Yancey, in an action of trespass for breaking his close an¿ house, and beating and wounding his slave, so that s'le was Ponfi°ed and useless for many months, recover-against Downer a verdict and judgment for five hundred and fifty dollars, from which Downer appealed anc^ eidere(l into an appeal bond, but never prosecuted the appeal, and afterwards filed this bill with injunction, praying the chancellor to grant him a new trial. ^ie cHancellor decreed a new trial, and to reverse that decree, Yancey has prosecuted this writ of error,
The grounds of equity set up by Downer, are, that at the time of the trial he was necessarily absent in Virg>n*a on indispensable business, from whence he expected to return before trial, but was unavoidably detained; that as a measure of precaution, he employed an agent afrenci to the suit, who caused all the proper witnesses to be subpoenaed, and he and the witnesses attended on the day on which the cause was set for trial, and
In an amended bill he states, that the son and agent of Yancey, who conducted the cause for him, had siderable conversation with the jurors or some of them, after their retirement, and before they agreed on their verdict, of which neither he nor his agent was apprised, until long since the transaction took place.
Yancey, in his answer, denies, any unfairness on his part, and alleges that when the cause was reached, the counsel of Downer urged trial, and his own counsel proposed a continuance, or to lay it over until the witnesses appeared, as none of them were present, ayxl thus Downer’s counsel hoped to compel a non-suit; that against the wishes of his counsel, a jury was empannelled, and some of his witnesses then appeared, and the cause progressed without some of his witnesses, and the most important witness he had. He denies the possibility of mitigating the damages, and any knoledge of communications to the jury from- his son, and pleads and relies on the proceeding at law, and the failure to apply for a new trial to a court of law, as a bar to relief.
We could not sustain the decree of the court below, if the merits of the cause were in its favor. It directly sets aside the judgment at law, and awards a new trial totidem verbis. We cannot concede to the chancellor the power of setting aside and altering the records of a court of law. If the powers of a chancellor were sep^
But we do not rest on this point only in reversing this decree; for, on the merits, it cannot be sustained. Indeed, if the fact of improper communication with the jury be excepted, the face of the complaint’s bill cannot authorise the interposition of the chancellor. The trial of torts belong not to the chancellor, and he but seldom ought to interfere with the proceedings at law in such cases. Where, by fraud or any artful contrivance of one party, or by unavoidable accident, a valid defence is kept out of sight, the chancellor may interpose. But it is not sufficient for a party applying to a court of equity for a new trial, to exhibit good grounds; he must also show, that it was out of his power, owing to some substantial cause, to make the application to the court of law in due time. Besides, it ought clearly to appear, that injustice had been done. Here the party has not shown it probable, that a different result would be produced on a second trial, even if the testimony of the witness, who alone appears to have been with him1 when he committed the trespass, and on whom he chiefly relies, be taken as conclusive. It does appear, that both his agent and counsel, had it in their power to apply for a new trial, and conversed upon it; that they were possessed of every fact in the bill, the communication with the jury excepted, then as well as now; and'that they declined it, and took another course.— By their decision, he must be bound so far as the rights of his adversary are concerned. As to his absence, he could and did act by agent; and as to the conclusion that the case would not be tried, as this was not induced by his adversary, the result of it must fall upon him; for it would be going far, to say, that the organs of the law should be bound to retry every case where parties had
As to the improper communications from the son and agent of the plaintiff in error, the proof amounts simply to this: At the place of trial there was no courthouse, and the jury deliberated out of doors, and not having agreed until evening, they retired to a room prepared for them. One of the jurors, on passing the son of the plaintiff in the street, told him that his father’s nearest neighbors on the jury, were the hardest against him, or were for the lowest damages, to which the son made no reply. Another juror coining shortly afterwards, spoke to the son in nearly the same words with the first, to which the son replied, that the first juror, (naming him,) had told him all about it, or that he had heard as much from the first juror, and here the conversation ended. It cannot be pretended, that this ought to vitiate the verdict. The impropriety was all on the part of the jurors, and however imprudently they may have acted in such communications, or subjected themselves to punishment, there is no pretext for attributing any impropriety to the son of the plaintiff.
He made no other reply than to intimate to the second juror, when troubled with such repeated addresses, that he wished to hear no more. Improprieties in jurors, will frequently subject them to punishment and not affect their verdict.
The decree must, therefore, be reversed with costs, and the cause be remanded, with directions there to dissolve the injunctions with damages, and dismiss the bill with costs.