I respectfully disagree with the holding of the majority. The respondent's failure to appeal the 15 March 2004 adjudication and disposition order bars her challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction to enter the 16 June 2004 custody review order at issue. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the custody review order.
*530The majority holds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order of adjudication and disposition, on the grounds that the original petition alleging neglect did not contain a verified signature of an authorized representative of Wilkes County DSS. However, respondent did not appeal the adjudication and disposition order placing custody of T.R.P. with Wilkes County DSS. Rather, she appeals only the review order entered several months after the adjudication, which ordered that, when T.R.P.'s father met certain conditions, the child would be placed in his custody within a few months. Respondent thus attempts to raise the issue of the court's jurisdiction over the original adjudication proceeding for the first time on appeal, not from the adjudication and disposition order, but from a later order entered on custody after a proper hearing.
Respondent does not question the trial court's general jurisdiction over custody review or its authority to review dispositional orders. Her only ground for challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction is that the petition in the earlier adjudication lacked a necessary signature. A similar issue was addressed by this Court in Sloop v. Friberg, 70 N.C.App. 690, 320 S.E.2d 921 (1984). In Sloop, the defendant challenged the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction over a custody determination only after the court had entered various custody orders over a period of years. This Court held:
[Defendant] first challenges the district court's exercise, beginning in 1980, of subject matter jurisdiction[.] . . . It is true that the question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point in the proceeding, and that such jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, estoppel or consent. . . . However, the district courts of this State do undoubtedly possess general subject matter jurisdiction over child custody disputes. . . . The real question under the Act is whether such jurisdiction is properly exercised according to the statutory requirements in this particular case. . . . The court's 1980 findings relative to the jurisdictional prerequisites . . . appear sufficient on their face to justify exercising jurisdiction. [Defendant] does not, on this appeal, point to any substantive deficiencies therein. He chose to withdraw his appeal in 1980 and to acquiesce in the judgment for several years. Accordingly, we hold that he has failed to preserve his objection and the assignment is without merit.
Sloop, 70 N.C.App. at 692-93, 320 S.E.2d at 923. See also, Ward v. Ward, 116 N.C.App. 643, 645, 448 S.E.2d 862, 863 (1994) ("Plaintiff's sole contention on appeal is that [the trial court] lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the [orders] . . . plaintiff has waived his right to challenge the validity of both orders on the grounds asserted, because he could have presented the same challenges in his initial appeals which were dismissed"). Thus:
An absolute want of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be taken advantage of at any stage of the proceedings[, but] . . . "objection to jurisdiction based on any ground other than lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter, such as . . . irregularity in the method by which jurisdiction of the particular case was obtained, is usually waived by failure to raise the objection at the first opportunity, or in due or seasonable time, or within the time prescribed by statute." 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 110.
Pulley v. Pulley, 255 N.C. 423, 429, 121 S.E.2d 876, 880 (1961).
I would apply the reasoning of the cases discussed above in resolving this issue. Here, respondent (1) does not challenge the court's general jurisdiction over custody review or allege jurisdictional infirmities specifically associated with the custody review proceedings and/or the resulting order, and (2) did not appeal the earlier adjudication and disposition order. She cannot, therefore, bring a belated challenge to the court's jurisdiction to enter the earlier order on abuse, neglect or dependency by attacking the present order on appeal. This collateral attack on the authority of the court to act cannot be sustained.1
*531The majority opinion relies upon appellate authorities concerning jurisdiction that are inapposite to the current appeal. While the black-letter law concepts contained in these cases cannot be seriously questioned, it is significant that all of them involve jurisdictional deficiencies in proceedings and orders that were the subject of a direct appeal. My research has not revealed any authority that supports the majority's application of the law concerning subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, the majority holding does not comport with concepts concerning judicial finality, and leaves the trial court and this child in a legal quagmire: while the order on appeal is vacated, the majority must necessarily leave the 15 March 2004 order on adjudication and disposition intact; indeed, that order is not before this Court and we are without authority to disturb it. In my view, even if the review order on appeal is reversed on some valid grounds, the earlier adjudication and disposition order unambiguously continues the child within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. One can only wonder what the trial court is now to do, given the fact that there is a child within its jurisdiction who still needs its assistance and protection. Presumably, under the holding of the majority, the trial court is presently without the authority to do anything. But, according to the undisturbed adjudication and disposition order, the juvenile court is statutorily obligated to enter appropriate orders consistent with the ongoing needs of the child.
Absent relief from our Supreme Court, county social services entities that have supervisory responsibilities for children within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court might wish to reexamine the petition(s) which triggered their courts' jurisdiction. Indeed, children who have been in foster care for many years may need to be returned to their parents unless new petitions and associated nonsecure custody orders are issued. Like respondent-mother in the present case who did not take an appeal until she became dissatisfied with the court's decision to place the child with father, the majority holding allows interested persons in juvenile proceedings to acquiesce in the actions of the juvenile court until they become dissatisfied with the same-and then attempt to undo what they could and should have done by taking a direct appeal months and years earlier. This is, in my view, the inevitable result of the majority's misapplication of the phrase, "jurisdiction . . . can be raised at any time."
I would reject not only respondent's argument that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the custody review order on appeal, but also the remaining arguments she sets forth in her brief. The order on appeal should therefore be affirmed in all respects.
DSS also argues, in the alternative, that the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction also arises from its obligation to hold a review hearing because T.R.P. was removed from the parent's care. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-906(a) (2003) ("In any case where custody is removed from a parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker the court shall conduct a review hearing within 90 days from the date of the disposition hearing and shall conduct a review hearing within six months thereafter."). The majority has not addressed this argument. I have not addressed this argument because I would conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction for the reasons discussed in this dissenting opinion.