delivered the opinion, of the Court:
This case, it appears, was argued and reargued in the' court below, and the learned justice who heard the case has given it very full and careful consideration, as is shown by his carefully prepared opinion contained in the record. Both the law and the facts are fully and clearly stated in that opinion, and, upon careful examination of the whole case, we entirely concur both with the reasoning and conclusion of the learned justice.
The only questions that would seem to admit of serious discussion, and which were much discussed in this court, are those in respect to the application of the statute of limitations, and the equitable doctrine of the lapse of time, pleaded and relied upon by the defendant. But those questions have been well considered and satisfactorily disposed of by the court below. Indeed, it may be very much doubted whether any such questions properly arise in the case. It is very clearly shown, that the $15,000 paid over to Cummings by Baker on the assignment of the former’s interest in the inspector cases, was not in truth the money of Baker, but was the moneyof the partnership of Cummings & Baker, deposited in the name of Baker; and that, in receiving the $15,000 as for his share or interest in the inspector cases, Cummings was in reality, and to all intents and purposes, receiving his own money, and not even the full amount due him, for and on account of the inspector cases previously earned, and actually realized or secured. This being so, the assignment of September 6,1886, was not only voidable for misrepresentation and failure to make full and frank disclosures of the real state of the business, and the extent of the interest of Cummings therein, as held by the court below, but it was void from the commencement, and transferred no interest to Baker, because of the entire want of consideration — the $15,000 being received by Cummings in ignorance of his rights. If this view of the transaction be correct, and we perceive no *279reason to doubt it (Helmore v. Smith, 35 Chan. Div. 436 ; Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall., 85), neither the statute of limitations, nor the doctrine of the lapse of time, as defenses to the relief sought, would have any application. The assignment did not break up or terminate the relation of partners; but the partnership continued not only with reference to the other business of the firm, but also with reference to the inspector cases; the assignment to Baker being without legal effect or operation. And that being so, and the partnership continuing until September, 1889, when it was dissolved, less than five months intervened from the time of dissolution to the time of filing the bill, on the 1st of February, 1890.
However, without insisting upon this view of the case, but treating the assignment as being voidable merely for misrepresentation and non-disclosure of material facts, we are of opinion that the court below was clearly right, and we shall affirm the decree appealed from for the reasons assigned by the learned justice in the court below. In either aspect of the case, the decree for an account was proper, and the basis for stating the account, as prescribed by the decree appealed from, is such as furnishes the appellant no just ground of complaint. The decree is affirmed, with cost to the appellee.
Decree affirmed, and cause remanded for further proceedings.