UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 95-20010
(Summary Calendar)
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JACKIE O. TEEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JAMES A. COLLINS, Director,
TDCJ-ID
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
93 CV 3072
_______________________________________________
June 21, 1995
Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jackie Teel, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice - Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ID"), appeals from the
district court's dismissal, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988), of
his pro se, in forma pauperis civil rights suit. We affirm in
part, vacate in part, and remand.
I
*
Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of opinions that have
no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on
the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published.
Teel filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), alleging
that prison authorities had violated his Eighth Amendment rights by
(1) assigning him to an overly strenuous work detail and (2)
denying him appropriate medical treatment after he injured himself
during his work assignment. Before service of Teel's complaint,
the district court ordered Teel to file a more definite statement
in the form of answers to a questionnaire. See Watson v. Ault, 525
F.2d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 1976).
In Teel's complaint, as amended by his answers to the court's
Watson questionnaire,1 Teel alleged that he had entered prison with
a thirty percent permanent disability stemming from a spinal neck
injury. Teel's prison and medical records, which he attached to
his complaint, show that he received frequent medical attention and
that his work assignments were restricted to accommodate his
disability. However, Teel alleged that:
[He] was forced by the supply officer to perform a job
assignment of carrying heavy supplies, even though the
officer was informed that such work detail would
aggravate [his] present medical condition and was against
[his] medical work restrictions. As a result of said
assigned work detail [his] disability was aggravated and
new injury occurred.
1
The district court's questionnaire posed the following questions:
1. Explain how the injury to your neck occurred. 2. When did the
injury occur? 3. What was your occupation before your neck injury?
4. What was your occupation after your neck injury? 5. When did
you enter TDCJ-ID? 6. Explain exactly why the work assignment on
March 4, 1993 aggravated your neck injury. 7. How heavy were the
supplies you were asked to carry? 8. What was the new injury you
suffered on March 4, 1993? 9. What medical treatment did you think
you should have had? 10. What medical treatment did you have? 11.
Approximately how many times did you visit the clinic and see a
physician's assistant, nurse, or physician after the March 4, 1993
injury?
Record on Appeal, vol. 1, at 59-60.
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Record on Appeal, vol. 1, at 52-53. After Teel's work assignment
allegedly aggravated his neck injury, he sought and received
frequent medical attention at the prison infirmary.
The TDCJ-ID medical staff also referred Teel to a specialist
at John Sealy Hospital in Galveston who, according to Teel,
determined that Teel had a torn disc in his neck.2 Teel further
alleged that the specialist told him his condition required
surgery, although the specialist could not guarantee that Teel
would not "end up in a wheelchair for the rest of [his] life."3
The prison medical staff continued to treat his condition with
medication and heat treatments. However, Teel alleged that the
medication he was receiving was not the same medication that the
specialist had prescribed.
After Teel filed his answers to the district court's Watson
questionnaire, the court dismissed Teel's claim as frivolous under
§ 1915(d).4 See Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990)
(noting that court may dismiss in forma pauperis proceeding "before
service of process or before the filing of the answer"). Because
it had accorded Teel an opportunity to elaborate on his claims by
answering its questionnaire, the court dismissed Teel's complaint
2
Teel's medical records simply state that an X-ray showed "minimal
spreading of disc C4 & 5." However, Teel alleged that he was later told by the
specialist that tests had revealed the torn disc.
3
In his brief on appeal, Teel contends that the specialist told him
that he would treat Teel's injury with medication and "therapy treatments"
because of the risks that surgery would pose.
4
Section 1915(d) provides that a district court may dismiss an in
forma pauperis proceeding "if satisfied that the action is frivolous or
malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
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with prejudice. See Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir.
1993) (noting that dismissal with prejudice would be appropriate
when plaintiff has had an opportunity to amend complaint by
answering Watson questionnaire), abrogated on other grounds by
Arvie v. Broussard, 42 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 1994). Teel now appeals,
contending that the district court erroneously dismissed his
complaint.
II
A district court may dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint
under § 1915(d) if it determines that it is "frivolous." A
complaint is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct.
1827, 1831-32, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). "[A] complaint is not
frivolous for the purposes of § 1915(d) merely because it fails to
state a claim according to the standards of Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6)." Thompson v. Patteson, 985 F.2d 202, 205 (5th Cir. 1993)
(citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 319-31, 109 S. Ct. at 1827-34).
Rather, "[a] complaint is legally frivolous if it is premised on an
`indisputably meritless legal theory.'" Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d
279, 281-82 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109
S. Ct. at 1833), and factually frivolous "if the facts alleged are
`clearly baseless,' a category encompassing allegations that are
`fanciful,' `fantastic,' and `delusional.'" Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, __, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992)
(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 325, 328, 328, 109 S. Ct. at
1833, 1831, 1833, 1833).
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We review a district court's § 1915(d) dismissal of an in
forma pauperis complaint for abuse of discretion. See Denton, 504
U.S. at __, 112 S. Ct. at 1734; Boyd, 31 F.3d at 282. In Denton,
the Supreme Court noted:
In reviewing a § 1915(d) dismissal, it would be
appropriate for the court of appeals to consider, among
other things, whether the plaintiff was proceeding pro se
. . . ; whether the court inappropriately resolved
genuine issues of disputed fact . . . ; whether the court
applied erroneous legal conclusions . . . ; whether the
court has provided a statement explaining the dismissal
that facilitates `intelligent appellate review,' . . . ;
and whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice.
Id. at ___, 112 S. Ct. at 1734 (citations omitted) (quoting Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 n., 102 S. Ct. 700, 701 n., 70 L. Ed.
2d 551 (1982)); see also Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 270-71 (5th
Cir. 1992) (applying Denton factors). With respect to the last
factor identified by the Supreme Court in Denton, we have held that
"[s]hould it appear that insufficient factual allegations might be
remedied by more specific pleading, we must consider whether the
district court abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint
either with prejudice or without any effort to amend." Eason v.
Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994).5
A
The district court dismissed Teel's first claim, in which he
alleged that his work assignment had aggravated his preexisting
neck condition, on the grounds that Teel had not sufficiently
5
"The principal vehicles which have evolved for remedying inadequacy
in prisoner pleadings are the Spears hearing and a questionnaire to `bring into
focus the factual and legal bases of prisoners' claims.'" Eason, 14 F.3d at 9
(quoting Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1985)).
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alleged deliberate indifference. In Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235
(5th Cir. 1989), we held that "[i]f prison officials knowingly put
[a prisoner] on a work detail which they kn[o]w would significantly
aggravate his serious physical ailment such a decision would
constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs," and
thus violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1246; see also Mendoza
v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1993) ("To be sure, if
prison officials assign an inmate to work detail and they know that
such an assignment could exacerbate a serious physical ailment,
then such a decision could constitute deliberate indifference."
(citing Jackson, 864 F.2d at 1246)). In Farmer v. Brennan, ___
U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994), the Supreme
Court clarified the level of culpability that constitutes
"deliberate indifference" as follows:
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the
Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions
of confinement unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;
the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.
Id. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 1979.
The district court held that "Teel does not allege that any
TDCJ-ID employee deliberately caused his injury or the conditions
under which it occurred. No more than negligence can be inferred
from Teel's complaint, and negligent acts by prison employees do
not violate the inmates' constitutional rights." Although the
district court incorrectly implied that Teel was required to allege
that prison authorities had intentionally caused his injury, the
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court correctly held that allegations of more than negligence are
required. See Farmer, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 1978 ("While
. . . deliberate indifference entails something more than mere
negligence, the cases are also clear that it is satisfied by
something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of
causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.").
However, Teel's complaint, construed liberally,6 does contain
allegations of more than negligence. According to Teel, the supply
officer forced him to carry heavy loads notwithstanding the fact
that the officer "was informed that such work detail would
aggravate [Teel's] medical condition." Teel's allegations, while
less than clear, could be read to allege that the officer was aware
of a substantial risk that Teel might be seriously harmed by
lifting heavy boxes. We therefore cannot say that Teel's claim is
"premised on an `indisputably meritless legal theory,'" Boyd, 31
F.3d at 281 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. at 1833),
in light of the Farmer standard for deliberate indifference and our
holding in Jackson, 864 F.2d at 1246.
In addition, because none of the questions posed by the
district court in its questionnaire asked for information
concerning the supply officer's statements and conduct or his
knowledge of Teel's condition, Teel has not had an opportunity to
clarify his allegations with respect to the supply officer's state
6
We must construe the allegations of pro se plaintiffs liberally.
Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994).
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of mind.7 Consequently, we hold that the district court abused its
discretion in dismissing Teel's first claim with prejudice without
first providing him an opportunity to more specifically state his
allegations. See Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 10 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that district court abused its discretion in dismissing in
forma pauperis complaint without providing plaintiff with
opportunity to offer more detailed factual allegations); see also
Mitchell v. Sheriff Dept., Lubbock County, Tex., 995 F.2d 60, 62-63
(5th Cir. 1993) (vacating and remanding district court's § 1915(d)
dismissal of in forma pauperis complaint because plaintiff's
allegations were unclear).8
B
In Teel's second claim, he contended that the prison
authorities had violated the Eighth Amendment by denying him proper
medical care. To state an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of
medical care, a prisoner must allege "acts or omissions
7
In Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 220, 130 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1994), we noted
that when a court provides a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis with an
opportunity to amend his complaint by answering a questionnaire, this opportunity
"limits our license to engage in speculation as to the existence of additional
facts." Id. at 97. However, the questionnaire in Macias contained questions
that "were specifically tailored to elicit relevant facts that might support [the
plaintiff's] claims." Id. The questionnaire in this case, in contrast, did not
elicit relevant facts regarding the work detail incident and the prison
authorities' role in causing Teel's injury. See supra note 2.
8
On appeal, Teel has told a far more complete story regarding the
incident, and we express no opinion as to whether those allegations are
sufficient under Farmer. If Teel amends his complaint to include the allegations
he has made on appeal, the district court should consider them in light of Farmer
and our decision in Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming
district court's § 1915(d) dismissal of in forma pauperis complaint in which
plaintiff alleged that he had been forced to work even though he informed prison
officer supervising him that he was unable for medical reasons to perform the
assigned work).
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sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct.
285, 292, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). Negligent diagnosis or
treatment does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 105-06, 97 S. Ct. at
292; Graves, 1 F.3d at 319 ("It is firmly established that
negligent or mistaken medical treatment or judgment does not
implicate the eighth amendment and does not provide the basis for
a civil rights action."); Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321
(5th Cir. 1991) ("Unsuccessful medical treatment does not give rise
to a § 1983 cause of action. Nor does `[m]ere negligence, neglect
or medical malpractice.'" (citations omitted) (quoting Fielder v.
Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1979))).
In his complaint, Teel alleged that he had not received "any
medical treatment" for his shoulder injury, but in his answers to
the district court's questionnaire, he acknowledged that he has
been seen by prison medical personnel "well over 27 different
times" since his injury, and that he has received pain medication
and heat treatments for his neck injury.9 Nevertheless, Teel
complains that he has not received "proper" medical treatment.
Because Teel alleges at most medical malpractice, and not
deliberate indifference, we hold that the district court did not
abuse its discretion is dismissing his second claim. See Estelle,
429 U.S. at 107, 97 S. Ct. at 292-93 (holding that plaintiff, who
9
In his brief on appeal, Teel states that he has also been seen at
John Sealy Hospital "8 to 10 times in that past 16 months."
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had received pain medication, muscle relaxers, and bed rest, had
failed to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim by alleging
that "more should have been done by way of diagnosis and
treatment"); Graves, 1 F.3d at 319-20 (affirming § 1915(d)
dismissal of complaints alleging inadequate medical treatment);
Mendoza, 989 F.2d at 193-95 (affirming § 1915(d) dismissal of
complaint alleging negligently deficient and delayed medical care);
Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming
§ 1915(d) dismissal of in forma pauperis complaint and holding that
plaintiff's "disagreement with his diagnosis" could not support
Eighth Amendment claim).
III
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM in part, VACATE in part,
and REMAND.
ROBERT M. PARKER, concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion vacating
the district court's order and remanding Appellant Teel's claim
that his work assignment aggravated his preexisting neck
conditions. However that conduct of the defendant's officer can be
characterized, it is far from being deliberately indifferent.
I concur with the majority's disposition of the remaining
claim.
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