NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 28 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MBENG LUTHER MBANWEI, No. 18-72057
Petitioner, Agency No. A209-869-582
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 26, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER, McKEOWN, and M. MURPHY,*** Circuit Judges.
Mbeng Mbanwei seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
decision dismissing his appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy, United States Circuit Judge for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). “When, like here, the
BIA issues its own decision but adopts particular parts of the IJ’s reasoning,” Iman
v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020), we review “the reasons explicitly
identified by the BIA” and “the reasoning articulated in the IJ’s oral decision in
support of those reasons,” Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted). We deny the petition for review.
Because his opening brief does not respond to the agency’s specific findings
at all, Mbanwei—who is proceeding with counsel—has waived the arguments
undergirding his challenge to those findings. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1152,
1157 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Issues not raised in an appellant’s opening brief are
typically deemed waived.”); Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“We review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s
opening brief. We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare
assertion does not preserve a claim . . . .” (internal citation omitted)).
The IJ found Mbanwei to be credible but determined that he had failed to
demonstrate the requisite level of “persecution” or show that his experiences
occurred on account of one of the statutorily protected grounds. The BIA adopted
the IJ’s findings and dismissed Mbanwei’s appeal on the ground that he failed to
meet the requisite level of “persecution.” See Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148,
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1153–54 (9th Cir. 2005). Mbanwei’s only “argument” with respect to the
persecution is just a few conclusory sentences long and entirely fails to address the
IJ’s specific findings that the police actions Mbanwei described “do not rise to the
level of ‘extreme’ treatment necessary for a finding of persecution,” or that “the
record does not indicate that [Mbanwei] would be singled out for persecution upon
returning to Cameroon, or that there is a pattern of persecution practice towards those
similarly-situated to him, i.e., politically active teachers in the northwest region of
Cameroon.” Mbanwei’s bare assertions to the contrary are insufficient to trigger our
consideration of the issues. See Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 993, 997 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“Issues raised in a brief that are not supported by argument are deemed
abandoned.” (internal citation omitted)).
In addition, Mbanwei unambiguously waived any challenge to the denial of
withholding or CAT protection by failing to make any argument at all with respect
to these denials.
PETITION DENIED.
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