[Cite as State v. Wood, 2022-Ohio-2548.]
COURT OF APPEALS
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. William B. Hoffman, P. J.
Plaintiff-Appellant Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs-
Case No. 2021 CA 00082
TAYLOR E. WOOD
Defendant-Appellee OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 2021 CR 00105
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: July 25, 2022
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee
WILLIAM C. HAYES APRIL F. CAMPBELL
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY CAMPBELL LAW, LLC
J. BRANDON PIGG 46-1/2 N. Sandusky Street
ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR Delaware, Ohio 43015
20 South Second Street, Fourth Floor
Newark, Ohio 43055
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00082 2
Wise, J.
{¶1} Appellant, State of Ohio, appeals the judgment of the Licking County Court
of Common Pleas granting the motion to suppress evidence. Appellee is Taylor Wood.
The relevant facts leading to this appeal are as follows.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On May 20, 2021, Appellee was indicted on one count of Possession of
Fentanyl-Related Compound in violation of R.C. §2925.11(A) & (C)(11)(e), one count of
Trafficking in Fentanyl-Related Compound in violation of R.C. §2925.11(A)(2) & (C)(9)(f),
one count of Aggravated Possession of Methamphetamine in violation of R.C.
§2925.11(A) & (C)(1)(c), and one count of Aggravated Trafficking in Methamphetamine
in violation of R.C. §2925.11(A)(2) & (C)(1)(d).
{¶3} On July 12, 2021, Appellee filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized
as a result of a traffic stop occurring on December 10, 2020.
{¶4} The trial court held a suppression hearing on September 29, 2021.
{¶5} At the hearing Detective Martens testified that on December 10, 2020 he
was employed by the Newark Police Department and assigned to the Central Ohio Drug
Task Force.
{¶6} On December 10, 2020, Martens received information from another
detective that a driver in a Dodge Avenger failed to use a turn signal and made an
improper lane change while driving in Newark, Ohio. Martens initiated a traffic stop at
12:58 p.m. Martens identified Appellee as the driver of the Dodge Avenger.
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00082 3
{¶7} Martens asked Appellee and passenger, Lynsay Lewis, for identification
and proof of insurance. Martens returned to his cruiser with the documents and contacted
Detective Vogelmeier, a canine officer.
{¶8} At 1:02 p.m. Martens return to Appellee’s vehicle to ask for consent to
search the car. Appellee denies consent. Martens then walked away from Appellee’s
vehicle at 1:03 p.m. to stand next to his cruiser to wait for Vogelmeier. About two minutes
later Vogelmeier and his dog arrived. Vogelmeier’s dog then alerted Vogelmeier of a
positive sniff.
{¶9} Martens and another officer searched the vehicle retrieving 25.959 grams
of fentanyl, 23.167 grams of methamphetamine, and $2,319 in cash.
{¶10} Martens also testified he never issued Appellee a traffic citation and could
not recall if he issued a written warning. Martens said the only steps he remembered
taking were opening up his warning book and laying it on the seat of his cruiser.
{¶11} On October 19, 2021, the trial court granted Appellee’s Motion to Suppress.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶12} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. He herein raises the following
Assignments of Error:
{¶13} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THE DECEMBER
10, 2020 TRAFFIC STOP AND SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF APPELLEE’S VEHICLE
VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE SEIZED
DURING THAT STOP AND SEARCH TO THE PREJUDICE OF STATE [sic].”
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00082 4
I.
{¶14} In Appellant’s first Assignment of Error, Appellant argues the trial court erred
in finding that Detective Martens impermissibly extended the stop in failing to pursue
investigating the traffic violation, issuing a citation or written warning for two minutes while
waiting for the canine unit to arrive. We disagree.
{¶15} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14,
Article I, Ohio Constitution, prohibit the government from conducting unreasonable
searches and seizures of persons or their property. See Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S.
1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87, 565
N.E.2d 1271.
{¶16} Appellate review of a motion to suppress is a mixed question of law and
fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶8. During
a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in
the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness credibility. State v.
Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 154, 1996-Ohio-134, 661 N.E.2d 1030. A reviewing court is
bound to accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent,
credible evidence. State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142,145, 675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th
Dist.1996). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must independently
determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s conclusions, whether
the trial court’s decision meets the applicable legal standard. State v. Williams, 86 Ohio
App.3d 37, 41, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1993), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Gunther, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 04CA25, 2005-Ohio-3492, ¶16.
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00082 5
{¶17} Three methods exist to challenge a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress. First, appellant may challenge the trial court’s findings of facts. State v.
Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Second, appellant may argue the
trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that
case, the appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. Williams
at 41. Third, appellant may argue the trial court incorrectly decided the ultimate issue
raised in the motion to suppress. When addressing the third type of challenge, an
appellate court must independently determine, without deference to the trial court’s
conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in the given case
(Citation omitted). State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96, 641, N.E.2d 1172 (8 th
Dist.1994).
When a police officer’s objective justification to continue detention of
a person stopped for a traffic violation for the purpose of searching the
person’s vehicle is not related to the purpose of the original stop, and when
that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to
a suspicion of some illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention,
the continued detention to conduct a search constitutes an illegal seizure.
State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 240, 685 N.E.2d 762, 767 (1997).
{¶18} An officer may briefly extend a traffic stop to inquire about the presence of
illegal drugs or weapons. Id. However, the officer must ascertain reasonably articulable
facts giving rise to a suspicion of criminal activity while inquiring to justifying a more in-
depth investigation. Id. Therefore, “[t]he critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff
occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket … but whether conducting the sniff
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00082 6
‘prolongs’ – i.e. adds time to- ‘the stop’” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135
S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015).
{¶19} In other words, a motorist may be detained beyond the time frame
necessary to conduct the stop for the purposes of the traffic violation when “additional
facts are encountered that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion [of criminal
activity] beyond that which prompted the initial stop[.]” State v. Smith, 117 Ohio App.3d
278, 285, 690 N.E.2d 567 (1st Dist.1996) citing State v. Myers, 63 Ohio App.3d 765, 771,
580 N.E.2d 61 (2nd Dist.1990).
{¶20} The United States Supreme Court held an officer may not prolong a traffic
stop to perform a drug sniff if the “overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in
relation to the duration of other stops involving similar circumstances.” Rodriguez at 1616.
However, reasonableness depends on what the police actually do and how they do it. Id.
{¶21} In State v. Hall, 2nd Dist. No. 2016-CA-13, 2017-Ohio-2682, 90 N.E.3d 276,
officers confirmed the defendant’s identification, then did nothing to process the traffic
stop while awaiting the canine unit to arrive. The Second District Court of Appeals found
that the officer did nothing for eight minutes to process the traffic stop, and that the
officer’s inaction was not reasonable or diligent. Id. The officer unreasonably prolonged
the stop, and the evidence was properly suppressed.
{¶22} Similarly, in the case sub judice, Martens testified after initiating the traffic
stop at 12:58 p.m. he returned to his cruiser to confirm license and registration. While at
his cruiser he requested a canine unit and then took out his warning book and set it on
the seat of his cruiser. He then returned to Appellee’s vehicle and requested consent to
search at 1:02 p.m. Appellee denied his request. Martens, after discussing the search
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00082 7
with Appellee, walked away from Appellee’s car and waited for two minutes, doing
nothing, for the canine unit to arrive. He did not issue a traffic citation and did not recall
issuing a warning to Appellee.
{¶23} Therefore, similarly, to Hall, Martens acted unreasonably and without
diligence by stalling for two minutes without processing the traffic stop to allow for the
canine unit to arrive. Waiting for the canine unit to arrive and conduct a sniff indisputably
added time to the stop. Therefore, Martens unreasonably prolonged the stop, and the trial
court properly suppressed the evidence.
{¶24} Appellants sole Assignment of Error is overruled.
{¶25} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of
Licking County, Ohio, is hereby affirmed.
By: Wise, J.
Hoffman, P. J., and
Delaney, J., concur.
JWW/d 0711