(concurring) :
I concur in the result reached by the foregoing opinion but have some additional comments.
As I argued in dissent in Nixon v. Sirica, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 58, 87-120, 487 F.2d 700, 729-762 (1973), the President, as distinct from the executive establishment generally, possesses a constitutionally founded privilege enabling him to protect the confidentiality of conferences with his advisors. Recognition of that presidential privilege would dispose of the demands made by the instant subpoena, but failing majority consensus on this point I concur generally in the reasoning of the foregoing opinion as embracing an accurate analysis and sound *192application of the principles established in Nixon v. Sirica. This position evidences no retreat from my previously expressed views on the force, validity and importance of congressional subpoenas, id. at 95-96, 487 F.2d at 737-738, nor does it reflect a comparatively higher esteem for judicial subpoenas. Rather, my concurrence today is premised on the basic proposition that enforcement of any subpoena, whether congressional or judicial, depends in the first instance upon an assessment of the immediate purpose, object and need which prompted its issuance. Thus, even though recognizing that the legislative function is no less important than the prosecutorial, I agree that the Senate Committee has failed to demonstrate a present need of sufficient urgency to overcome even the qualified presidential privilege recognized by the majority in Nixon v. Sirica. Additionally, while I would not characterize the Senate Committee’s need as “merely cumulative,” it bears particular-emphasis that legislation involves a cooperative effort of both the House and the Senate, that the House Committee on the Judiciary already possesses the recordings sought here, and that these materials more than likely eventually will be released to the public.