Cir. Jul. 2, 1993) (unpublished opinion).

3
dismiss for failure to state a claim, or alternatively, for summary

judgment, which the court granted. The district court ruled that,

based on Parratt v. Taylor5 and Hudson v. Palmer6 (the

Parratt/Hudson doctrine), Alexander did not have a viable § 1983

claim. The availability of a state tort claim remedy and a

statutorily-prescribed forfeiture proceeding in which the DA had

the burden of proving why the seized property should be forfeited,

the district court reasoned, provided Alexander with an adequate

state postdeprivation remedy for the state's intentional

deprivation of her property and obviated the need for adjudication

of Alexander's § 1983 claim in federal court. In addition, the

district court stated that abstention based on Younger v. Harris7

(the Younger abstention doctrine) also justified granting the

Defendants' motion, as the state court had the ability to resolve

Alexander's federal claim in its pending action. Alexander timely

appealed the district court's ruling pro se.

II

ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our review of the district court's application of the

Parratt/Hudson doctrine is de novo, as the issue whether Alexander

alleged an actionable due process claim under § 1983 is a question

5
451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981),
overruled in part not relevant here, Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).
6
468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984).
7
401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).

4
of law.8 We review the district court's decision to dismiss on

Younger abstention grounds under an abuse-of-discretion standard.9

Our application of the abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing a

district court's decision to abstain, however, is more stringent

than in reviewing a district court's evidentiary ruling.10 To

abstain properly, the district court must exercise its discretion

strictly within the limits imposed by the particular doctrine of

abstention on which the court relies.11

B. PARRATT/HUDSON DOCTRINE

Under the Parratt/Hudson doctrine, a state actor's negligent

or intentional deprivation of a plaintiff's property does not

result in a violation of procedural due process rights if there

exists an adequate state postdeprivation remedy.12 Our examination

8
See Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th
Cir.1995) (reviewing de novo district court's dismissal for
failure to state claim upon which relief may be granted);
Shabazz v. Van Benschoten, 996 F.2d 1217 (table), No. 92-2380,
1993 WL 225324, at *2 (6th Cir.1993) (unpublished opinion)
(analyzing Parratt/Hudson doctrine); Hall v. Arizona State Dep't
of Corrections, 977 F.2d 588 (table), No. 92-15641, 1992 WL
246984 at *1 (9th Cir.1992) (unpublished opinion) (examining
Parratt/Hudson doctrine).
9
See American Bk. and Trust Co. v. Dent, 982 F.2d 917, 922
n. 6 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that abstention decisions are
generally reviewed under abuse-of-discretion standard).
10
See id.
11
See id.
12
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 529-537, 104 S.Ct.
3194, 3202-05, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (intentional conduct);
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-45, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913-17,
68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) (negligent conduct), overruled in part on
other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662,
88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).

5
of Alexander's allegations leads us to conclude that the

Parratt/Hudson doctrine does not foreclose her § 1983 claim.

1. Adequacy of State Postdeprivation Remedy

We noted in Alexander I that it was clear "that under

applicable law, whoever held Ms. Alexander's property was required

to institute a forfeiture proceeding promptly."13 Alexander's

allegation that the Defendants failed to institute a timely

forfeiture proceeding convinces us that the available state

remedies—which may be adequate in other circumstances14—were not

adequate as applied to Alexander in the instant case.

As the purpose of the forfeiture proceeding was to determine

whether the Defendants were entitled to forfeiture of Alexander's

car, the Defendants' initiation of the forfeiture proceeding was a

necessary predicate to adjudicating the state tort action.

Consequently, even though Alexander pursued the available state

remedy of filing a tort action against the Defendants seeking

damages and return of her car, she could not procure relief without

the Defendants' cooperation. Alexander was therefore stymied in

her pursuit of her available state remedy by the very action—or,

more accurately, inaction—that is the focus of her § 1983 claim.

13
Alexander v. Ieyoub, 997 F.2d 881 No. 92-4278 (5th Cir.
Jul. 2, 1993) (unpublished opinion).
14
See id. (recognizing that Louisiana law provides an
adequate remedy for negligent deprivation of personal property);
Marshall v. Norwood, 741 F.2d 761, 764 (5th Cir.1984) (finding no
actionable claim because Louisiana law afforded opportunity to
redress intentional torts as well as negligence and because
complainant had not met burden of showing that state remedy was
not adequate).

6
 The Supreme Court ruled in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,15 that

the Parratt/Hudson doctrine was not designed to reach a case in

which the state, pursuant to established procedures, deprives

someone of "an opportunity [to be heard] granted at a meaningful

time and in a meaningful manner."16 The Logan Court found that the

established state procedure of foreclosing a handicapped state

employee's claim of unlawful termination if the state failed to

convene a timely factfinding conference unreasonably destroyed the

terminated employee's entitlement without proper procedural

safeguards.17 Moreover, the Logan Court observed that the lengthy

and speculative process of bringing a state tort suit—the

terminated employee's only remedy—would not be constitutionally

adequate to redress the employee's injuries.18

The Defendants' unreasonable delay in instituting a forfeiture

proceeding forced Alexander to suffer, for nearly three years, a

continuing property deprivation over which she had no say or

control, and it effectively denied Alexander an opportunity for

redress. In light of the slow progress of Alexander's state tort

action, even after the Defendants finally instituted a forfeiture

proceeding, we are convinced that the available state remedies did

15
455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982).
16
See id. at 437, 102 S.Ct. at 1158-59.
17
See id. at 424-428, 435-37, 102 S.Ct. at 1152-53, 1158
(under statute, state's Fair Employment Practices Commission had
120 days within which to convene conference after complainant
filed discrimination charge).
18
See id. at 435-437, 102 S.Ct. at 1158.

7
not protect, and are not adequately protecting, Alexander's right

to an opportunity to address her entitlement to the car in the

Defendants' custody. We conclude that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine

does not foreclose Alexander's § 1983 claim and that the

Defendants' refusal to institute a forfeiture proceeding within a

reasonable time after the seizure, even after Alexander's fervent,

repeated requests, provides appropriate grounds for her claim that

the Defendants violated her due process rights.19

2. Random and Unauthorized Conduct

In addition to finding that the Defendants' conduct served to

enervate the adequacy of Alexander's available state remedies, we

also find that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine is inapplicable because

the "random and unauthorized" element necessary for its application

is absent in Alexander's § 1983 claim. The Supreme Court in

Zinermon v. Burch20 observed that, to warrant application of the

Parratt/Hudson doctrine, the state actors' conduct must have been

random or unpredictable as well as unauthorized, in the sense that

it was not within the state officials' express or implied

authority.21

19
The Defendants contend that Alexander does not even own
the car and therefore may not assert any rights to it.
Alexander's putative ownership of the car, however, is irrelevant
to the instant case, as it is a disputed issue of fact that
should be (and, ideally, should already have been) resolved in a
forfeiture proceeding instituted by the Defendants.
20
494 U.S. 113, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990).
21
See id. at 128-32, 110 S.Ct. at 985-86 (observing that
Supreme Court in Hudson and Parratt concluded that, as States
could not predict and therefore could not safeguard against
random and unauthorized deprivations through predeprivation

8
 We disagree with the Defendants' contention that their actions

were unpredictable, intentional violations of state law that fell

within the ambit of the Parratt/Hudson doctrine and therefore

foreclosed Alexander's § 1983 claim. Although the Louisiana

statute providing for a forfeiture proceeding gives the DA the

authority to institute the proceeding, it does not specify a time

period within which the DA should act.22 The Defendants therefore

had discretion to institute the proceeding whenever they wanted,

and their actions in delaying for nearly three years, although

unreasonable, were not in conflict with their authority under state

law.

Moreover, Alexander averred in her § 1983 claim that the

Defendants were following their common practice for dealing with

seized property when they kept her car in custody without timely

instituting a forfeiture proceeding, and she supported her

assertion with corroborating depositions. As Alexander alleged

that the Defendants' failure timely to institute a forfeiture

proceeding was in accordance with their customary procedures, the

"random and unauthorized" element required for Parratt/Hudson

preclusion of a claim is not met. The Defendants' delay, which

effectively blocked Alexander from asserting her rights to her car,

also undermined the adequacy of the existing state remedies of a

tort action and a forfeiture proceeding. Both the predeprivation

process, adequate postdeprivation remedies were sufficient
process).
22
See La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 32:1550(C) (West 1989).

9
and postdeprivation conditions necessary for applying the

Parratt/Hudson doctrine to invalidate a procedural due process

claim, therefore, are unfulfilled, and Alexander has stated an

actionable § 1983 claim.

C. YOUNGER ABSTENTION DOCTRINE

The Younger abstention doctrine provides that federal

equitable relief is generally unavailable against pending state

criminal prosecutions except in narrowly defined and unusual

circumstances.23 The Supreme Court in Huffman v. Pursue24 extended

the doctrine to state civil proceedings that were "both in aid of

and closely related to criminal statutes," as those cases involved

the same concerns of comity and federalism present in state

criminal proceedings.25

In the instant case, two state proceedings are pending:

Alexander's state tort claim seeking the car's release and damages,

and the forfeiture proceeding for which no date has yet been fixed.

The adjudication of the forfeiture proceeding is a prerequisite for

deciding the issue of damages in the state tort action, as the

proceeding would determine whether the Defendants are entitled to

forfeiture of Alexander's car.

Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that a

23
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-46, 91 S.Ct. 746,
751, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).
24
420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975).
25
See id. at 603-05, 95 S.Ct. at 1208.

10
forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal26, Younger abstention is not

appropriate in the instant case. We have previously observed that

the Younger abstention doctrine does not apply to a suit seeking

only damages.27 Even though Alexander seeks both damages and the

return of her car in the pending state tort action, her federal §

1983 claim seeks only monetary relief for the Defendants' delay in

instituting a forfeiture proceeding.28 Thus, the district court did

not have a valid reason for refusing to consider Alexander's § 1983

claim for damages due to the Defendants' alleged constitutional

violation of her rights.

More importantly, the district court's adjudication of

Alexander's § 1983 claim would not interfere with any state

interest involved in the pending state proceedings.29 Although

26
See State v. Manuel, 426 So.2d 140, 143 (La.1983) (object
of forfeiture proceeding is "to penalize for the commission of an
offense against the law" and "forfeiture is clearly a penalty for
the criminal offense and can result in even greater punishment
than the prosecution").
27
See Lewis v. Beddingfield, 20 F.3d 123, 125 (5th Cir.1994)
(Younger not applicable to § 1983 claim for damages); Allen v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry, 835 F.2d 100, 104 (5th
Cir.1988) ("requests for monetary damages do not fall within the
purview of the Younger abstention doctrine"); Bishop v. State
Bar of Texas, 736 F.2d 292, 295 (5th Cir.1984) (a § 1983 claim
for damages is a "species of relief wholly unaffected by Younger"
).
28
Even though Alexander seeks both the return of her car and
damages in her state tort claim, that claim is essentially only
for damages as well, as the forfeiture proceeding—and not the
independent state tort action—would determine the proper
disposition of her car.
29
See Middlesex Co. Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar
Assoc., 457 U.S. 423, 431, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116
(1982) (observing that Younger and its progeny "espouse a strong
federal policy against federal-court interference with pending

11
Alexander's § 1983 claim and the pending state proceedings arose

out of the same event—the Defendants' seizure of Alexander's

car—they are not inextricably intertwined. Alexander's

constitutional claim for damages due to her inability to address

her entitlement to her car until thirty-five months after the

Defendants seized it has nothing to do with the pending state

proceedings, which focus on whether the Defendants' seizure of her

car (and not their delay in instituting a forfeiture proceeding)

was constitutional. The pending state proceedings, therefore, do

not afford Alexander an adequate opportunity to raise her

constitutional claim related to the Defendants' unreasonable delay,

as the subject of those actions is the Defendants' seizure of

Alexander's car. Thus, we conclude that the district court abused

its discretion by refusing, based on its unwarranted reliance on

Younger, to exercise its jurisdiction over Alexander's § 1983

claim.

III

CONCLUSION

The Defendants' unconscionable delay of nearly three years

before finally instituting a forfeiture proceeding calls into

serious question the adequacy of the state's postdeprivation remedy

in providing Alexander with due process. That a remedy exists is

not sufficient—the remedy must provide redress in a meaningful and

timely manner to be constitutionally adequate. Here, initiation of

the forfeiture proceeding was neither timely nor meaningful.

state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances").

12
Moreover, Alexander's allegation that the Defendants were acting in

their customary manner of failing timely to institute a forfeiture

proceeding negates the "random and unauthorized conduct" element

needed for application of the Parratt/Hudson doctrine. We

therefore conclude that Alexander has stated an actionable § 1983

claim alleging that the Defendants violated her due process rights.

In addition, as Alexander's § 1983 claim seeks only damages

for the Defendants' delay in instituting a forfeiture proceeding,

the district court's adjudication of her federal claim would not

impinge on the state's interest of determining its asserted

forfeiture rights in the pending quasi-criminal forfeiture

proceeding. Thus, the narrowly-defined Younger abstention doctrine

is inapplicable and the district court abused its discretion in

abstaining on that ground. Based on the foregoing, the district

court's ruling dismissing Alexander's § 1983 claim is reversed and

the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

13