UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4640
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANGELO GALLOWAY, a/k/a Gelo,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Mark S. Davis, District
Judge. (2:10-cr-00096-MSD-TEM-2)
Submitted: March 29, 2012 Decided: April 17, 2012
Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven P. Hanna, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H.
MacBride, United States Attorney, Laura M. Everhart, Assistant
United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Angelo Galloway appeals his conviction following a
guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (2006). On appeal, Galloway argues that the
district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea based on his counsel’s alleged conflict of interest.
We affirm.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. United States v.
Dyess, 478 F.3d 224, 237 (4th Cir. 2007). “A defendant has no
absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea . . . .” United
States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 413 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The district court may exercise its
discretion to grant a motion to withdraw a plea if the
defendant’s request is supported by “a fair and just reason” for
doing so. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B).
To determine whether the defendant has demonstrated
such a reason, the district court must consider:
(1) whether the defendant has offered credible
evidence that his plea was not knowing or not
voluntary, (2) whether the defendant has credibly
asserted his legal innocence, (3) whether there has
been a delay between the entering of the plea and the
filing of the motion, (4) whether defendant has had
close assistance of competent counsel, (5) whether
withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government, and
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(6) whether it will inconvenience the court and waste
judicial resources.
United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991).
“[A]n appropriately conducted Rule 11 proceeding . . . raise[s]
a strong presumption that the plea is final and binding.”
United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en
banc).
Galloway asserts that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea
without first conducting a hearing to determine, under Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), whether trial counsel labored
under a conflict of interest and whether such a conflict
affected his representation of Galloway. Contrary to Galloway’s
assertion, however, the district court held a lengthy hearing in
which it conducted this very inquiry. The district court
specifically concluded that no conflict of interest existed and
that counsel had competently and zealously represented Galloway.
Further, the court analyzed each of the Moore factors, finding
that these factors weighed against granting Galloway’s motion.
Based on these findings, which Galloway does not
challenge and which are amply supported by the record, * we
*
Our review of the supplemental record on appeal provides
no basis for altering our prior conclusion that Galloway
knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty during the court’s
thorough plea colloquy. See United States v. Galloway, No.
(Continued)
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conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that Galloway failed to demonstrate “an actual conflict
of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance,”
Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348, or in denying Galloway’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea on this basis. See Lambey, 974 F.2d at
1394 (presumption of finality); Moore, 931 F.2d at 248
(six-factor test).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We deny Galloway’s motion to expedite. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
11-4640 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 2011) (unpublished order); Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th
Cir. 1991) (addressing knowing and voluntary plea).
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