PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
_______________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
11/23/99
No. 96-2306 THOMAS K. KAHN
_______________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 95-55-CIV-T-21-E
DWAYNE HAWKINS,
MILLARD G. RIPLEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
______________________________
(November 23, 1999)
Before BIRCH, Circuit Judge, FAY, Senior Circuit Judge, and COHILL*, Senior
District Judge.
*
Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
The facts in this case are set out in our prior opinion in which we certified a
controlling issue of law to the Supreme Court of Florida. See Hawkins v. Ford Motor
Co., 135 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court of Florida rephrased1 our
original certified question as follows:
Does section 320.643(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), provide the
exclusive basis for objection by a motor vehicle manufacturer to a
proposed transfer of all the equity interest in a corporate motor vehicle
dealership?
On October 14, 1999, The Supreme Court of Florida in Case Number 92,503,
Hawkins v. Ford Motor Co. responded as follows:
. . . we answer the rephrased certified question in the negative and hold
that the entire transaction must be analyzed and multiple statutory
provisions considered depending on the structure of the entire transaction
which, as here, may involve both a transfer of all the equity interest in a
corporate motor vehicle dealership and a change in executive
management control of that dealership. (footnote omitted).
Based upon the holding of the Supreme Court of Florida on the determinative
issue of Florida law in this case, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
1
The certified question, as rephrased, is identical to our original question but for the
insertion of the word “corporate.”
2