PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 95-8557
_______________
D. C. Docket No. 1-94-CV-1984-RLV
GEORGE N. UBOH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JANET RENO, Head of U. S. Dept. Of Justice and Attorney General of
the United States, ROBERT C. BONNER, Administrator, Drug
Enforcement Admin., JANIS C. GORDON, Assistant U. S. Attorney, MARY
P. GHOLSON, Agent, Drug Enforcement Admin., BRIAN SULLIVAN, Drug
Enforcement Admin., FRANK SMITH, Agent, Drug Enforcement Admin.,
FRANK SMITH, Agent, Drug Enforcement Admin.,
Defendants-Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
______________________________
(May 18, 1998)
Before BIRCH, Circuit Judge, RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
O’KELLEY*, Senior District Judge.
*
Honorable William C. O’Kelley, Senior U. S. District Judge
for the Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation.
BIRCH, Circuit Judge:
This case requires that we decide whether a prosecutor’s
unilateral decision to dismiss some counts of an indictment following
a defendant’s conviction on other counts of the same indictment
constitutes favorable termination for purposes of the defendant’s
subsequent Bivens1 action for malicious prosecution. Further, we
must determine, in light of the particular facts presented in this case,
when the causes of action alleged in the complaint accrued and
whether these claims are time-barred. The district court dismissed
this case after finding that the plaintiff had failed to file the complaint
within the time dictated by the applicable statute of limitations. For
the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
1
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971).
2
For purposes of this appeal, the following facts as alleged in the
complaint are undisputed: In 1992, federal agents sought and
obtained authorization to wiretap George Uboh’s telephone. The
application for the wiretap was based in part on affidavits provided
by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), indicating
Uboh’s possible involvement in the importation of heroin and
cocaine. Uboh subsequently was indicted, along with nineteen co-
defendants, for charges related to credit card fraud. Unlike any of
his co-defendants, however, Uboh was also indicted on three counts
related to the importation of narcotics. Of the nineteen defendants
charged in the indictment, Uboh also was the sole defendant denied
bond; specifically, a district court judge denied bond initially on
February 20, 1992, and on appeal on May 14, 1992. The federal
prosecutor based the request for detention without bond on the drug
charges set forth in the indictment.
The district court severed the drug-related charges from those
counts of the indictment alleging credit card fraud. On February 1,
3
1993, a jury convicted Uboh of credit card fraud. On July 20, 1993,
the district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss the
drug charges.
Uboh filed this Bivens action2 and alleged, inter alia, that DEA
agents Mary P. Gholson, Brian Sullivan, and Frank Smith falsified
affidavits for Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Janis C.
Gordon, who knowingly used the false affidavits to obtain
authorization for a wiretap on Uboh’s telephone. Uboh further
alleged that Gordon intentionally sought his indictment on fabricated
charges of conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine and heroin,
and that the district court denied him bond solely due to Gordon’s
assertion that Uboh was involved in illegal drug activity.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that the claims were time-barred, the federal defendants were
entitled either to absolute or qualified immunity, and the allegations
2
Uboh initially filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§
1983 and 1985(3), but later amended the complaint to allege
correctly a cause of action within the framework of Bivens.
4
were insufficient to state a constitutional violation. The district court
granted the motion to dismiss exclusively on the basis of the statute
of limitations. The court reasoned that the statute of limitations for
a Bivens claim was analogous to Georgia’s two-year personal injury
statute of limitations and that, under our Bivens case law, an action
accrued at the time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of his
claims. The court explicitly rejected Uboh’s assertion of a malicious
prosecution cause of action on the ground that this type of claim
arose only under state law. The court further determined that,
because Uboh became aware of his claims at the time of his
indictment or, at the latest, when his bond was denied on appeal, the
statute of limitations barred his claims. Uboh filed a motion for
reconsideration and argued that, consistent with the analysis set
forth by the Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994), his claims did not accrue
until the criminal charges against him were dismissed. The district
court denied the motion for reconsideration.
5
On appeal, Uboh argues that, although the district court
properly determined that the claims presented are subject to a two-
year statute of limitations, the court erroneously failed to treat his
allegations as akin to the federal constitutional tort of malicious
prosecution and, as a result, erred in determining the date on which
the causes of action accrued. The defendants originally asked that
we affirm the district court’s decision for the reasons discussed in
that court’s opinion; in a supplemental brief, however, the
defendants appear to have shifted gears entirely and argue, instead,
that because Uboh has failed to establish the elements of a Bivens,
malicious prosecution claim, the general rule regarding the accrual
date of a Bivens cause of action should obtain and the claims should
be deemed time-barred.3
3
The defendants also reassert their arguments regarding
absolute and qualified immunity. As discussed further below,
because we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing
this case on statute of limitations grounds and remand for further
proceedings, we decline to address the defendants additional
arguments without benefit of the district court’s factual
determinations.
6
II. DISCUSSION
We independently review the district court’s ruling concerning
the applicable statute of limitations. Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961
F.2d 157, 159 (11th Cir. 1992). Federal courts apply their forum
state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to actions
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; similarly, we have held that
the application of the state personal injury statute of limitations
period obtains in the context of Bivens actions as well. See Kelly v.
Serna, 87 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1996). It is undisputed in this
case that Georgia’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations
applies to Uboh’s constitutional claims.
A statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action
accrues. Id. The question of when the limitations period begins to
run, however, is one of federal law. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 268-71, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1942-44, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1985).
Here, the district court construed Uboh’s claim of malicious
prosecution solely as a state law cause of action and noted that “the
7
plaintiff ignores that [sic] fact that he is not suing the defendants for
violation of any state law; indeed, Bivens creates a cause of action
only for a violation of federally created rights.” R1-20 at 3. The
district court went on to find that the plaintiff had failed to show that
he was unaware of the alleged injury caused by the wiretaps, the
indictment, and the denial of bond at the time those events
transpired. Consequently, because even the last of those events
occurred more than two years prior to the filing of this action, the suit
was barred by the statute of limitations. See id.
In the first instance, the district court erred in failing to recognize
in Uboh’s complaint the assertion of an established, federally-
protected constitutional right. Indeed, there has been a remarkable
divergence of opinion among the circuit courts as to both the extent
to which the claim of malicious prosecution gives rise to a federal
cause of action and, assuming that such a claim is cognizable, its
constitutional source; our court, however, unequivocally has identified
malicious prosecution to be a constitutional tort that is cognizable
8
under § 1983.4 In Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581 (11th Cir. 1996), for
instance, we observed that
[l]abeling . . . a section 1983 claim as one for a
“malicious prosecution” can be a shorthand way
of describing a kind of legitimate section 1983
claim; the kind of claim where the plaintiff, as
part of the commencement of a criminal
proceeding, has been unlawfully and forcibly
restrained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
and injuries, due to that seizure, follow as the
prosecution goes ahead.
4
See Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 426 n.5 (11th Cir. 1988)
(“[F]reedom from malicious prosecution is a federal right protected
by § 1983. . . .”); Accord Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1159
(5th Cir. 1992) (“[O]ur circuit recognizes causes of action under
§ 1983 for false arrest, illegal detention (false imprisonment),
and malicious prosecution. . . . These causes of action implicate
the constitutional guarantees of the fourth and fourteenth
amendments.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But
see Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he
general rule is that a claim of malicious prosecution is not
cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if process is available within
the state judicial system to provide a remedy.”). In Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S. Ct. 807, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1994)
(plurality opinion), the Supreme Court altered the analytical
framework surrounding the federal claim asserted in this case by
deciding that the substantive due process component of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not provide the constitutional source of
a right to be free from malicious prosecution; significantly,
however, the Court explicitly left open the possibility that the
Fourth Amendment might serve as an appropriate locus for the
claimed right to be free from malicious process. See id., 510 U.S.
at 274-75, 114 S. Ct. at 813-14 (“We have in the past noted the
Fourth Amendment’s relevance to the deprivations of liberty that go
hand in hand with criminal prosecutions.”). Consistent with the
suggestive reasoning advanced by the Court in Albright, our court
has since expressly characterized the right to be free from
malicious prosecution as an independent cause of action that
potentially is cognizable under the Fourth Amendment.
9
Id. at 584; accord Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116
(2nd Cir. 1995) (“The Fourth Amendment right implicated in a
malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable
seizure of the person--i.e., the right to be free of unreasonable or
unwarranted restraints on personal liberty.)); Smart v. Board of
Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois, 34 F.3d 432, 434 (7th Cir. 1994) (“If
malicious prosecution or abuse of process is committed by state
actors and results in the arrest or other seizure of the defendant . . .
we now know that the defendant’s only constitutional remedy is under
the Fourth Amendment. . . .”). Preliminary to our discussion of the
merits of Uboh’s challenge to the district court’s final disposition with
respect to the statute of limitations, therefore, we note that the district
court erred in failing to treat the claims asserted in this case as
premised on a theory of malicious prosecution pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment; contrary to the district court’s stated justification for its
10
decision, such a cause of action does constitute a cognizable Bivens
claim.5
Having determined that the complaint presented in this case
must be construed as setting forth allegations that comprise a
malicious prosecution claim, we next must decide whether the
causes of action asserted are barred by the statute of limitations. As
noted, the issue of whether the district court properly applied
Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations regarding personal injury
causes of action is undisputed; the contested point, rather, is when
Uboh’s claims accrued. Uboh argues that, consistent with the
jurisprudence of this circuit and the Supreme Court pertaining to
malicious prosecution as a federal cause of action, his claims could
not have accrued until the charges against him that relate to this case
were resolved in his favor.6 In response, the defendants submit that
5
Although the federal defendants declined to acknowledge the
district court’s error in either of their appellate briefs, they
did concede at oral argument that the court had erred in failing to
recognize the existence of a federal right to be free from
malicious prosecution.
6
The drug charges initially brought against Uboh were
dismissed on July 21, 1993. Uboh filed this action on July 28,
11
Uboh has failed properly to plead the elements of a cause of action
for malicious prosecution; consequently, his claims should be
construed not within the context of our decisional law on malicious
prosecution but as general, federal claims that are subject to a
residual statute of limitations for Bivens actions. Under this theory,
because Uboh knew or should have known of the alleged violations
simultaneous with their occurrence and because these events
undisputedly took place more than two years before the case was
filed, the claims are time-barred.
Because the species of Fourth Amendment violation alleged in
this case arises by way of analogy to the common law tort of
malicious prosecution, courts historically have looked to the common
law for guidance as to the constituent elements of the claim. See
Whiting, 85 F.3d at 585 n.7 (“Where an arrest is made after the filing
of an information and the arrest is the basis of a Fourth Amendment
1994. If Uboh’s claims accrued on the date the drug charges were
dismissed, the complaint in the instant civil case would have been
filed within the applicable two-year statute of limitations
established under Georgia law.
12
section 1983 claim, we think the tort of malicious prosecution is the
most analogous tort to the section 1983 claim.”). See also Hilfirty v.
Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 579 (3rd Cir. 1996) (“In order to state a prima
facie case for a section 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, the
plaintiff must establish the elements of the common law tort as it has
developed over time.”) Georgia law provides that:
[a] criminal prosecution which is carried on
maliciously and without any probable cause and
which causes damage to the person prosecuted
shall give him a cause of action.
O.C.G.A. § 51-7-40. Further, in order to state a cause of action for
malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege and prove that the
criminal proceeding that gives rise to the action has terminated in
favor of the accused. See Kelly v. Serna, 87 F.3d at 1240-41; Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2371, 129 L. Ed.
2d 383 (1994) (“One element that must be alleged and proved in a
malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal
proceeding in favor of the accused.”).
13
The government’s contention that Uboh has not stated the
elements of a claim for malicious prosecution rests on the premise
that the prosecutor’s decision to dismiss the drug charges at issue
here does not constitute a favorable termination of the underlying
criminal proceeding.7 Whether a prosecutor’s unilateral decision to
dismiss specific counts of an indictment – and the defendant has
been convicted on other counts of the same indictment – constitutes
termination in favor of the accused for purposes of the constitutional
tort of malicious prosecution is an issue of first impression.
The Supreme Court has observed that the requirement of
favorable termination in the context of malicious prosecution suits
7
In a supplemental brief, the defendants further aver that
Uboh has failed to present probative evidentiary support for the
allegation that the defendants instigated the prosecution on drug
charges without probable cause. We note, at the outset, that this
argument is raised for the first time on appeal and was neither
discussed or addressed by the district court. Moreover, we agree
with Uboh’s response, as set forth in a reply brief, that the
government’s challenge to the evidentiary basis for the allegations
is best reserved for summary judgment. We therefore decline to
consider whether, at this point in the proceedings, Uboh has proven
the first element of a malicious prosecution claim. We do find,
however, that the pro se complaint--which we are required to
construe liberally--adequately alleges that the wiretap request and
indictment lacked probable cause; stated differently, we conclude
that, for purposes of our analysis of the statute of limitations
issue, the complaint does not fail to state a claim with regard to
the probable cause component of malicious prosecution.
14
prevents parallel litigation over the issues of probable cause and guilt
and the possible creation of conflicting resolutions arising out of the
same or identical transactions. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484, 114 S.
Ct. at 2371. Courts have further reasoned that “only terminations
that indicate that the accused is innocent ought to be considered
favorable.” Hilfirty, 91 F.3d at 580 (relying on Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 660 cmt. a (“Proceedings are ‘terminated in favor of the
accused’ . . . only when their final disposition is such as to indicate
the innocence of the accused.”)); Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 456
(5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (same); Singleton v. City of New York,
632 F.2d 185, 193 (2nd Cir. 1980) (same). Thus, courts have found
that withdrawal of criminal charges pursuant to a compromise or
agreement does not constitute favorable termination and, thus,
cannot support a claim for malicious prosecution. See, e.g., Taylor,
36 F.3d at 455-56 (holding that pretrial diversion agreement, in which
accused must acknowledge responsibility for offense conduct, “does
not terminate the criminal action in favor of the criminal defendant for
15
purposes of bringing a malicious prosecution claim.”); Laster v. Star
Rental, Inc., 181 Ga. App. 609, 353 S.E.2d 37, 38 (Ga. App. 1987)
(“[W]here the termination of the prosecution has been brought about
by compromise and agreement of the parties, an action for malicious
prosecution can not be maintained.”). Similarly, courts have refused
to permit a finding of favorable termination where the stated basis for
the dismissal of criminal charges has been “in the interests of
justice,” see Singer, 63 F.2d at 118; Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359,
368 (2nd Cir. 1992), or where a conviction has been reversed and the
cause expressly remanded for retrial, see Brandley v. Keeshan, 64
F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1995).
Consistent with each of the policies underlying the favorable
termination requirement, however, courts have found favorable
termination to exist by virtue of an acquittal, an order of dismissal
reflecting an affirmative decision not to prosecute, a dismissal based
on the running of the statute of limitations, an entry of a nolle
prosequi, and, in some cases, a granted writ of habeas corpus. See,
16
e.g. Hilfirty, 91 F.3d at 584-85 (where court determined that when the
grant of nolle prosequi was not the result of a compromise, “grant of
nolle prosequi was sufficient to satisfy the requisite element of
favorable termination of the criminal action.”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); Brandley, 64 F.3d at 199 (“Even a
prosecutor’s failure to act on remand will at some point entitle a
defendant to an order of dismissal.”).
Here, the unilateral dismissal by the AUSA of drug charges that
had been instituted against Uboh transpired in a context slightly
different from the “terminations” described in the cases cited above.
In this instance, not only were the counts of the indictment that were
dismissed originally part of a larger indictment that gave rise to
several convictions, but there was no expressed basis for the
dismissal; as a result, we cannot ascertain with certainty whether the
dismissal constitutes conclusive proof of Uboh’s innocence. Actual
innocence, however, is not required for a common law favorable
termination. Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3rd Cir. 1996) (citing
17
Restatement of the Law of Torts §§ 659, 660 (1938). We find nothing
in the record to suggest that the prosecutor’s request to withdraw all
drug charges – in the absence of any agreement or compromise
involving Uboh – amounts to anything less than an indication of
innocence. Because the drug counts of the indictment were
dismissed after Uboh had already been convicted of credit card
fraud, thereby disposing of all counts of the indictment, there appears
to be little risk that the AUSA intended to renew these charges at a
later date; thus, the potential for a renewed prosecution on the same
criminal charges that are implicated in an ongoing malicious
prosecution action to result in inconsistent, parallel proceedings is not
present here. The fact that the allegations concerning drug trafficking
were included alongside other charges for which Uboh ultimately was
convicted does not alter our conclusion that the prosecutor’s decision
to dismiss the drug counts constituted favorable termination,
particularly under the facts of this case. See Janetka v. Dabe, 892
F.2d 187, 190 (2nd Cir. 1989) (where plaintiff in malicious prosecution
18
action was convicted on some charges and acquitted on others, court
found that acquittal constituted favorable termination.) Uboh was
charged in the indictment with two distinct offenses, drug importation
and credit card fraud. Each of these offenses contains entirely
different elements, neither charge is a lesser-included offense of the
other, and the charges were not tried as part of the same proceeding;
in this context, it is reasonable to interpret the prosecutor’s decision
to not pursue the drug-related charges as consistent with (though
perhaps not dispositive proof of) a finding of innocence on these
specific counts of the indictment.8
In sum, we conclude that the dismissal of some charges of the
indictment by the prosecutor – notwithstanding Uboh’s earlier
conviction on other charges set forth in the indictment – constituted
8
Our consideration of these factors is not intended to convey
any determination as to whether, given a different set of
circumstances, dismissal of charges that do arise out of the same
set of circumstances as the charges for which a defendant was
convicted might constitute termination in favor of the accused. We
only note that the unique combination of factors present in this
particular case further bolsters our conclusion that voluntary
dismissal of charges by the prosecutor is a favorable termination
for purposes of malicious prosecution.
19
termination in favor of the accused for purposes of our preliminary
inquiry into the statute of limitations issue raised in this appeal. It is
worth noting that the charges involved in this action were not
dismissed pursuant to any agreement among the parties and, under
the particular facts of this case, were extraordinarily unlikely to be
renewed in a subsequent action. See Laster, 353 S.E. 2d at 38
(“[Favorable] termination may be caused by the voluntary
abandonment of the case by the party who instituted the
prosecution.”).
Having determined that the dismissal of drug charges against
Uboh constituted favorable termination against the accused, we
resolve that Uboh’s claims for malicious prosecution accrued on July
21, 1993, the date on which the district court entered its order of
dismissal. See Whiting, 85 F.3d at 585-86 (“[W]here a section 1983
plaintiff is seized following the institution of a prosecution . . . and he
seeks to recover damages for all the elements of the prosecution, he
can properly wait until the prosecution terminates in his favor to bring
20
his section 1983 claim which alleges that the seizure was
unreasonable.”) Because Uboh filed the instant action on June 6,
1994, less than two years after the claims accrued, the case is not
barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The district court
therefore erred in dismissing this case as time-barred.
We further discern that, had Uboh attempted to file the instant
action during the statutory period proposed by the defendants, his
action would have been barred pursuant to the dictates of Heck v.
Humphrey. In that case, the Supreme Court held that § 1983 actions
that necessarily call into question the validity of a conviction or
sentence do not accrue until the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise
declared invalid by a tribunal authorized to make such a finding. See
Heck at 487, 114 S. Ct. at 2372. Even assuming, as the defendants
argue, that Uboh’s complaint does not fall within the confines of a
constitutional claim for malicious prosecution, there is little doubt that
the allegations of fraud and malice with respect to the wiretap and
21
indictment would, if proven, call into doubt the validity and justification
of the criminal proceedings that were then pending against Uboh.9
In other words, a civil proceeding challenging the grounds on which
the prosecution against Uboh had been commenced indirectly would
implicate the question of Uboh’s guilt; this type of parallel inquiry by
way of a civil suit prior to the resolution of a criminal action based on
the same set of events is precisely the quandary that Heck prohibits.
The defendants’ suggestion that Uboh should have filed his action at
the time the alleged events giving rise to this action transpired would
have placed Uboh effectively in a double-bind: Had he filed the action
simultaneously when he discovered the defendants’ alleged
9
The defendants argument on appeal is, at best, confusing; on
the one hand, they submit that Uboh has failed to state a
constitutional claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth
Amendment, while on the other hand, they suggest that the claim --
regardless of what type of claim it is -- should be deemed barred
by the statute of limitations. First, we wonder to which part of
the Constitution the defendants perceive this action to refer.
Second, we do not understand the suggestion that, because the
plaintiff allegedly has failed to state the requisite elements of
the proposed cause of action, we then should regard his Bivens
action as asserting some unidentified, residual, federal right and
dismiss the case on statute of limitations grounds. If Uboh has
failed to state the claim that he proposes he is stating, the case
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6); the claim does not transform automatically into some
other indeterminate, unnamed cause of action that is barred by the
statute of limitations.
22
misdeeds, his case would have been dismissed under Heck; had he
waited to file the action (as he did) until the criminal proceeding was
resolved in his favor, the action would have been dismissed under
the statute of limitations. We decline to adopt a construction of either
the complaint or the applicable law that permanently would preclude
the plaintiff from filing any action at all. Rather, we conclude that the
complaint in this case does state a cause of action for malicious
prosecution, that the prosecution did terminate in favor of the
accused, and that had the action been filed at the time these events
accrued -- as proposed by the defendants -- Heck would have barred
its continuation.
III. CONCLUSION
Uboh asks that we set aside the district court’s decision to
dismiss this cause of action based on the statute of limitations. In
evaluating the propriety of the district court’s order, we must decide
whether a dismissal of some portions of an indictment following a
23
defendant’s conviction on other charges contained in the same
indictment constitutes “favorable termination” for purposes of a
subsequent Bivens action for malicious prosecution. We conclude
that (1) the district court erred in failing to treat the complaint filed in
this case as a claim for the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution
under the Fourth Amendment; (2) Uboh’s pro se complaint, which we
are bound to construe liberally, does state a claim for malicious
prosecution; (3) the prosecutor’s dismissal of those charges in the
indictment underlying the instant action did constitute termination in
favor of the accused; (4) the cause of action stated by Uboh accrued
at the time the drug charges were dismissed; and (5) regardless of
the specific constitutional provision under which the complaint is
construed, Heck v. Humphrey dictates that this action could not have
been filed prior to the favorable resolution of the drug charges initially
included in the indictment. This cause of action, therefore, is not
barred by the statute of limitations and may proceed. Because the
district court has not yet had an opportunity to address the
24
defendants’ claims regarding absolute and qualified immunity, we
decline to consider the merits of those arguments and permit the
district court to conduct the requisite factual and legal analysis in the
first instance.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
25