Respondent father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights as to his minor son, D.M., born 19 August 1999. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the order of the trial court.
On 11 June 2001, the Mecklenburg County Youth and Family Services, a division of the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed a petition alleging that D.M. was a neglected and dependent juvenile in that he lived in an environment injurious to his health, did not receive proper care or supervision, and did not receive proper medical care. In the petition, DSS alleged that a history of domestic violence existed between respondent and D.M.'s mother, and that both respondent and the child's mother had violated protective orders put in place to protect the mother and her children, including D.M. DSS took custody of D.M. by non-secure custody order and placed him with his maternal grandmother.
On 28 August 2001, nunc pro tunc 23 July 2001, D.M. was adjudicated a neglected and dependent juvenile as to his mother. The case was continued as to respondent to allow for paternity testing. On 31 July 2001, respondent entered into a case plan with DSS, in which he agreed to participate in a domestic violence program entitled "New Options *670for Violent Actions" ("NOVA"), and follow all recommendations in order to "learn about the effects of domestic violence" on his child and the child's mother. On 7 March 2002, nunc pro tunc 28 February 2002, D.M. was adjudicated neglected and dependent as to respondent.
On 25 July 2002, DSS filed a petition to terminate respondent's parental rights. As grounds for termination, the petition alleged: (1) D.M. had been in the custody of DSS for more than six months and respondent had willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of child care; and (2) respondent had willfully left D.M. in foster care for more than twelve months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress had been made towards correcting those conditions which led to D.M.'s removal. Accordingly, DSS argued that it was in the best interests of the child that respondent's parental rights be terminated.
On 31 July 2003 and 25 September 2003, hearings were held on the petition to terminate respondent's parental rights, during which DSS offered evidence tending to show the following: Kathy Broome, case management supervisor for the Mecklenburg County NOVA program, testified that respondent had been enrolled in the NOVA program on three separate occasions, but had been terminated from the program each time. According to Ms. Broome, the NOVA program required respondent to "attend [a] group [session] once a week for two hours, take responsibility for his domestic violence behaviors, and not violate any of the program rules." Ms. Broome testified respondent began his most recent enrollment in the program on 9 March 2002, but was sent home during the following session because "he was so angry and defensive and unwilling to listen." During the 23 March 2002 session, respondent was again asked to leave after he brought a tape recorder to the group and attempted to secretly record the session in violation of NOVA rules. Respondent was subsequently terminated from the program. During his enrollment at NOVA, Ms. Broome stated respondent "severely minimized his part in [incidents of domestic violence]." Ms. Broome testified respondent
refuses to accept any kind of feedback. He is not taking full responsibility for his behaviors. That was the first problem. And then he's not willing to accept any feedback or any ways that he can make changes in his life. He's not interested in making changes from what I can see. He's more interested in finding other people to blame for his situation.
Ms. Broome classified respondent as being "at high risk to re-offend."
Respondent testified that following his latest termination from the NOVA program, he sought private counseling with Mr. Larry Shullman. Respondent stated he attended six counseling sessions with Mr. Shullman, during which he discussed "the trouble I was having in our home . . . . the trouble with temper. Try to walk away from people who keep on starting trouble. There was a lot of stuff I talked to him about. You know, about my job situation, you know, other things." Mr. Shullman did not testify.
Belinda McLaughlin, a social worker with DSS, testified she spoke with Mr. Shullman and was only able to verify that respondent attended four counseling sessions with him. Ms. McLaughlin stated this time was insufficient to properly address respondent's issues of domestic violence. Respondent offered no other evidence of his compliance with the DSS case plan.
Following presentation of the evidence, the trial court concluded that respondent had willfully left D.M. in foster care for more than twelve months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress had been made towards correcting those conditions which led to his removal. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that it was in the best interests of the juvenile that respondent's parental rights be terminated. Respondent appeals.
Respondent argues the trial court erred by granting the petition to terminate his parental rights because the allegations were not proven by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. Respondent contends the trial court ignored positive evidence regarding his attempts to correct those conditions *671which led to his child's removal. Respondent cites evidence that he completed parenting classes, sought private counseling, obtained employment, and enjoyed visitation with his son. Respondent concedes that he did not complete classes with NOVA, but contends he was treated unfairly. After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of the parties, we affirm the order of termination.
Section 7B-1111 of the North Carolina General Statutes sets out the statutory grounds for terminating parental rights. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1111 (2003). A finding of any one of the separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to support a termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C.App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990). "[T]he party petitioning for the termination must show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds authorizing the termination of parental rights exist." In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997).
In the case sub judice, the trial court concluded that respondent had willfully left D.M. in foster care for more than twelve months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress had been made towards correcting those conditions which led to the child's removal. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2003). The evidence in the record supports the trial court's findings and conclusion. Respondent had a history of engaging in domestic violence with the child's mother which led to the child's removal. Due to the issue of domestic violence, respondent agreed to complete an assessment with NOVA, to learn about the effects of domestic violence on his child, and follow all recommendations. Domestic violence counseling was the focal point of his case plan, and respondent's participation in NOVA was the key to successfully completing the case plan. Respondent, however, did not complete the NOVA program. Although respondent claims to have sought private counseling with Larry Shullman, there was no evidence in the record from Mr. Shullman regarding the substance of the counseling or treatment. Indeed, it is unclear from the record that domestic violence was even the central focus of the limited counseling respondent attended with Mr. Shullman. Respondent testified he spoke with Mr. Shullman about various topics, including employment issues. Thus, we conclude there was clear, cogent and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings and conclusion that respondent had failed to make reasonable progress towards correcting the conditions that led to D.M.'s removal. Accordingly, the order terminating respondent's parental rights is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judge LEVINSON concurs.
Judge TYSON dissents.